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ABSTRACT 
RECONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL: 
A STUDY ON CONTEMPORARY ALEVI POLITICS 
FROM A GENERATIYE STRUCTURALIST PERSPECTIVE 
by 
EmrahGÖKER 
M.A., Department ofPolitical Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Dr. Tahire E. ERMAN 
Jun&_1999 
The thesis, fırstly, introduces and engages in a critica! relationship with the 
sociological theory (namely, generative structuralism) of Pierre Bourdieu, 
retbinking his understanding of politics as a "field". For this purpose, the theory 
of ageney within the paradigm of generative structuralism is questioned and 
supplementary views are offered, emphasizing the no tion of "class embodiment". 
The central aim of this critica! engagement is to use the Bourdieusian "toolbox" 
for the sociological study of social movements. 
Secondly, building on the strengths of Bourdieu's theory of field analysis, and on 
the suggestions for the "treatment" of the theory' s weaknesses, the thesis focuses 
on contemporary Alevi politics as a case. Making use of an intensive literature 
research, the inner dynamics, agent-structure relationships and the limits (in terms 
of both potentials and constraints) of contemporary Alevism as a social mavement 
is investigated. 
In conclusion, the thesis makes a brief discussion, inspired by the M.A. 
candidate' s own political dispositions, of the possibility of transformatİ ve, 
resİstant political action within Alevism. In the same chapter, there also is a crude 
proposal for a future research agenda for the study of social movements using 
generative structuralism. 
Keywords: Pierre Bourdieu, generative structuralism, political field, Alevism, 
Alevi politics, social movements 
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ÖZET 
SİY ASİ OLANIN YENİDEN iNŞASI: 
DOGURGAN Y APISALCILIGIN BAKlŞ AÇlSINDAN GÜNÜMÜZ ALEVi 
SİY ASETİ ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA 
hazırlayan 
EmrahGÖKER 
M.A, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Tahire E. ERMAN 
Haziran 1999 
Bu tez, ilk olarak, Pierre Bourdieu'nün sosyolojikuramını (doğurgan yapısalcılık) 
tanıtınakta ve onun siyaseti bir "alan" olarak yorumlamasını yeniden 
değerlendirerek kurarola eleştirel bir ilişki kurınaktadır. Bu amaçla, doğurgan 
yapısalcılık paradigınası içindeki faillik kuraını sorgulanınakta ve "sınıfın 
bedenselleştirilınesi" kavramı vurgulanarak tamamlayıcı görüşler sunulmaktadır. 
Bu eleştirel ilişkinin temel amacı Bourdieugil "alet kutusu"nu toplumsal 
hareketler sosyolojisinde kullanmaktır. 
İkinci olarak da tez, Bourdieu'nün alan çözümlemesi kuraınının güçlü yanlarından 
ve zayıf yanlarının giderilmesi için yapılan önerilerden yararlanarak günümüz 
Alevi siyaseti üzerine odaklanınaktadır. Ayrıntılı bir literatür taraması üzerinden 
bir toplumsal hareket olarak günümüz Aleviliğinin iç dinamikleri, failiik-yapı 
ilişkileri ve sınırları (hem potansiyeller hem de kısıtlılıklar açısından) 
araştırılınaktadır. 
Sonuç bölümünde, derece adayının kendi siyasi yatkınlıklarından da yola çıkarak, 
Alevilik içindeki dönüşümcü, direnişçi siyasi eylemin olanaklılığı üzerine kısa bir 
tartışma yapılmaktadır. Aynı sonuç bölümünde, doğurgan yapısalcılık üzerinden 
toplumsal hareketlerin çalışılması için gelecekte oluşturulacak, kaba bir araştırma 
gündemi taslağı bulunmaktadır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Pierre Bourdieu, doğurgan yapısalcılık, siyaset alanı, Alevilik, 
Alevi siyaseti, toplumsal hareketler 
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C HAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
I begin by exposing the spectre that will haunt this study: A desire of "making 
hope practical, rather than despair convincing". This short phrase from Raymond 
Williams' Toward 2000 means a lot for the theoretical trajectory of this study. I 
am go ing to try to legitimize my engagement with Pierre Bourdieu' s social theory 
below in detail, but before that, it should be clarified that this study is primarily a 
theoretical one, where, by trying to rebuild co ncepts like "resistance", I try to 
construct a sound theoretical background which will not only aid me in studying 
Alevism -in this thesis- but also help me outline a research agenda -for field 
study- for the future. 
Therefore, the task at hand, concerning "ho pe to be made practical", 
requires the insertion of the social scientist typing these words in to the text itself. 
Given that (at least theoretically) a master's thesis is not supposed to be an 
assembly-line product where creativity is killed in the name of duties and 
regulations, I feel that I have to be existent ( along with my emotions, my 
subjective experiences on the way, my failures, along with my conscious faults 
and hesitant steps forward) in this piece of academic labor as the author of it. Ina 
way, the study of politics, body, social theory and social movements in Turkey 
here is (the beginning of) my own "story" asa candidate for the academic world. 
ı 
Furthermore, while engaging here in a practice of abstraction and theorizing, I 
prefer to see myself among the "crowd" stoning the ancient Ivory Tower of 
scientific indifference and impartiality; I heartily believe that the role of the social 
scientist (even in an era where both the "social", via thinkers like Jean 
Baudrillard, and the "scientist", via thinkers like Paul Feyerabend, are extremely 
problematized) in the new millenium is far from being obsolete (in the coming 
pages, I will deal with the question of "doing social science" in more detail). In 
summary, with its pluses and minuses, a fundamental strategy that I am going to 
try to inscribe into the text is self-reflexivity as defined by Bourdieu (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992: 40): 
[Reflexivity] entails... the systematic exploration of the "unthought 
categories of thought which delimit the thinkable and predetermine the 
thought", as well as guide the practical carrying out of social inquiry. The 
"return" it calls for extends beyond the experiencing subject to encompass 
the organizational and cognitive structure of the discipline. What has to be 
constantly scrutinized and neutralized, in the very act of construction of the 
object, is the collective scientific unconscious embedded in theories, 
problems, and (especially national) categories of scholarly judgment. 
Thus, in exposing the contradictions in Pierre Bourdieu' s theory, in arguing for a 
reconstruction of the theory, in reflecting on the nature of Alevi politics today, 
and in proposing a sociology of agency, I will try to draw attention to the inherent 
objectification practices and to expose the "order" being maintained in social 
discourses and in discourses on social discourses. That way, I am looking forward 
to accomplishing a more flexible, alternative "ordering" with respect to 
understanding the politics of new social movements. Bourdieu (1983: 4-5) 
reminds us that while philosophy asks about thinking, it never questions its own 
"necessary social conditions": A philosophically inspired theory of the social, too, 
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should be ab le to objectify its own conditions of production, and Bourdieu' s own 
theory (and of course my own academic practice here) is vulnerable to such an 
interrogation. Whatever the study focuses on, politics, religion, ethnicity, or even 
on the very conceptual toolbox used to study these topics, an awareness of the 
practice of objectification is necessary. 
1.1 IN DEFENSE OF SOCIAL THEORV AFTER THE 
CR ISI S 
"Social theorists today", Alvin W. Gouldner (1970: vii) w as writing just after '68 
uprisings, ''work within a crumbling social matrix of paralyzed urban centers and 
battered campuses. Some may put cotton in their ears, but their bodies stili feel the 
shock waves. It is no exaggeration to say that we theorize today within the sounds 
of guns. The old order has the picks of a hundred rebellions thrust into its hide." 
After 30 years of rocking and rolling in social theory -although Westem 
campuses are for long havens of peace and obeyance- rebels against the 
"establishment" never buried their picks. 
There sure isa erisis in social theory today. In the Westem lands, home to 
almost all production of social thought and philosophy, the tides have turned 
against traditional academism: the current "spasms" suffered by social theory, 
fighting arena for numerous "heresies" (in fact, orthodoxies began to disappear), 
will either bring death to the patient, or something "new" will be bom. Today, 
established "centers" have been decentered, almost all types of taken-for-granteds 
are problematized, "grand" thinking is renounced, the gods of Reason and Truth 
have been denied. Debates on modemity 1 modemism and postmodemity 1 
postmodemism now fill a smail library. Here, I will not go into an unnecessary 
3 Bllkt:.:.- " ·-·. ~•ıoı\J 
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trouble to reflect on this vast literature extending to topics like art, literature, 
ethics, and so on, but confine myself with a number of views on the relationship 
between social science and "postmodernism". In engaging briefly with these 
specific debates, I am aiming to justify my own position which will be prominent 
in the whole of the study, with respect to the relevance of social theory in the 21st 
century. 
The extremist opponents of the "old ways" of social theorizing reject 
general, "grand" theories and favor local narratives which come in a broad 
variety, and without any claims to truth and to knowing; in talk:ing about the 
social, their narrative orderings are anti-foundational (Vattimo, 1988). Modern 
social theory, in close relation with power struggles, assumed that it represented 
social "reality", that it produced a reliable, correct knowledge of it, and thus it 
contributed to the infinite replication process of hyperreality (Baudrillard, 1983): 
The world social theory hopelessly tries to explain is a world where the 
represented, the signifier and signified, fıxed identities, predictable trends, change, 
and so on are all simulation, where the "original" or the "really real" disappears, 
where the residue of the replicated remains. According to Jean Baudrillard (1984: 
24) the postmodern is "characteristic of a universe where there are no more 
definitions possible ... lt has all been done. The extreme limit of these possibilities 
has been reached. lt has destroyed itself. lt has deconstructed its entire universe. 
So all that are left are pieces. All that remains to be done is to play with the pieces. 
Playing with the pieces- that is postmodern" (emphasis mine). 
In a similar vein, Jean-Francois Lyotard "polemicizes against the demand 
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for unity and coherence in theoretical discourse, arguing that such a battle is 'a 
battle for reason, for unity, for the unification of diversities, a quibbling battle 
which no one can win for the winner is already and has always been reason' 
[Lyotard, 1984a: ll] ... Criticizing and negating, he suggests, is infinite and 
useless, never coming to an end" (Best and Kellner, 1991: 153). 
In his famous The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984b: 
74-75), rejecting modem, foundationalist metanarratives, Lyotard states that 
postmodem knowledge aims for heterogeneity, multiplicity and in contrast to 
modern knowledge, may be used to construct local narratives that account for and 
recognize differences. In being against offering "prescriptions" for the salvation of 
all, against theorizing universalities, Richard Rorty allies with him. In his 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), we encounter the same aggression 
against foundational philosophy. He too holds that there is no "ultimate truth" to 
be had. Rejecting the correcting, normalizing, ordering attitudes of modern 
philosophy in the disguise of liberation, his version of philosophical thinking 
promotes abnormal discourse (Rorty, 1979: 320): 
Normal discourse is that which is conducted within an agreed-upon set of 
conventions about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as 
answering a question, what counts as knowing a good argument for that 
answer or a good criticism of it. Abnormal discourse is what happens when 
someone joins in the discourse who is ignorant of these conventions or who 
sets them aside. 
Thus, an alınormal discourse would define what is "true" pragmatically as "good 
in the way of belief'. This label, Christopher Norris (1990: 167) notes, is "a label 
of convenience attached to those ideas that currently enjoy widespread approval, 
or which make good sense in the context of this or that language-game, 
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discipline or cultural 'form of life"'. Our habits of thought, according to Rorty, 
should change; instead of searching for coherence, unity and clarity, we should 
multiply the language-games to create conversational openings (Norris, 1990: 
168). 
There are hundreds of other thinkers, whom I have no place here to cite, 
with similar political and philosophical dispositions, situating themselves in a 
"postmodern" world, of whose "hyper-culture" their views are a part. I have 
shortly passed over the views of the most famous "players" in the postmodern 
front of the intellectual field, in order to reflect on the implications of such ideas 
for my reconstructive project in this study. While I will not directly engage with 
the epistemology and ontology of post-structural (and similar other) philosophies, 1 
it will be clear that I distance myself from the anti-foundationalist, 
deconstructivist versions of social thinking. The reasons for this will be much 
clearer in Chapter 2, where I introduce Pierre Bourdieu's sociology. Below, I go 
on by recalling some of the recent reactions to the postmodern "social scientific" 
project of "playing with the pieces" as Baudrillard put it. These reactions are also 
answers to the question of "social theory after the crisis". 2 
1 This is why I did not introduce in this study concepts like deconstruction, text, intertextuality, 
Cartesian metaphysics, and so on. I will not build my argument on a closely-engaged critique of 
postmodernism. Rather, by stressing on the neglected -by anti-foundationalists- alternatives 
through Bourdieu's generative structuralism and his sociology of body, I am going to attempt to 
reclaim the contemporary practice of social theory rejected by anti-foundationalists. Accusations 
against "postmodernists" like nihilism, skepticism, solipsism, reductionism, and so on, while not 
irrelevant to this study, will not be a central focal point. 
2 My aim is not to propose social theory versus postmodemism. Rather, I am concemed with the 
question: What will become of social theory after the deluge? 
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One leading Polish-British sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman (1987; 1991; 
1992; 1997), agrees with the critique of modemity and modem social theory 
offered by extreme anti-foundationalists like Lyotard and Baudrillard from a 
s imilar yet different (in the end, problematic) perspective. Bauman, in most of his 
writings, criticizes the legislative, order-making, unifying, normalizing, 
standardizing practices, ideologies, institutions of the modem era. Not only 
liberalism, he holds, but also versions of totalitarianism lik:e fascism and 
communism were products ("legitimate children") of modemity (Bauman, 1992: 
xv). 
The new, modem order took off as a desperate search for structure in a 
world suddenly denuded of structure. Utopias that served as beacons for the 
long march to the rule of reason visualized a world without margins, 
leftovers, the unaccounted for - without dissidents and rebels; a world in 
which, as in the world just left behind, everyone will have a job to do and 
everyone will be keen to do the job he has to: the I will and I must will 
merge. The visualized world differed from the lost one by putting 
assignment where blind fate once ruled. The jobs to be done were now 
gleaned from an overall plan, drafted by the spokesmen of reason; in the 
world to come, design preceded order. People were not bom into their 
places: they had to be trained, drilled or goaded into finding the place that 
fitted them and which they fitted. 
Following that, Bauman (1992: 170) celebrates the fall of Communisms as the 
most decisive end of modernity, and the beginning of the triumph of 
postmodemity: 
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Even if communism could hope ( erroneously, as it turned out in the end) to 
out-modemize the modemizers, it has become apparent that it cannot 
seriously contemplate facing the challenge of the postmodem world: the 
world in which consumer choice is simultaneously the essential systemic 
requisite, the main factor of social integration and the channel through 
which individual life-concems are vented and problems resolved - while the 
state, grounding its expectation of discipline in the seduction of consumers 
rather than the indoctrination and oppression of subjects, could (and has to) 
wash its hands of [sic] all matters ideological and thus make conscience a 
private affair. 
Bauman is, in the final analysis, ambiguous about the benefits of 
postmodemity. On the one hand, he celebrates the fragmentation of oppressive 
measures, defeat of Reason, decline of the dietating role of the state, exposal and 
variation of differences and distinctions, and so on. On the other hand, he 
criticizes (but does not radically denounce) the logic of the market and extreme 
consumerism (Bauman, 1997: 13-14 ), and drawing attention to the growing 
poverty and deprivation and the power of free capital in postmodemity, he calls 
for freedom (1997: 199-208). His sociological project is situated within this 
political move: not a postmodem sociology, but a sociology of postmodemity, 
which is against the legislative practices of grand theory, and which aims solely 
interpretation. His sociology attempts to account for the fundamental changes that 
brought the end of modemity and started postmodemity. Bauman does not openly 
oppose extreme "postmodemists", but he stili believes in the relevance of the 
sociological enterprise. Although he holds that for the interpreter relativity is "the 
existential condition of knowledge" (1992: 21) and that "knowledge has no 
extralinguistical standards" (1992: 22), he stili objectifies "postmodemity" as his 
object of study and determines a number of analytical tenets. He denies the 
privileged position of the social scientist and his 1 her "will to knowledge" and 
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ultimately aims to interpret the world in its unstructurable chaos. 
While offering interesting insights and rightfully pointing out the intensified 
inequalities emerging with the changing times, Bauman very quickly celebrates 
the "new" (or, fundamentally different) trends and objectifies the era under the 
ambiguous label "postmodemity". Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (1991; 1997; 
forthcoming), watching closely the emergence of postmodem paradigrns and the 
deepening of the erisis over the years, are skeptic about periodizing our era as 
"postmodemity" (Best and Kellner, 1997: 21): 
Bauman's problem is that he veers between essentializing the postmodem 
and declaring it to be incoherent and without clear identity. Throughout his 
studies, he reduces a complex phenomenon to a monolithic entity as when 
he collapses "postmodemity" into a "postmodern mind" and culture ... But 
in fact there is no "postmodern mind"; rather, there is a complex set of 
postmodem perspectives that sometimes coalesce into distinct paradigms 
and often coexist uneasily with each other and with modem perspectives. 
According to them, the emerging paradigrns with the onset of the erisis do not 
signify a radical break, but a "shift", or "tum"; there are continuities as there are 
discontinuities: "Often what is deseribed as 'postmodern' is an intensification of 
the modem, a development of modem phenomena such as commodification and 
massification to such a degree that they appear to generate a postmodem break ... " 
(Best and Kellner, 1997: 31 ). They are highly critical of those thinkers that stress 
on the "break approach" and reject dialogical academic protocols, ending up with 
skepticism and nihilism. Therefore, while Bauman, according to Best and Kellner, 
has completed his own "postmodern turn" quite successfully, he fails to cover 
"modernity" in its complexity, he does not theorize on its stages. Like he reduces 
"postmodernism" to a homogeneous actor, he comes up with a uniform 
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conception of modernity (Kellner, 1998: 77): 
there is no dialectics of modernity in Bauman that sees the positive gains in 
democratic participation, rights, associations and socio-political 
contestation. Indeed, theories of democracy play a surprisingly small role in 
Bauman's optic ... Moreover, against Bauman, one could argue that the 
ambivalence, solidarity and pluralism that he takes as the marks of the 
postmodern are themselves all modern concepts or ideals, and that Bauman 
is identifying modernity with just one of its (Cartesian and ultra-
Enlightenment) strands, is essentializing and totalizing it, reducing the 
modern mindset to rationalism, to the quest for order and certainty, failing 
to see a variety of different discourses within modernity, different stages of 
modern thought, competing paradigms and a more variegated conceptual 
and intellectual field. 
Best and Kellner (1997) hold that the "turn" implies a "paradigm shift" 
emerging from the current crisis. Although there is yet no consensus on the 
alternative paradigm, there are a number of similar themes and methodologies 
employed positively or negatively by different "post" scholars. The paradigm, 
that is to say, is not yet normalized. They themselves propose, inspired by the 
"shift" and its conceptual contents, yet in a neo-Frankfurtean vein, a critica! social 
theory which is multidimensional and dialectical. The very details of their project 
is beyond my concern, but their point is very well taken (Best and Kellner, 1991: 
260): 
Social theory charts and makes connections between different domains of 
social reality and theorizes the causal power of different forces such as the 
economy, state, sexuality, or discourse in social or everyday individual life. 
Modern social theory contains a tradition that analyzes the big, or macro, 
structures and relations of society; another tradition focuses on 
microelements of everyday life, while there have been recent attempts to 
combine these traditions. We believe in the continuing importance of 
macrotheory and argue that the postmodem assault on macroanalysis 
produces aporia and lacunae in the various postmodem theories. [ emphasis 
mine] 
In this study, I share the two authors' reservations against so me of the 
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postmodern theories and totally agree with them about the ensuing relevance of 
macrotheory which seeks a foundation in microtheory. In fact, the whole attempt I 
make here in engaging with Bourdieu and politics is encouraged by an attempt to 
go beyond -but not to eradicate- classical dichotomies of the social. 
American sociologist Charles Lemert (1995; 1997a; 1997b) is also 
concerned with the condition of social theory after the crisis. While he is not 
engaged in a broad theoretical reconstruction, Lemert (1997a: 26) makes an 
interesting observation on postmodernism: 
Postmodernism is not what you think, that is: Not only is it not what you 
might suppose it is, it is not primarily something one thinks. In fact, one of 
the most crucial ways in which postmodernism is not what many people 
think it is that it is not principally (and certainly not exclusively) a form of 
social thought. True, it has spawned a great deal of important social theory. 
But this fact alone must be interpreted with respect to the more interesting 
question: What does the remarkable appearance of postmodernism in fields 
as seemingiy different from each other as social theory, architecture, and 
popular mu sic say about the world? 
Therefore, different from Best and Kellner, Lemert sees postmodernism asa new 
state of world affairs, the culture (including social theories, seen by Lemert as 
essentially part of the culture) of this age mixed up with modernity. Le mert 
(1997a: 53) states that contemporary social theories are interpretations of the 
experience of our postmodern world, which implies that be they Derridean or neo-
Marxist, all are "postmodern". Then how to situate social sciences? Lemert has an 
idea (Lemert, 1997a: 134): 
ll 
I certainly do not believe that sociology, however it is organized, is of no 
importance; nor that our field is in any way least among the knowledges, 
formal and informal, of the human condition. N or do I mean to suggest that 
we should not take ourselves seriously. Rather, the questions to ask are: 
Se rio us with respect to what? And what is the mode of seriousness proper to 
whatever we consider ourselves to be? These ultimately are questions of o ur 
self-understanding. What people think they are, or ought to be, when 
measured against actual conditions of existence, largely determines how 
they feel about themselves. In short, sociologists may doubt themselves 
because they aspire to be what they may never have been capable of being, 
nor should have been. 
For Lemert it is much more crucial to detect the changes in our unconscious, 
our self-reflections, and also to detect the growing reactionary feelings of 
nostalgia before a world gone mad. I believe that Lemert has a point in stressing 
that like every other thing, social science -not only sociology- is constantly 
shaped and reshaped by the rapid changes, global or local, postmodem or Iate-
modem; even our theories developed to understand these changes cannot remain 
untouched. 
Following that, I think that social scientists, after the erisis (which of course 
cannot be reduced to a battle between "modemists" and "postmodemists"), will 
find it more and more difficult to be identified with a community of professional 
academics possessing inherent privileges (like being "above" and "neutral") with 
respect to other citizens; they will be more aware of the fragility of their 
profession, w orse (better?), ·of the fact that most of their life and w or k concems 
are outside that community. Nevertheless, I am going to try to show that this self-
awareness and this reflexive engagement with the social world makes "grand" 
social theory and the social scientist more, not less, important, especially in 
ethico-political terms. The question which the social scientist who has 
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''unlearned" his 1 her gemeinschaftlich privileges over the "ordinary citizen" 
should ask, according to me, should not be whether an age called "modemity" 
ended and a new one began. Before inventing "postmodemity" as an age of 
promise, the questions we ask have to dig into and account for the "lost worlds" of 
modernity (Lemert, 1997b: 64): 
Behind [postmodemism's] glitter and boasting lie the lost pasts of the 
modem world. Until the past is remembered and spoken about, no world 
will be truly better. Modem, or postmodern, sociologies, whether practical 
or professional, must be able to imagine those lost worlds. Without them 
there is no way to understand the present or face the future. Without those 
lost worlds, well remembered, there is no way to imagine the structures of 
power and inequality that determine the present and frustrate some people's 
futures. 3 
I will finally mention the views of Greek-British sociologist Nicos Mouzelis 
(1995), who, like many other of his contemporaries, aims for a sociological 
reconstruction of macrotheory and comes up with an interrogative question: What 
went wrong in theory? Very generally, his answer to that concems the historical 
attempt of social theorists to properly link the micro and macro levels of analysis. 
According to Mouzelis (1995: 149), after 1960s, the "momentum" of this 
theoretical labor was lost when the energies of good theorists turned towards 
issues of epistemology, linguistics, semiotics or psychoanalysis: 
3 Similarly, my delving into the question of Alevism is generally about looking back at a lost 
world of Alevi religiosity and ancient modes of oppression to reflect on the contemporary political 
situation. Will I be able to get rid of, or, to unlearn, the social scientist inside me who is lost in his 
objectifications? lt remains to be seen. 
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This, fınally, has resulted in a situation where the inherent paradigmatic 
pluralism of sociology has degenerated into anarchy and cacophony, a total 
lack of communication between warring theoretical schools; it has also led 
to a postmodemİst abolition of such fundamental distinctions as micro-
macro, agency-system, representing-represented, ete. In combination with 
the abolition of boundaries between disciplines and subdisciplines, this has 
led to a free-for-all where anything goes, and where the analysis of societies 
by means of various reductive explanations (in terms of ''texts", the 
unconscious, chains of signifiers, desire, ete.) has regressed to pre-
Durkheimian standards. We are faced, in other words, with a situation of 
theoretical dedifferentiation or theoretical primitivism which, instead of 
building on what has already been achieved by the classical sociologists and 
their followers, takes us back to extremely crude, facile and even grotesque 
forms of sociological analysis. 
Against this, Mouzelis tries to unite and reshuffle the grand-theoretical 
approaches of Talcott Parsons, Anthony Giddens, Norbert Elias and Bourdieu. 
Very different from Bauman and Lemert, who also are professional sociologists, 
Mouzelis is openly hostile to almost everything postmodemism represents, and 
reclaims the foundationalist tradition endangered after the crisis. Although, allied 
with Bourdieu, and without engaging in an ontological discussion of the condition 
of the social reality "out there", I share Mouzelis's distinction between 
Generalities II (conceptual framework) and Generalities III (substantive 
generalizations), and his emphasis on the need, before everything, for an 
e la boration of the former, I find his reactions against postmodemists too extreme, 
if not emotional. On the one hand, although he harshly criticizes radical anti-
foundationalism, his theory's main tenets (1995: 153-159) dictate that theory 
should abandon foundational closures (but not holism), essentialism (but should 
not give credit to linguistic approaches), teleology and reification (but should 
retain functionalism). On the other hand, his approach, not recognizing the very 
context it is produced in and rejecting any dialogical relationship with "post" 
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developments, bears the danger to reproduce the traditional closures of modem 
social theory, worse, it may lead the practicing sociologist to fail to recognize his 
or her own reifications in reflecting on Generalities III by using the means of 
Generalities II, that is, producing general statements through the deployınent of a 
certain theoretical toolbox. 
I have thus scanned a number of contemporary reactions to the current 
condition of social theory. Although I am aware that rnany precious views have 
been excluded, I believe that this much is enough to weave myself a relatively 
sturdy web to be spread under this study, which will defend the relevance of a 
(generative) structuralist social theory in accounting for a certain sp here of 
contemporary Turkish politics. There are three further points I wish to clarify: 
1. Although Bourdieu himself is very well aware of the erisis (of both social 
theory in general and sociology in particular), his main problematic concerning 
social theory, unlike the thinkers surveyed above, is not the effects of Iate 
modernization (or postmodemization) on social science. Rather, beginning from 
early 1960s, his elaboration on theory (never apart from his empirical work) 
aimed to go beyond what he called ''the rock-bottom antinomy upon which all the 
divisions of the social scientific field are ultimately founded, namely, the 
opposition between objectivism and subjectivism" (Bourdieu, 1988b: 780). 
However, I interpret my own reconstructive intervention as an answer, from the 
Turkish context, to the erisis I have been talking about. I also wish to see, as I 
mentioned before, the conceptual framework built in this study as a guideline for 
more complex empirical studies to come. 
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2. lt may be wrongly assumed that my introduction of the debates araund 
postmodemism and the erisis of theory are essentially sociological debates aiming 
to exclude other related disciplines, particularly, political science. I deliberately 
chose to bring up the issue via sociologists, because I thought that the problematic 
is much more clearly set by them Furthermore, as one of the moves of this study 
is to try to "open" the political in Bourdieu' s theory, and in retum to bring a 
different sociological insight into political theory (add the fact that I am a 
sociology graduate planning to make careerin the field), sociology may seem to 
be pronounced more. In fact the same debates, in different contexts, are 
reproduced in political theory itself: Feminists stili argue among themselves on 
issues like capitalism-patriarchy, private-public, the relevance of woman as a 
political subject, and so on. Liberals, socialists and conservatives stili disagree 
(eve n among themselves) on foundationalism, regulation, fragmentation, 
micrological or macrological ethics, definitions of freedom, equality or peace ... 
It will be apparent in the coming chapters that questions of agency-structure or 
agency-body cannot be appropriated by any single discipline. And immediately 
following this point, I should mention that the division of intellectual labor among 
social scientific disciplines is not without problems. I believe that Immanuel 
Wallerstein (1997; Wallerstein et. al., 1996) has a point in saying that these 
divisions are mo re political than intellectual. Bourdieu ( 1988b: 778-779) also 
draws attention to the harınful oppositions between disciplines like sociology-
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anthropology, sociology-history, history-anthropology; we can safely include 
political science in any of these misleading oppositions.4 Consequently, I reject 
Mouzelis' (1995: 149-150) proposal to portray a specific logic for sociology in 
order to mark its distinction from other disciplines. 
3. It should also be questioned whether any "crisis" in social theory and 
social science in general is on the agenda of contemporary debates among Turkish 
social scientists. As I tried to survey, these debates are very much Westem in 
character; and in terms of intensity, variety, intellectual richness and distribution 
of academic power, their "history" is certainly more established compared to 
Turkish debates. Nevertheless, given the growing interest for postmodern, post-
structuralist and post-colonial approaches in the universities and respectable 
joumals of Turkey after the mid-1 980s, w e may talk about a deepening clash 
between the strong positivist legacy (prominent in all liberal, conservative and 
Marxİst academic traditions) and the new generatian of scholars, much more 
critica! of the "Establishment" in theory and in empirical research. 
I believe a very recent publication, the collection of papers presented in the 
important symposium, Rethinking Social Sciences (1998) will be a comerstone in 
the deepening of the erisis in Turkey. The symposium primarily targeted the 
4 Of course this is an issue beyond the concems of this study. lt may be argued against Wallerstein 
that multi- or inter-disciplinarity is a highly contextual, even Eurocentric project not apart from the 
question of power. Bourdieu himself, as I will point out while I eriticize him, seems to privilege 
sociology from time to time. Leaving the debate as it is, I will just be content to state that I do not 
intentionally give any epistemological priority to any discipline. Having been trained as a 
sociologist, though, my methodological approach may bear disciplinary bias. 
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Gulbenkian Commission Report (Wallerstein et. al., 1996), Open Social Sciences, 
published in Turkish in 1997 and most of the papers questioned the modernist cast 
of the social sciences, bringing in important post -structuralist insights. W ith the 
increasing academic interest in the questions of pluralism, difference, social 
movements, extra-party politics, public sphere, and so on, it is very likely that 
searches for new, innovative theoretical approaches will increase. Therefore, this 
study is unlikely to be proposing irrelevant points for studying Turkish society, in 
particular the Alevi people. 
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
Jeffrey Alexander writes that (1998:61): 
Social science is organized by traditions, and traditions, whatever their 
aspirations for rationality, are founded by charismatic figures. At the 
beginning of a discipline, powerful intellectual figures are regarded as 
classical founders ... at later points, they are accorded quasi-classical status 
and treated as founders of powerful schools. Social reality, then, is never 
confronted in and of itself. Because perception is mediated by the discursive 
commitments of traditions, social scientific formulations are channeled 
within relatively standardized, paradigmatic forms. 
Today, Pierre Bourdieu may be seen as one the few leading sociologists of 
the world. Stronger in France, the social scientific tradition he founded -and 
which is stili fed by his work- has lured, including myself, many thinkers in all 
over the globe. Along with a number of other names, he is among the founding 
fathers of the grand-theoretical attempt to coherently combine both macro and 
micro (agency-structure, individual-society, and so on) levels of social analysis. 
Given that the primary motor of social scientific growth is conflict and 
competition between traditions, my relationship with Bourdieu in this study will 
be a critical and positive relationship. Jeffrey C. Alexander, leading proponent of 
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the neo-functionalist school, deseribes his own relationship with Parsons's system 
as "reconstruction", by which he means an intervention different from elaboration 
or revision "in that differences with the founder of the tradition are clearly 
acknowledged and openings to other traditions are explicitly made. 
Reconstruction can revive a theoretical tradition, even while it creates the 
opportunity for the kind of development out of which new traditions are bom" 
(Alexander, 1998: 62). 
In my attempt to reconstruct Bourdieu's sociological theory (which I call 
generative structuralism here) I will not aim a ''transcendence" of his strengths 
and weaknesses; different from what Alexander tries to do to Parsonsian 
sociology, I am not proposing to found a new tradition. In fact, it will be apparent 
in the third chapter that most of the questions I raise against his theory are not 
novel,_ some of which have even been consensually agreed on among both the 
applauders and cursers of Bourdieu. Anyway, I also try to point out misleading, 
crudely-formulated questions and ask some others in a different way. On the 
whole, my intervention is an emphasis on an undertheorized part of his whole 
system: I try to bring new insights to his ideas on politics and resistance through 
reflecting on a reconsidered theory of agency. Bourdieu's ideas on body and 
agency, according to me, constitute the most important part of his theory, 
presenting us very illuminating, yet not wholly developed insights promising 
many theoretical openings (Shilling, 1994: chp. 6; Tumer, 1992: 88-91). On the 
other hand, through my intense research of the literature including Bourdieu' s 
works and works on him, there are very few studies which reflect on the 
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implications of generative structuralism for the study of politics. Even those 
scholars who study body politics neglect Bourdieu's contributions with respect to 
the political dimension. Of course the fact that most of Bourdieu's weaknesses 
can be located both in hisideason politics and in the political implications of his 
overall approach can also explain this lack of interest. 
I also strongly believe that the Bourdieusian toolbox can be eınployed in 
analyzing contemporary Turkish society. Newly emerging consumer culture, 
transforming lifestyles and community-based "ways of life", "distinction" 
between classes, state-society relations, and so on are some "social things" about 
which generative structuralism has a lot to say. Having such a positive 
predisposition, in this study I set out to analyze a very recently emerged social 
phenomenon, that of Alevism and Alevi politics, using Bourdieu's (rethought) 
approach. 
Although I will not directly deal with specific cultural aspects of Alevism, I 
want to talk about what is different about Alevism briefly. Alevism in Turkey can 
be viewed asa religious syncretism, the second major Islamic community, with a 
belief system and a set of religious practices quite different than that of Sunnism. 
Anthropologically, there are countless forms of Alevism, some are more 
influenced by ancient Turkic traditions like shamanism, some are quite heterodox 
and bear heavy influences from sufism, while some resemble contemporary 
Shi'ism. Yet there are common elements shared by almost all Alevis: The special 
- and sacred - emphasis on Ali (Prophet Mohammad's son-in-law) and his 
family, the rejection of compulsory Sunni religious practices like namaz or 
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visiting Mecca, the existence of cem houses instead of mosques5 (where men and 
women socialize, pray, feast and dance togetlier, something interpreted as sinful 
by some Sunni sects)... The religious days of Alevis are also different. 
Furthermore, different than most Sunni sects, there are quite a lot of Alevi groups 
where one is bom as an Alevi, and cannot ever be converted, which adds an 
ethnic element into Aleviness. 
Although the anthropological diversity and difference of Alevisms has been v 
a frequent topic of study, the question of the Alevi identity and Alevi difference, 
publicly problematized and (re)politicized only in the last eight or nine years, is 
stili not properly studied from a political-sociological perspective. Moreover, 
attempting to "test" the relevance of refining Bourdieusian Generalities II 
(namely, his canceptual toolbox) for understanding a concrete, contemporary 
social problem will be a challenging, but obligatory task. Employing his concepts 
in studying Alevism, and then reconceptualizing the dynamics of contemporary 
Alevi politics by bringing in the "revision" which I attempt to develop in the third 
chapter will be the main strategy of the study. 
The crux of the study, aside from this introductory chapter, consists of three 
main chapters anda conclusion chapter. 
5 Cem is the name of a specific religious ri tual of dan ce and music, practiced in cem houses. White 
the content and form may differ from community to community, it exists in almost all Alevi 
groups. 
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Cbapter 2: In the second chapter, I will attempt to make a general 
introduction to generative structuralism. Turning to Bourdieu' s main texts and to 
some works on him, I am going to define the main concepts and methodology in 
his approach, pointing out the persistent questions he frequently deals with in his 
40 years of social scientific practice. In engaging with his theory, I am tirniting 
myself to his arguments about politics, class relations and power struggles, 
leaving out his studies of art, literature or anthropology. This chapter will set the 
path to a critique and application of the main tenets of generative structuralism. 
Cbapter 3: Here, I reinvoke a number of issues discussed by Bourdieu, like 
class, and body's relation with the field(s) and try to determine the fissures, 
weaknesses, undertheorized or undeveloped parts of the theory as it is covered in 
Chapter 2. In this chapter, inspired by my own ethico-political dispositions (which 
would all be clarified, hopefully, throughout the study), I am going to try to 
reconceptualize resistance. Without leaving Bourdieu's theoretical territory, I am 
planning, by introducing the concern for social justice and for the possibility of 
collective anti-systemic action, to "open up" (or, reconstruct) Bourdieu's theory. 
One central move in the chapter is to search for a way to characterize a "political 
field" in the Bourdieusian sense, but one that will be more sensitive to issues 
about resistance, one that will not be marked by only structural closures. Of 
course, this move has an important significance for the Alevi case, and indeed, the 
chapter ends with a brief linkage of the discussion to Alevism. Concerning the 
connection between the resisting agent and the political field (and also concerning 
the whole meaningfulness of this reconstructive project), I seek to arrive at a 
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decisive conclusion only after the analysis of Alevi politics in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4: lt consists of six sections. After the brief introduction, in the 
second section, I will speak: about Alevism in general, and sean briefly the 
histoncal process of contemporary Alevi revivalism, trying to delineate the spatio-
temporal background of the constitution of the Alevi political field. In the third 
section, I deal with the vast popular, semi-academic and academic literature on 
Alevism. I hold that one of the two prominent determinants of the political 
"players" (in the institutional sense) within the field is the published material, 
where most of the debates are carried out. Here I will limit myself with only 
outlining the most common topics and points of interests in different types of 
publications on Alevism (mainly dividing the whole literature to three: popular, 
semi-academic 1 journalistic, academic ), leaving the debate on their political and 
ideological content to the last two sections. In the fourth section, I try to introduce 
the second main determinant of the political field, namely, significant public 
debates which have conditioned who opposes whom and why within the field. 
Beginning from the early 1990s, I only touch upon three particular debates and 
discuss their possible political after-effects. Following that, in the fifth seetion of 
the chapter, I attempt to map the political field and determine the main "agents"6 
and their programs 1 purposes for daiming a kind of Alevism. I will try to show 
how "Alevi identity" becomes a stak:e to appropriate in Alevi politics. 
6 That is, agents in the sense of organizations, institutions, associations or groups. 
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Furthermore, I will focus on the most powerful political agents of Alevi politics in 
more detail in order to be able to reflect on the position of individual agents. 
Finally, in the sixth section, I will talk about the "winners" and "losers" within the 
political field and problematize the representation of all Alevis through a small 
number of cliques. This fınal seetion will also speculate on future prospects of 
Alevi revivalism and question whether the "Alevi difference", in a near future, 
can be politicized asa (or, in alliance with a) counter-hegemonic movement. 
Chapter 5: In the conclusion, having dealt mostly with the constraining 
effects of Alevi politics, I will briefly interrogate resistance in Alevism. Here I am 
also going to try to be self-critical on the study' s weaknesses, especially in trying 
to ally Bourdieusian theory with the Alevi practice; more importantly, I will 
question the soundness of thinking social movements in general within the 
problematic of agent-structure. In this chapter I also offer a future research 
agenda, implied by the possibilities of generative structuralism. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
MAIN TENETS OF 
GENERATIYE 
STRUCTURALISM 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I aim to briefly summarize Pierre Bourdieu's sociological project, 
but only to a limited extent. Bourdieu has been publishing for at least 40 years, 
and his collection, now over 30 books and 400 articles, covers an unbelievably 
broad array of topics. Therefore, in restating the main concerns of his theory in 
this chapter, I willleave out many of his discussions (for example, I will not deal 
with his research on art, literature and photography, or his -probably most 
delicately worked on- studies of the French educational system). 
I will be discussing Bourdieu with respect to a few but central topics, 
themes which are more or less prominent throughout his whole studies. On the 
other hand, as I focus on one particular domain, politics, in this study, I will try to 
stay within the confines of the domain, infarıning on how Bourdieu 
conceptualized it. 
The fırst issue to be discussed is Bourdieu's metatheory, the way he tries to 
transcend objectivism and subjectivism and the way he constructs his objects of 
study. Later, I explain a number of central concepts, like "field" and "habitus", by 
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discussing how he understood the field of politics. That brings me to his 
understanding of class and his conceptualization of body (in linlcage to the agent 
and the structure ). 
As Derek Robbins (1991: 1) confesses, Bourdieu is not easy to read.7 Yet 
this is because of his disciplinary concerns, his purpose of going beyond non-
reflexive, unproblematized, commonsense beliefs about the social. One can also 
feel, deep in his texts, a war declared against the orthodox academic discourse and 
writing styles. In a way, "summarizing" Bourdieu is a highly unjust (though, in 
this context, necessary) practice. What will be done in the remaining part of this 
chapter is to repeat (but I try to be creative doing that) what Bourdieu and his 
critics have produced before in order to introduce the theory. Therefore, until the 
third chapter, I am not daiming to be adding anything "new"; I am bringing the 
springboard in, so we can jump on it and try to go beyand the limits of generative 
structuralism in the coming c hapters of the thesis. 
2.2 METATHEORETICAL BASIS 
Bourdieu's metatheory, Rogers Brubaker (1985: 750) informs us, "is constructed 
with reference to a set of problems that he subsumes under the rubric 'objectivism 
vs. subjectivism."' Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 5) finds both 
7 David Swartz (1997: 13) also observes: "Bourdieu is both a superb stylist and the author of some 
impenetrable prose. He writes long, complex sentences with many phrases embedded in one 
another. Commas and semicolons proliferate. His prose is charged with polemic, paradox, 
negation, and an occasional pun that make his work difficult for those readers who are not familiar 
with the French intellectual context in which he is writing. Bourdieu can never be read casually." 
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approaches to social reality problematic and his whole work may be read as a 
:1--
search for a way out: 
[B]ased on a non-Cartesian social ontology that refuses to split object and 
subject, intention and cause, materiality and symbolic representation, 
Bourdieu seeks to overcome the debilitating reduction of sociology to either 
an objectivist physics of material structures or a constructivist 
phenomenology of cognitive forms by means of a genetic structuralism 
capable of subsuming both. 
Although the tools it offers allow us to reflect on the general mechanisms 
and structures and go beyond simplistic, commonsensical views of the social, 
objectivism is problematic because it neglects the interventions by the agents and 
their conceptions of social reality and ignores the results of the agents' physical 
existence and their subjectivity. The agent is cast out of the explanation of 
practice and turned into a machine merely responding to the structural 
determinations. Bourdieu (1990: 26) states that, in establishing objective 
regularities devoid of individual consciousness and wills, objectivism "introduces 
a radical discontinuity between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge, 
rejecting the more or less explicit representations with which the latter arms itself 
as 'rationalizations', 'prenotions' or 'id eo lo gies. "' 
Subjectivism, on the other hand, should be appreciated for its focus on the 
ways agents give social meanings to life, for its assertion of the importance of 
practice in the reproduction of social reality. However, it tends to deny the 
influence of objective reality conditioning the agents' beliefs, practices and 
behaviors. Phenomenology conducts analysis as if every human practice is a 
product of a rational or conscious choice. Subjectivism, for Bourdieu ( 1990: 25), 
"cannot go beyond a description of what specifically characterizes 'lived' 
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experience of the social world, that is, apprehension of the world as self-evident, 
'tak:en for granted. "' So, it has two major flaws (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
10): 
First, conceıvıng social structures as the mere aggregate of individual 
strategies and acts of classification mak:es it impossible to account for their 
resilience as well as for the emergent, objective configurations these 
strategies perpetuate or challenge. Neither can this kind of social 
marginalism explain why and according to what principles the work of 
social production of reality itself is produced. 
So Pierre Bourdieu's sociology aims to cover social reality in its "double 
life", be ing sensitive both to the structures constituting the social universe, and the 
mental and bodily schemata, feelings, joys, tastes of the agents participating that 
universe. Bourdieu thinks that the antinomies between theory and empirical 
research, symbolic properties and material properties, macro and micro levels of 
analysis "have a social foundation but they have no scientific foundation" 
(Bourdieu, 1994: 34). The problem with such oppositions poses not only a 
philosophical problem, but also a political problem, considering the power 
struggles between academics and between those people who actually use social 
theories to legitimize their various acts. 
This is where concepts specific to his theory come in: field, habitus, species 
of capital, class and so on. Bourdieu, in order to realize the moment of 
transcending epistemological dichotomies, tums to practice, "the site of the 
dİaleetic of the opus operatum and the modus operandi; of the objectified 
products and the incorporated products of histerical practice; of structures and 
habitus" (Bourdieu, 1990: 52). Bourdieu, in focusing on the economy of practices, 
grants an "epistemological priority" to "objectivist rupture over subjectivist 
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understanding" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: ll). The space allocated to 
different agents is essentially constrained in its possibilities of action because of 
the structure of the fıelds and the implied relations of damination and symbolic 
violence. Y et the practices of individual experiencing, leaming and reconstructing 
cannot be assimilated to the abstract constraints of theory. In the last analysis, as 
Swartz (1997:56) points out, Bourdieu proposes a two-step model of 
epistemological retleetion which 
integrates subjectivist and objectivist forms of knowledge into a more 
comprehensive, third form of knowledge which he calls a "general science 
of practices". The fırst [step] calls for breaking with subjectivist knowledge 
of social practices and the second for breaking with objectivist explanation. 
It is by means of this epistemological model that Bourdieu designs and 
conducts empirical research. According to Bourdieu, there is a logical order of 
epistemological acts (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1991). The social 
scientist must fırst of all "win" the social fact against commonsensical, subjective 
knowledge (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1991: 17): 
If spontaneous sociology reappears so insistently and in such different 
guises in would-be scientific sociology, this is probably because sociologists 
who seek to reconcile the scientific project with affirmation of the rights of 
the person - the right to free action and the right to full consciousness of 
action - or who simply fail to subject their practice to the fundamental 
principles of the theory of sociological knowledge, inevitably return to the 
naive philosophy of action and of the subject's relation to his action which 
is applied in their spontaneous sociology by subjects concerned to defend 
the lived truth of the ir experience of social action. 
Thus the sociologist is to bring out the "logic" behind micro-level experiences. 
Here comes the second epistemological move, the "construction" of the social 
fact, with a language aiming to go beyond the language by which agents explain 
their own actions. Thus the theoretical model to be constructed "is characterized 
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by its capacity for breaking with appearances and its capacity for generalization, 
these two qualities being inseparable. It is a forınal outline of the relations among 
relations that define constructed objects, which can be transposed to 
phenomenally very different orders of reality and suggest, by analogy, new 
analogies that can give rise to new object constructions" (Bourdieu, Chamboredon 
and Passeron, 1991: 54-55). Finally, in the third step of the epistemological chain, 
the social fact is tried to be "confirmed" via whatever research methodology is 
employed. Here Bourdieu warns against the fetishization of methodology (against, 
for example, the pleasures and false self-confidence of employing hi-tech 
statistical techniques); the empirical data used to validate or falsify theory are not 
superior or inferior than the theory. 
Consequently, it can be safely argued that at the heart of Bourdieu' s 
metatheory lies methodological relationism, which provides him the necessary 
epistemological breaks in going beyond the misleadings of objectivism and 
subjectivism. Relational thinking extracts an object of inquiry from the context of 
everyday assumptions and perceptions, which reflect the practical interests of 
social life, and transforms that object of inquiry into an object of scientific 
knowledge (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1991: 253). The Bourdieusian 
motto, "think relationally", does not only mark his metatheory, it is also 
prominent in his understanding of social life, in his grasping of inequalities, 
contradictions and struggles. 
In this study, I share Bourdieu's project of relational sociology, and being a 
social scientist respectful of empirical observations, I will approve his above 
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proposal of epistemological hierarchy. However, as I will try to elaborate in the 
third chapter, Bourdieu's "iron trust" in science and his views of the intellectual as 
social scientist are not immune to criticisms. To give a brief idea on the nature of 
this criticism, Swartz (1997: 64) and Lamont and Lareau (1988: 158) both argue 
that the rigidity of Bourdieu's metatheory, seeing contradiction and hierarchy in 
both material and symbolic worlds, does not allow the understanding of worlds or 
situations where cooperation and solidarity are predominant features. This eye-
opening point, although not necessarily forcing us to abanden the whole model, 
impels us to reconsider the role of resistance and collective action in 
methodological relationism. 
2.3 THE THEORV OF FIELD DVNAMICS AND RELATED 
CENTRAL CONCEPTS 
In order to closely engage with the reconstruction of his theory, we will have to 
further deal with how Bourdieu gives flesh to the skeleton of his metatheory I 
tried to summarize above. Bourdieu, in a great majority of his works, deals with 
one or more specific fields, inside which he tries to define regularities of different 
types of struggles, determine the unequal distribution of species of capital among 
agents; he analyzes the formatian of dispositions and practices via dasses and 
habitus. Using more or less the same toolbox in all of his analyses, his purpose is 
to show that there is a logic inherent in all practice with respect to the field, and 
that one can detect homologies between fields like the academic field, the field of 
artistic production, the field of consumption, and the like, which implies that 
forms of damination and the condition of dasses in different fields may be 
similar. 
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According to the delicate archaeological analysis of Bourdieu's intellectual 
development conducted by Robbins (1991) in his book, the reconstruction of the 
concept "field" (champ) occurred in the early 1970s, after Bourdieu's first studies 
on education. Robbins (1991: 87) holds that Bourdieu, at fırst, "struggled to 
advocate an ideal 'rational pedagogy' which would secure a functional neutrality 
for the educational system within the totality of French sub-systems". Bourdieu 
had used the concept before, in discussing art and intellectuals, but he thought he 
required a different approach, one that would account for the relations between 
power struggles and fields, that would expose how symbolic power is transmitted 
and how its economy worked. Bourdieu was aware of the fact that "structure" 
never purely "determined", although education ("learned mastery" in the school or 
in the church) had a certain continuing logic, in terms of reproducing class 
inequalities and so on, he thought that pedagogic action should not be 
conceptualized as "regulated" but as "strategic". 
According to Bourdieu, the sets of relationships and institutions related with 
politics, production, consumption, education, art, and the like are "life-orders" in 
themselves, all containing their own logic, like a "game" has its "rules" obeyed 
unconsciously by its players. Thus, for Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
97), a field 
may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations 
between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence 
and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or 
institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of 
the distribution of species of power (or capital) who se possession 
commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well 
as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, 
homology, ete.). 
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So, there is a constant struggle within each field over the monopoly of the species 
of capital operating in the field, and the gains, profits, losses, hindrances as a 
result of this dynamics of struggle shape the field as a structure of probabilities, 
rather than a mere manipulating mechanism. Agents inhabit unequal positions in 
the social space created by the field, and their positions may always change as the 
agents stake and risk the capital types they possess. However, as any field is 
above all influenced by the field of power (inscribed by the class struggle), the 
"regulations" -which are in fact "embodied" by agents unconsciously- usually 
remain unchallenged, the doxa of the field is unquestioned, and the condition of 
dominated versus dominant endures. Rather than functions (as in the concept of 
"institution" in classical sociology), struggles and relations are important in field 
analysis, yet we should have in mind that one of the common properties of fields 
is that specific forms of struggles are imposed on agents by the field. 
Before engaging in the discussion of politics it is time to explain what he 
means by "habitus" and "types of capital". 
First of all, a frequent analogy used by Bourdieu -at times going beyond an 
analogy, thus drawing upon criticisms- needs to be elucidated, because in 
Bourdieu's texts, the "game" analogy is used in conjunction with his more 
complex theory of action. Bourdieu, in field analysis, while elaborating on the 
nature of agents' actions in a certain field, also makes use of the analogy of 
"games" played by "players" who have embodied the "rules" and who "stake" or 
"risk" the types of capital ( economic, cultural, social) they possess in order to 
achieve better and gain advantages in the game. Agents ina certain field are said 
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to have a "feel for the game", because they have the practical knowledge of how, 
where and when to do or avoid to do a certain thing, and they possess and employ 
this knowledge unconsciously, without rational calculation, like a habit. 
Furthermore, Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 99) holds that players can 
play to increase or to conserve their capital, their number of tokens, in 
conformity with the tacit rules of the game and the prerequisites of the 
reproduction of the game and its stakes; but they can also get in it to 
transform, partially or completely, the immanent rules of the game. They 
can, for instance, work to change the relative value of tokens of different 
colors, the exchange rate between various species of capital, through 
strategies aimed at discrediting the form of capital upon which the force of 
their opponents rests (e.g., economic capital) and to valorize the species of 
capital they preferentially possess (e.g., juridical capital [a form of cultural 
capital specific to the juridical field -EG]). 
In explaining human action, it can be argued that Bourdieu develops a 
political economy of symbolic power. One can infer from Bourdieu that according 
to him, Marx left his work incomplete by only elaborating on the dominating 
power of economic capital. Bourdieu, on the other hand, sees capital in general as 
a social relation, "an energy which only exists and only produces its effects in the 
field in which it is produced and reproduced" (Bourdieu, 1984: 113). Sounder the 
expression "symbolic capital" he includes a number of different capitals, which 
are determined fırst of all according to the specific properties of the field in 
concern, according to the power and rank of the agents mobilizing the capital 
type. The accumulation of "symbolic properties" (for example, graduate 
certificates, completion of specific rites of passage, giving gifts, and so on) 
becomes an important element for situating agents. His expanded notion of capital 
represents power "over the accumulated product of past labour ... and thereby over 
the mechanisms which tend to ensure the production of a particular category of 
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goods and thus over a set of revenues and profits" (Bourdieu, 1991: 230). 
Cultural capital is the most frequently employed capital type by Bourdieu, 
which, very broadly, corresponds to the educational performance and participation 
in cultural practices (be they normatively defined as ''traditional" or "modern"). 
Familial socialization and the field of education are two fundamental resources of 
cultural capital, and its "volume" is determined by the amount of time invested to 
acquire it (Brubaker, 1985: 757). The social capital, stili another but less 
frequently pronounced capital type, corresponds to the composition of primary 
and secondary relationships (the social network) established by the agent. 
Furthermore, the name of these capital types may change with respect to the field 
being analyzed, like political capital, religious capital, and so on. In all cases, 
Bourdieu sees capital as abasis of demination and class distinction (Mahar et al., 
1990: 13), which takes him to treat symbolic systems, in which capital types are 
unequally distributed, as "structured structures". Within these structures inscribed 
in fields, there is always a specific logic producing distinctions and oppositions, 
excluding and including different groups. This logic, created by symbolic 
properties, always operates in alliance with the distinction logic produced by 
material properties, i.e., class structure (Swartz, 1997: 87): 
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This social function of the classification logic of symbolic representations 
generates, therefore, a political effect to the extent that the social groupings 
identified are hierarchically differentiated and therefore legitimated. Binary 
symbolic distinctions correlate with social distinctions turning symbolic 
classifications into expressions of social hierarchy. The relationship between 
mental structures and social structures obtains through the binary logic that 
imprints upon our cognitive and communicative capabilities and 
simultaneously provides a sort of map of social distinctions to be established 
between ingroups and outgroups. One dimension correlates with the other: 
social distinctions are internalized and structured by the polarity logic of 
cognitive processes. 
Bourdieu's alternative conceptualization of capital and symbolic power is further 
allied with his sociological project in that properties concerning symbolic 
structures are practically (i.e., when we consider their practical manifestations) 
material properties (Bourdieu, 1990: 135): 
Individuals or groups are objectively defined not only by what they are but 
by what they are reputed to be, a ''being-perceived" which, even if it closely 
depends on their being, is never totally reducible to this. Social science 
therefore has to take account of the two kinds of properties that are 
objectively attached to them: on the one hand, material properties, starting 
with the body, that can be counted and measured like any other thing of the 
social world; and on the other hand, symbolic properties which are nothing 
other than material properties when perceived and appreciated in their 
mutual relationships, that is, distinctive properties. 
Capital and symbolic power is in organic relationship with "habitus" (best 
expressed by Bourdieu himself in the equation: Habitus x Capital + Field = 
Practice), which may be briefly defined as "a set of dispositions, created and 
formulated through the conjuncture of objective structures and personal history" 
(Mahar et al., 1990: 10). It operates from within agents; it is embodied by agents, 
be ing the internalization of the externality of field dynamics. Bourdieu ( 1977: 72 
and 95) further elaborates that it is 
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the strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen 
and ever-changing situations... a system of lasting and transposable 
dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment 
as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions and makes possible the 
achievement of infinitely diversified tasks. 
Habitus is theorized as a mediating ( a structured and structuring structure ), rather 
than a determining construct. Agents' bodies are adapted to the field practices via 
habitus, while their autonomous action structures and rewrites the field itself. 
Perhaps the concept of habitus best illustrates Bourdieu' s purpose for an 
epistemological break from the objectivist-subjectivist antinomy (which I briefly 
mentioned while discussing his metatheory): In order to account for both the 
agent's autonomy (plus his 1 her bodily dispositions) and the macro-level material 
and symbolic dynamics of the field, Bourdieu burdens habitus with the past, 
present and future of action; on the one hand, the agent inherits a past legacy 
imprinted on his 1 her body through socialization processes, on the other hand, 
given the field is a field of probabilities, habitus has to be ready, expectant and 
adaptalıle to what is to come. Therefore, habitus should be understood as a 
"structured" and "structuring" structure.8 
8 I will develop my critique of habitus in the third chapter by pointing out that Bourdieu 
undermines the practical-evaluative dimension of ageney and does not leave many open doors to 
conscious action against a field itself. Bourdieu gives an epistemological priority to the objectivist 
approach, which causes him, in the last analysis, to subject the habitus to conditionings, leaving 
no room for the individual to be critical of and resİstant to these conditionings. I will returo to that 
problem in more detail. 
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2.4 THE POLITICAL FIELD 
As in every field, what is of primary analytical importance here is to reveal the 
integrating logic of cornpetition between opposing viewpoints. Bourdieu tries to 
seek out conflict sources in politics and attempts to relate these sources to other 
fields and to class and power. Y et when he talks about politics as a field, he only 
has in mind party politics (and that in terms ofFrench parliamentarism). 
According to Bourdieu (1984: 399), the field of politics has a dual structure: 
On one side is the field of ideological production, a relatively autonomous 
universe in which amidst competition and conflict, the instruments for 
thinking the social are created and where, through this process, the field of 
the politically thinkable, or, to put it another way, the legitimate 
problematic, is defined. On the other side are social agents, occupying 
different positions in the field of class relations and defined by a greater or 
lesser specific political competence -a greater or lesser capacity to 
recognize a political question as political and treat it as such by responding 
to it politically, i.e., on the basis of specifically political principles (rather 
than ethical ones, for example ). 
Setting this overall view, he argues that we can read the logic of this field in terms 
of supply and demand, where a host of political programmes, issues, discourses, 
campaigns, views are supplied, to be consumed by a mass of citizens, where a 
doxa of "democratic c ho ice" is created (Bourdieu, 1991: 1 71-172). 
In the political field, the rules of the game are established so that certain 
agents have the authority to speak about politics, to determine what is discussable 
and what is not, according to the class habitus they have. In that sense, Bourdieu 
argues that in party politics, bourgeois or upwardly mobile middle class 
professionals dominate. In order to account for the institutional and individual 
agents within the political field (from the ordinary party militant to the party as 
propaganda machine), he constructs a "social spaceasa structure of differentiated 
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positions, defıned in each case by the place they occupy in the distribution of a 
particular kind of capital" (Bourdieu, 1998: 15). When we think this social space 
in the framework of politics, inside it agents are distributed ( 1) according to the 
overall volume of the political capital (and also other capitals) they possess, (2) 
according to the relative weight of economic capital and political capital in their 
patrimony, (3) according to the evolution over time of the volume and structure of 
their capital (Bourdieu, 1998: 15). 
Therefore, agents desiring to be initiated in should master the practical logic 
of the political field (that is, be subjected to the values, hierarchies, censorship 
inherent in the field). The political capital then corresponds to political 
relationships, access to informal networks related to political issues, the practical 
knowledge or the "feel for the game" (sens du jeu) with respect to parliamenfary 
manoeuvres, tactics, agitation 1 propaganda strategies and so on. Bourdieu further 
holds that political parties are the most important agents, "combative 
organizations specially adapted so as to engage in this sublimated fonn of civil 
war by mobilizing in an enduring way, through prescriptive predictions, the 
greatest possible number of agents endowed with the same vision of the social 
world and its future" (Bourdieu, 1991: 181). Within the political field, parties are 
seen as the agents which are more likely to influence the field dynamics. 
Within the political party, there exists an ethos which legitimizes the claim 
to "represent" a certain class or dasses or groups. Around this ethos, or in 
Bourdieusian terms, symbolic power shaped according to the dominant agents' 
interests, the professionals produce the "choices" and "opinions" which would 
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bring them the votes and thus political power (Bourdieu, 1984: 424): 
All political judgments, including the would-be most enlightened ones, 
inevitably contain an element of implicit faith, due to the very logic of 
political choice, which is a choice of spokesmen and representatives and 
also a choice of ideas, projects, programmes, plans, embodied in 
"personalities" and depending for their reality and credibility on the reality 
and credibility of these "personalities". 
So, building upon this, the political capital becomes a "form of symbolic 
capital, credit founded on eredence or belief and recognition or, more precisely, 
on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or an 
object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it)" (Bourdieu, 1991: 192). 
That capital may be staked in two different ways, which imply the dominated and 
dominant poles inside the political field. lt can be based on fame, being known 
and having a "good reputation", available only to a few dominant agents inside 
the field. This is more or less what Max W eber termed "charisma" and most of the 
time is a key to the success of the political party or a legitimate political 
organization. The political capital can also be based on loyalty, recognition, which 
is not a personal capital but can only be accumulated by the political organization 
itself. In this form, the party gains militants, followers, new bureaucrats, most 
crucially, votes. This capital through loyalty is accumulated both by the structural 
mechanisms, party employment, task division, education, and so on, and by the 
agents' dispositions, which "party officials or militants implement in their daily 
practice andintheir properly political action" (Bourdieu, 1991: 195). 
2.5 BEFORE CRITICISMS 
In this chapter, I tried to construct a very general, but nevertheless useful, outline 
of Bourdieu's sociological theory. Although I left out many other important 
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issues, I have mentioned before that I do not have a bold purpose of founding an 
alternative approach, one which claims to transcend Bourdieu's weaknesses. 
Therefore, I deliberately confined myself with the political field and touched upon 
Bourdieu's central concepts without calling upon his empirical fındings by which 
he concretizes the canceptual framework of generative structuralism. In fact, in 
the next chapter, I will be continuing to introduce Bourdieu further during my 
discussion of what aspects of the theory I agree with and of what aspects I have 
objections to. 
Be fo re co ncluding the chapter, another important po int to note is that my 
analysis of Alevi politics in Chapter 4 builds largely on the theoretical foundation 
set up by Bourdieu's analysis of the field of party politics covered briefly in this 
chapter. Yet Chapter 3 will demonstrate that when certain ethico-political 
dispositions are pronounced and certain parts of the theory are revised, an 
alternative analysis of Alevi politics is possible, one that is not, fırst of all, limited 
with the closures of party politics. My own interventions developed in the next 
chapter will be "operationalized" in the final two sections of Chapter 4 and also in 
the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE 
POLITICAL IN BOURDIEU 
3.1 GETTING STARTED 
Up to here, I tried to reveal the nature of the intellectual relationship with social 
theory developed in this study, particularly one that follows the Bourdieusian path 
in seeking an alliance between (if not transcendence of) macrological and 
micrological levels of analysis. This chapter, before my engagement with Alevi 
politics, aims to complete my proposed theoretical excursion. I ınake two central 
moves in this chapter: (1) Starting from a number of primary issues that are 
problematic in Bourdieu, I am going to bring in reconstructive arguments in 
offering a revised view of politics, without abandaning the crux of generative 
structuralism. (2) By clarifying my personal ethico-political dispositions (or, in 
other words, restating the ones I have -from time to time- implied in the previous 
two chapters more openly), I am going to try to justify my selectivity with respect 
to Bourdieu's theory and why I prioritize some ofthe concepts I use in this study. 
As I mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, the scope of this study is too narrow to 
make it an overall "reconstruction" in the real sense. My attempt of 
"reconstruction" is limited with the reception of and response to "the political" in 
generative structuralism. (Needless to say, the subject who "receives" and 
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"responds" here is the social scientist.) Thus I open the windows, let same fresh 
air in, reshuffle the furniture araund a bit, throw out a couple of items, fix still 
operatable ones - hopefully, in the end, I will have a tidy (no, tidier) room for 
use! Nevertheless, before passing on the discussion, I feel that it will be necessary 
for me to give a general outline of how I will develop the argument, and in doing 
this, what aspects of generative structuralism (as presented in Chapter 2) are 
conserved. 
1. I retain Bourdieu's critique of subjectivism and objectivism, and his 
epistemological project of winning, constructing and canfırıning the social fact. 
Although my relationship with contemporary Alevism does not completely fulfil 
this threefold task (the reasons of that will be covered later), I find Bourdieu's 
proposed methodological agenda favourable for future empirical research. On the 
other hand, as will be clear towards the end of the chapter, I have problems with 
Bourdieu's commitment to "science" and his privileging of the intellectuals' 
corporatio (in fact, his most ambitious -if not only- radical political project). 
2. I alsa follow the Bourdieusian proposal of "field analysis", along with the 
relationalism constituted by it between the body, agent, habitus and structure. 
However, I set out to eriticize and supplement his nations of "field", "habitus" 
and "body" ina number of ways. 
3. First of all, Bourdieu's construction of the political field should be 
reconsidered given its tendencies of determinism and conditioning. A more 
"political" understanding of the political field should go beyand party politics and 
should try to account for an action-oriented political resistance. In that sense, I 
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believe that in Bourdieu' s work, one can fınd mo re points which make "despair 
convincing" than points which boister "practicalized ho pes". This critique will 
also problematize Bourdieu' s scienticist position: He often invites intellectuals to 
be more conscious of what they are doing, warns "ordinary people" of the 
everyday magic spells caston them by the media, the state, the market, and the 
like; however, his political warnings are undermined by his very vision of the 
field where such warnings are received. 
4. Related to this attempt to "open up" the political field, a supplementary 
critique of the concept of habitus and thus ageney as Bourdieu conceptualizes it, 
should be developed. When Bourdieu exposes the symbolic structures of a 
particnlar field which produce a "magical effect" (doxa), providing unquestioned 
adaptation of the conditionings of the field by the habitus, he undermines the 
potential of a single agent to challenge or change the order of things. Voluntary, 
autonomous and creative anti-systemic action should be introduced as a 
possibility into the no tion of habitus, supplementing it. 
5. The notion of "class as embodied" will be prioritized in retbinking ageney 
within the problematic of resistance. Without getting rid of structuralist 
dispositions, I will then bring the discussion to the question of social justice and 
the relevance of collective action inside the field of politics. This will then 
constitute a further break with Bourdieu's own political project, not necessarily 
falsifying his theory' s main tenets. 
Therefore, these five general points will be my guideline in developing the 
reconstructive argument in this chapter. From time to time, I will be returning to 
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the same point, detailing my propositions further, and the items I listed above do 
not appear in that order. 
3.2 CLASS, BODV AND EMBODIMENT OF 
INEQUALITIES 
I have already mentioned that "class as embodied" will be a primary notion in my 
attempt to discuss the political in Bourdieu. I have not touched upon how 
Bourdieu conceptualized social class until now, and it w as a deliberate mo ve: I 
was looking forward to accounting for how Bourdieu made use of class together 
with my own "class embodiment" approach, in order tonaila firın handie into the 
wall that would provide leverage for me for my upcoming critique of "field" and 
"habitus". 
3.2.1 CLASS: ON PAPER OR OUT THERE? 
Bourdieu's notion of class has a problematic relationship with Marxism. On the 
one hand, he retains the Marxian dispositian of opposing inequality and 
damination stemming from the agents' unequal positioning within the social space 
and their unbalanced access to sources of types of capital. On the other hand, he 
criticizes Marx' s objectivism and he expands Marx' s political economy (which is 
based largely on economic capital). Chris Wilkes (1990: 109) argues that 
Bourdieu's class analysis 
does not depend on objective economic or indeed political criteria alone for 
its foundation, but on a broad-ranging account of class practices which 
includes food tastes, clothing, body dispositions, housing styles and forıns 
of social choice in everyday life, as well as the more familiar categories of 
economy and polity. 
Although this may sound Weberian more than Marxian, it should immediately be 
noted that Bourdieu never reduces the formatian of "class habitus" to mere 
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lifestyle or consumption behavior. He always identifies, within every field, the 
unequal distribution of power, the unresolvable antagonism between the 
dominated and the dominant. Y et when he breaks with the Marxist view of class, 
he does it decisively (Bourdieu, 1985: 726): 
Marx either summarily identifies constructed class with real class (in other 
words, as Marx complained about Hegel, it confuses the things of logic with 
the logic of things); or, when it does make the distinction, with the 
opposition between "class-in-itself," defıned in terms of a set of objective 
conditions, and "class-for-itself," based on subjective factors, it deseribed 
the mavement from one to the other (which is always celebrated as nothing 
less than an ontological promotion) in terms of a logic that is either totally 
determinist or totally voluntarist. 
Theoretical dasses are, according to Bourdieu, regroupings which exist only "on 
paper" and should not be confused with groups mobilized for comman purposes, 
as Marx did. Bourdieu (1998a: 12) writes: 
All my work shows that in a country said to be on the way to becoming 
homogenized, democratized, and so on, difference is everywhere .... Thus, 
difference (which I express in describing social space) exists and persists. 
But does this mean that we must accept or affirm the existence of classes? 
No. Social dasses do not exist (even if political work, armed with Marx' s 
theory, had in same cases contributed to making themat least exist through 
instances of mobilization and proxies). What exists is a social space, a space 
of differences, in which dasses exist in same sense in a state of virtuality, 
not as something given but as something to be done. 
The problems with this approach will be made apparent later. For now, it is 
sufficient to remind that Bourdieu gives an epistemological priority to "objectivist 
rupture over subjectivist understanding", which takes him to objectify, for purely 
"scientific" purposes, a social space and the logic of practices in operation there 
(with respect to any specific field). In the mean time, he seeıns to be concerned 
with "class as constructed" (Bourdieu, 1984: 101): 
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One must therefore construct the objective class, the set of agents who are 
placed in homogeneous conditions of existence imposing homogeneous 
conditionings and producing homogeneous systems of dispositions capable 
of generating similar practices; and who possess a set of comman 
properties, objectifıed properties, sametimes legally guarantecd (as 
possession of goods and power) or properties embodied as class habitus 
(and, in particular, systems of classificatory schemes). 
In constructing that "objective class", Bourdieu does not have in mind a 
model where, considering the occupational structure, the surplus-extraction 
process, age, gender, educational capital, and the like, one of these properties, or a 
calleetion of them, defines the class. He neither believes that one of these 
properties is centered as the catalyst and the atlıers add up. Social class, in the last 
analysis, is defined by "the structures of relations between all the pertinent 
properties which gives its specific value to each of them and to the effects they 
exert on practices" (Bourdieu, 1984: 1 06). Thus, eve n where he seems to have a 
single pertinent eriterian for class -which is occupation in most of the statistical 
classifications we find in Distinction- he breaks with the logic of linear thinking 
where one relation directly determines the others, and the stress is, in the end, on 
the structural causality of the network of factors. 
However, before bringing in the criticisms of what he leaves out, his 
account should not lead us to the conclusion that Bourdieu reproduces anather 
version of determinism in his class analysis. When he talks about food choices, 
meal aesthetics, artistic values, music tastes, housing styles, language use, the 
volume and compasİtion of capitals, analyzing their roles in the distinctions 
bctween the bourgeoisie, the middle and the lower classes, obviously the 
subjective dimension, via habitus, takes the lead. He tries to show how class (even 
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if it is "constructed") is embodied by agents. However, the political implications 
of class embodiment are not clear in Bourdieu, because he has no faith, unlike 
Marx, in class as a possible source of mobilization. 
What is, then, the problem? Wilkes (1990: 130) argues that Bourdieu's 
overall account of class is ambiguous, but does not engage in a thorough critique. 
Brubaker (1985: 763) thinks that the problem lies in the tension between 
Bourdieu's "strong" defınition of class, which includes all the theoretical 
discussion about field dynamics and habitus, and his "weak" definition, which is 
nominally defined to cope with the statistical data. I do not believe that is the case, 
because Bourdieu undergoes an exhausting job trying to build a dialectical 
relationship between his theoretical elaboration and the empirical findings. His 
discussions on both structured practices and structuring practices reflect the 
implications of the empirical data properly. 
The real problem lies elsewhere and it is spread over a number of issues: 
First of all, the ontological status of "social space" and that of "class" are totally 
different; the former, although both are acknowledged to be constructed, "exists" 
w hile class is in a "s ta te of virtuality". 
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Secondly, related with this, Bourdieu's account for the class structure, 
although not ignoring social change, lacks a histarical perspective which would 
characterize the "actuality" of the social space.9 
Thirdly, following this criticism, Bourdieu's understanding of class seems to 
have gotten rid of the production paradigm and the labor theory of value analyzed 
exhaustively by Marx, which also causes Bourdieu (who has never conducted a 
study of the labor process) to fail to offer an account of class from the problematic 
of exploitation (Di Maggio, 1979: 1469-70): 
[I]f Bourdieu is a materialist, his is a non-Marxian materialism. This can be 
seen most clearly in his discussions of class and class conflict. Class, for 
Bourdieu, is only roughly based on relationship to the means of production . 
. . . There are no classes-for-themselves in his writings. Classes do not seize 
power. ... The members of Bourdieu' s dasses are strategists, not strugglers, 
engaging in practices, not praxis; families, not classes, are the agents of 
conflict. 
Although Bourdieu does not neglect the importance and qualitative difference of 
economic capital compared to symbolic or cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986: 254), 
the lack of interest in the labor theory of value in his class analysis, according to 
me, has high political costs. Swartz (1997: 74-75) further observes: 
His concept of capital, unlike that of Marx, does not distinguish types of 
work specific to capitalism. Bourdieu treats capital as power relations 
founded on quantitative differences in amount of labor they embody. His 
concept cannot therefore distinguish capitalİst from noncapitalİst forms of 
la bor. 
9 Craig Calhoun (1995: 139) also warns against this, daiming that Bourdieu's theory lacks the idea 
of capitalisın. Calhoun hiınself suggests a Marxian suppleınent -though it is rejected by Bourdieu-
and as it will be apparent, I will try to develop an arguınent in this line. 
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These problems inherent in Bourdieu's understanding of class do not 
denounce his project of introducing the symbolic dimension to class struggles. Y et 
I believe that in order to argue for collective action which would challenge the 
capitalİst class structure, which would mobilize for social justice, we have to 
break: with Bourdieu's disbelief in the existence of dasses and even tak:e a bolder 
step to prioritize "class as embodied". In order to develop this argument, I now 
turn to a number of pro-class arguments. 
3.2.2 CLASS: OUT THERE AS EMBODIED 
As the vulgar postmodern attacks on the usefulness and explanatory power of the 
concept of class intensified, along with the "affirmative postmodernist" (Rosenau, 
1992) assertian that inequalities and conflicts are plural and co-exist equally with 
the class struggle, there have been several attempts in the last years to reinscribe 
and refine class and place class struggle at the heart of the conflicts in 
contemporary capitalism. Aside from Bourdieu' s multi-dimensional approach 
which I tried to present above, such attempts unite on one aspect: That Marx' s 
bright analysis of exploitation, surplus value, capital flow, and the like, regarding 
the process of capitalisı production and commerce is far from being invalid taday. 
So, in differing ways, scholars try to rebuild the critique of capitalİst political 
economy, trying to cogitate on new dynamics, new class fonnations or new 
definitions of labor. 
To begin with, John Frow (1995), from within the Cultural Studies 
paradigm, argues against critics like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, daiming 
that post-Marxists are deliberately equating the concept of class with the 
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economistic and reductionistic model, in order to reject it wholly. According to 
Frow (1995: 98), class is too precious for social theory: 
Class theory is an instrument for pulling together the strands of social being, 
thinking it in terms of relationality (which is not the same as totality) rather 
than the pure dispersal of social action over a multiplicity of disconnected 
sites. It is never a singular instrument, since social position is always a knot 
of determinations: the choice of focus on class rather than gender or race or 
ethnicity will be one determined by narrative usefulness rather than a 
hierarchy of theoretical models; but without it social and cultural theory is 
trivialized. [ emphasis mine] 
Anthony Woodiwiss (1990: 1 75) observes that although class is not the 
most important social entity, it is the most socially significant entity in the 
capitalist society: "Unlike the entities constituted primarily on the basis of, for 
example, gendering and racializing discourses, [class entities] are necessarily 
multi-dimensional and therefore have the complex, self-constitutive, internal 
structure that guarantees them a wide social pertinence ... What is more, since the 
human subjects that embody classes are always gendered and often racialised, it is 
most likely that classes will provide the medium through which gendering and 
racialising discourses and the other entities they support are either sustained or 
transformed" (emphasis mine; 175). Woodiwiss (1990: 177) goes on to argue that 
the processes explained by Marx in Capital which maintain class as an existing 
entity in the society are still in operation: 
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Surplus-value is the difference between necessary and surplus labour. Thus 
it cannot exist unless there also exists an entity that can ensure that such a 
difference is produced at the level of the unit of capital and at that of capital 
in general. For such an entity to exist it must comprise an ensemble of 
economic, political and ideological positions which can, qua ensemble, 
produce such a difference and enforce its own retention of it. No such 
surplus may exist, Zet alone be retained, unless an entity exists: first, that 
monopolises possession of the means of production, ... second, that exercises 
a "dictatorship" in production, ... and third, that enjoys what is most often a 
legal right oftitle to its possessions. [emphasis mine] 
Woodiwiss' points are very illuminating because he reminds us a frequently 
neglected dimension of class formatian and class embodiment. 
In alliance with Woodiwiss, Eric Olin Wright (1985), one of the leading 
neo-Marxİst theorists of class analysis, justifies his privileging of "class" and 
"property-based exploitation" by defining a distinct, prior logic for the category 
(1985: 98): 
Above all, production relations are a distinctive basis for exploitation 
because of the way they are systematically implicated in the basic 
subsistence of the exploited. Property relations not only determine 
mechanisms by which surplus is appropriated; they simultaneously 
determine mechanisms by which the exploited gain access to subsistence, to 
their means of existence. Other mechanisms of exploitation [e.g., those 
based on gender or ethnicity -EG] are essentially redistributive of a social 
product already produced within a set of property relations; property-based 
exploitation is directly bound up with the social production of that product 
in the first place. 
Now, the criticisms against Wright's positivistic tendencies compiled in the 
volume fallawing his Classes (Wright et. al., 1989) problematizes, similar to 
Bourdieu's "class on paper" criticism, the survey-oriented construction of the 
concept. Nevertheless, what isimportant for me is the primacy of "property-based 
exploitation" as it is embodied by agents, in terms of inscription of primary 
properties into their habitus -constraining (like dispossession or powerlessness) 
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and enabling (like having marketable skills or material wealth) properties. I will 
try to explain myself more clearly in the coming pages. 
Evan Watkins (1993) states that multiple conflicts defıned along the lines of 
gender, race, ethnicity and the like should be seen as being constituted through 
"class-as-lifestyle." Watkins situates gender as a constitutive factor of class 
position, "as a differential marker of relative mobility" (56). According to 
Watkins (1993: 57), the rise ofthe bourgeoisie 
made class, unlike gender and race, an avenue of universalization as well as 
a means of distinction. For all the ways in which "the natural" supplied 
rationales for the positionalities of a working-class population, it wasn't (in 
principle, at least) impossible for certain individuals of the working class to 
become good bourgeoisie. . . . Class, that is, continued to function as a 
measure of distinction, and hence a vehicle for natural coding, but in 
principle it alsa represented a universalizing potential unavailable to 
categories of race and gender. 
Inside class-specific lifestyles, he argues, the general system preserves race and 
gender as "choices", where class becomes a mark of distinction. I mentioned 
earlier that in Bourdieu, there is no one single property, no essence (no "magnet" 
property attracting different properties) which makes class, furthermore, age, 
ethnicity or sex are not principles of division cross-cutting class. As Brubaker 
(1985: 767) explicitly puts it, such properties are "indicators of class-constitutive 
differences in conditions of existence and dispositions". My own reconstructive 
intervention, for the sake of transformative politics, would be to prioritize the 
notian of exploitation (but not occupation), as the lived experience, as a bodily 
reality, which has the histarical potential (but only through human agency) to 
bring differences together for the purpose of changing the order which marks 
them as subaltern, disadvantaged, dispossessed and powerless. 
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Finally, from a political perspective, George Lafferty (1996) argues for the 
persisting meaningfulness of class and class struggle in the contemporary world. 
He complains that "[t]he possibility that not just class but class conflict can occur, 
regardless of the presence or absence of any consciousness of a class identity, 
appears to be outside the schema presented in much class analysis" (58). 
According to him, class cannot be reduced to a hypothetical collectivity of "class-
conscious" individuals, stressing on the multi-dimensionality of class conflicts 
and class positions. Exploiting that insight, he distinguishes between "class-based 
politics" attached to the orthodox Marxİst-Leninist model and "class politics", 
which bears a Bourdieusian aura (Lafferty, 1996: 64): 
Insofar as bodies such as trade unions, women' s organizations, 
environmental groups and socialist parties can politicize processes of 
accumulation, directing economic activity towards social ends, they are 
conducting an effective class politics. Conversely, insofar as private capital 
and markets continue to organize economic processes (with the exclusion of 
formally political intervention), this indicates the success of neo-liberalism 
and the suppression of the politics integral to "economic" relations, fırst 
explored by Marx. [emphasis mine] 
That there is more to class than the typology of class positions ıs, as Lafferty 
acknowledges, undeniable. The relationality between different fields, fırst of all, 
in structuralist terms, opens the way to class politics. Furthermore, comman 
principles of damination (determined by the logic of capital) which mark our 
bodies offer the possibility of class politics at the agential level. Agents, fallawing 
Lafferty, do not have to be conscious of the class basis of their deprived state and 
thus act in a rational way as workers or white-callar proletarians. So what is 
crucial here for the possibility of a broad-based political action -one that is 
heyand the mechanistic dynamics of party politics (hut nevertheless not totally 
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autonomous from the structure)- is that comınan principles, across very different 
moveınents, can be defined over class inequalities, both at macro and ınicro 
levels. 
So what do I ınean by "class as embodied"? What is the relationship of this 
notian with the body? With Bourdieu's theory? I now turn to this. 
3.2.3 EMBODIMENT OF INEQUALITIES 
In fact, body isa recurrent theıne in Bourdieu's social theory, but because he does 
not stress ınuch on the political implications of how the dynaınics of a field, via 
habitus, influences bodies, his project remains incoınplete. Bourdieu recognizes 
that "acts of labour are required to turn bodies into social entities and that these 
acts influence how people develop and hold the physical shape of their bodies, 
and learn how to present their bodies through styles of walk, talk and dress" 
(Shilling, 1994: 128). Furthermore, Bourdieu's contribution to the analysis of 
distinction between classes is invaluable from the perspective of bodily 
dispositions. His political econoıny of syınbolic capital tries to show how 
inequalities in access to and possession of different types of capital leads to the 
formatian of different tastes, habits, preferences, needs, and so on (Bourdieu, 
1984). According to Bourdieu, an agent's corporeality (both in material and 
syınbolic terıns) is the product of his or her class upbringing. The part of our 
habitus which represents our social inheritance and early socialization inscribes 
the physical and syınbolic ±rame of our bodies. (Of cmırse, the "structuring" 
diınension of habitus alsa iınplies downward or upward ınobility, which implies 
that in terıns of identity, class eınbodiınent cannot be fixated.) 
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Yet this notion of body is not without problems, problems largely 
originating from the incompleteness of his theory of agency. I will be talk:ing in 
more detail about the tendencies of closure inherent in his notion of habitus later. 
Although Bourdieu acknowledges that class is embodied, he does this in a way 
which is problematic in two ways. 
Firstly, he is highly pessimistic (if not totally silent) about the possibility of 
future-oriented resistance creating new critica! strategies which can shatter the 
doxa of the field, and about also the practical-evaluative element of ageney 
(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998), present-oriented, creative action independent of 
the imposed dispositions which may go beyond non-reflexive adaptation to 
inconveniences caused by the extemal restraints. Thus, he seems to undertheorize 
how the embodiment of class can be enabling (Tumer, 1992: 91): 
[T]he body in Bourdieu's theory is a carrier of dispositions which are 
themselves the conduits of interests within the habitus or life-world of the 
actors. Although the habitus is a practical logic (and is therefore vague and 
indeterminant), Bourdieu writes about the habitus in a very deterministic 
fashion. The habitus is a system of dispositions with reference to a given 
place, which produces the regularities in modes of behaviour. In short, 
Bourdieu's theory appears to retain a deterministic and structuralist logic in 
which the body is primarily the bearer (Triiger to use Weberian 
terminology) of cultural codes; there is little room in Bourdieu's work for 
some phenomenological understanding of the "lived-body" as an essential 
aspect of action, intention and disposition. 10 
Secondly, as mentioned before, Bourdieu' s political critique of inequalities 
seems to shift the focus from production (and thus, exploitation) to distribution. 
10 It should be added that this observation does not efface the explanatory power of habitus -this 
problem will be discussed thoroughly below. 
56 
So when labor is related with also symbolic capital, the emphasis loses touch with 
the relations of production, capital becomes a stake passessed by agents, used to 
gain advantage. Antagonisms are defıned only over distributive processes. Class 
struggle becomes "classification struggle", a struggle over proper categories, 
definitions, preservation of distinctions (Bourdieu, 1998a: ll; Swartz, 1997: 185). 
Although not totally wrong, this view of Bourdieu limits the visian of politics, 
blinds us to different manifestations of class struggle. 
When we conceptualize class embodiment as both enabling and 
constraining, accepting that stili, the majority of the citizens of Turkey, for their 
subsistence and reproduction, have to be active in the economic field, we then 
may point at a number of issues of potential political conflict shared by all 
disadvantaged people. It should then be emphasized that exploitation within 
capitalİst relations of production constitutes the primary element of class 
embodiment in the first instance ina non-deterministic way: For those who suffer, 
material constraints and bodily dispositions studied by Bourdieu are together 
inscribed on people's lived experiences, on the very physicality of their bodies, 
through pain, disease, emotional stress and so on. Other properties like gender, 
ethnicity, religiosity also bring in different dimensions of inequalities, yet they 
constitute class embodiment (not class on paper), they are not essentially rival, 
separate domains of conflict. 
Of course, the constraining effects of class embodiment are not be ignored. 
Most of the time, whatever the level of deprivation of the agent is, obedience and 
consent gains the upper hand. As I will try to show in Chapter 4, for example, the 
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lower classes of the Alevi community seem largely content with the way Alevi 
politics is publicized to day. Y et via certain events, like the Sivas Massacre of July 
1993, the reactionary potential of their class embodiment may surface. Of course, 
I am aware of the concrete fact that, for the case of Alevism or for any other social 
movement in contemporary Turkey, collective action stemming from dire events 
like July 1993 Massacre or Susurluk Seandal did never form so that a broad-based 
resistance (not reaction) could be defined. Although I am optimistic in searching 
for the conditions of possibility for actual resistance, the reality of class 
embodiment by itself can not agitate the agent against the system. Plus, the overall 
balance between material and symbolic properties, between forıns of inequalities, 
between enabling and constraining processes cannot be fixed in a deterıninistic 
way. 
3.3 BRINGING THE POLITICAL BACK IN 
At different places above, I have argued that Bourdieu' s theory of ageney need to 
be reconsidered. Having set my first leverage of "class as embodied" in the 
previous section, I will now present the common criticisms against the concept of 
habitus and try to offer my solution for the problem. Almost all critics I have 
encountered thus far connect their argument against the closure effect (or, 
determinism) of habitus with a critica! remark on Bourdieu's understanding of 
politics. Therefore, this seetion will also cover the criticism and reformulization of 
how Bourdieu conceptualizes revolution and political change. With the aim of 
concretizing my reformulization of agency, I will also thoroughly analyze the 
notion of resistance. Consequently, in this section, the "stage" will have been set 
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for the final discussion, in the last section, of social justice and political struggle 
in the re(de)fined field of politics. 
3.3.1 WHAT IS WRONG WITH HABITUS? 
Craig Calhoun (1995: 151) draws our attention to the histarical (and contingent) 
tension that may develop in a certain field when the tendeney of independent 
decision-making, or, in other words, the radicalization of heterodoxies increase. 
So he directs the question towards Bourdieu's concept of habitus: What happens 
when some agents begin to act in a habitus which goes against the interests of 
others in the field, who se habitus are in harmony with the dynamics of the field? 
Calhoun thinks that "even in the absence of internal contradictions which hamper 
their capacity to reproduce stably, the self-regulating systems nonetheless are apt 
to give rise to social relational patterns which do undermine stable reproduction" 
(153). This implies that habitus may not always produce practices which are 
compatible with the doxa of the field, but that tends to contradict with Bourdieu' s 
later approach -which, while recognizing the possibility of a resİstant habitus on 
paper, always looks for field-conditioned regularities when it is concerned with 
actual events. Thus, Nicholas Garnham (1986: 433), in his review of Bourdieu's 
Distinction (1984), wonders: 
If Bourdieu' s is a progressive political intervention, as he clearly believes, 
does the structure of the symbolic field, according to his own theory, doom 
the intervention to recuperation and futility? Or, on the other hand, are there 
conditions under which the logic proper to the symbolic field can produce 
contradictions at the symbolic level, such that they no loııger tend to 
reproduce the given set of class relations? 
Robin Griller (1996) has an outwardly negative answer to Garnham's 
second question. He blames generative structuralism for being positivist and 
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determinist, and criticizes Bourdieu for developing his argument and presenting 
his empirical data in tautological circles. In the end, according to him, Bourdieu's 
ethnographical stance reproduces that of structural anthropologists like Levi-
Strauss by privileging the social scientist's "view from above" (19-20). Although 
Griller undermines Bourdieu' s own critique of objectivism, he has a point ın 
drawing our attention to the closure effect of the concept ofhabitus (1996: 21): 
The subject in Bourdieu's socio1ogy is ultimately a determined subject 
devoid of choice, and his theory of practice must be deemed a failed attempt 
to revive the subject in objective soicology .... [P]osition in the social space 
produces habitus: the experience of conditions and the conditionings 
associated with a specific set of conditions in a specific position in the social 
space will determine the set of dispositions in the individual agent. The 
agent has neither control of his or her dispositions nor even awareness of 
them, given their location in the unconscious. 
Thus Griller is ata loss with Bourdieu's forbiddance of autonomy and conscious 
action to the individual age nt. Anather question comes to o ur min d: W as not 
Bourdieu aware of the tension between autonomy and determinism in his theory 
of agency? 
Interestingly, Derek Robbins (1991: 142-144) claims that he was. Let us 
quickly remember Bourdieu' s epistemological break which I talked about in the 
second chapter: Arguing against subjectivism, he was breaking with the primary 
experience of the social world, namely, the commonsense construction of 
everyday reality. Arguing against objectivism, on the other hand, he tried to claim 
the possibility of a "general science of practices". Robbins (1991: 143) argues 
that, Bourdieu later realized that the science of practices he advocates (particularly 
in Outline of a Theory of Practice) is anather version of objectivism: 
60 
Bourdieu realized that he had himself imposed on agents the 'liberating' 
view that they could themselves manipulate these structures strategically 
without himseli relinquishing the assumption that his perception of their 
structures coincided theirs. In order properly to appreciate the reciprocal 
relationship between structures and agents within societies, it was clear that 
Bourdieu had to restore the immanence of structures - to clarify that 
structuration, or the structuring of structures, is an aspect of the logic of 
practice. 
Robbins goes on to argue that in order to establish that his visian of the world was 
not a "de-contexted fantasy'' but a scientific product which reflects his position-
taking within the histarical struggle between dominated and dominant, Bourdieu, 
in Distinction, reaffirms the objectivity (being really real) of class and social 
space (144). Yet as I tried to show in my discussion of his notian of class, 
Bourdieu alsa denies objectivity to class as he constructs it. One can therefore 
claim that there is an oscillation between, rather than transcendence of 
subjectivism and objectivism in his writings. I believe that this ambiguity is alsa 
the reason for his concept of habitus to be criticized for determinism. 
(Nevertheless, Bourdieu is for sure confident about his identity as the self-
reflexive sociologist producing scientific knowledge, who has a political -and 
surely "leftist"- commitment to the responsibility of the intellectual.) 
Chris Shilling (1994), after giving a very useful -and sympathetic- outline 
of Bourdieu's sociology of body, makes a similar observation canceming habitus. 
He states that social reproduction comes before everything in Bourdieu's social 
theory and as a result, it becomes very hard for people to leave the social 
trajectory dictated by their social location, habitus and taste (146). Habitus, 
according to Shilling (1994: 146), operates beyand the will and control of the 
agent. 
61 
Consequent1y, a1though Bourdieu frequently asserts the facts of changing 
bodi1y dispositions, it is difficu1t in the extreme for his formu1ations to 
account for forms of embodiment and taste which do not correspond to their 
pre-assigned class bases. Furthermore, this focus on reproduction means that 
the body is primari1y a bearer of extema1 structures or cultural codes. 
In fact, Bourdieu acknowledges that there can be a mismatch between 
aspirations and opportunities or probabilities, implying that habitus may be 
differently shaped than the dietates of the field (see for example, Bourdieu, 1984: 
143-168). It cannot be denied that he incorporates a theory of social change: 
"Conditions for change rather than reproduction are set up when habitus 
encounters objective structures radically different from those under which it was 
originally formed" (Swartz, 1997: 113). Moreover, Bourdieu should not be 
blamed for insisting on that all behavior is governed by habitus. He writes that 
(1994: 108): 
habitus may be superseded under certain circumstances --certainly in 
situations of erisis which disrupt the immediate adjustment of habitus to 
field- by other principles, such as rational and conscious computation. 
However, as the critiques above demonstrate, the subjective, voluntarist 
dimension of individua1 ageney is undertheorized in Bourdieu. Although he 
conceptualizes habitus as both a structured and structuring structure, when it 
comes to creativity, hoping, planning, resisting, habitus seems to be unab1e to 
account for (1) the conditions of possibility of behavior that can be destructuring, 
and (2) the complexity and ambiguity of perceptions with respect to externa1 
realities. What I wish to do here is not to entirely reconceptualize habitus. Rather, 
I aim to focus on the political implications of these two critica! items. 
Therefore, the concept of habitus needs to be supplemented by a further 
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dimension of agency, one that is to account for the autonomous, conscious, 
voluntaristic action of the agent. Nicos Mouzelis (1995) makes exactly this move. 
According to him, ageney should be theorized in three dimensions: (1) the 
positional dimension, which represents the social location of the agent in the 
social space (class, roles, status, and so on); (2) the düpositional dimension as 
theorized by Bourdieu, representing class embodiment, intemalization of 
extemalities inscribed by the field and dispositional effects of socialization 
processes; and (3) the interactive-situational dimension, which is to account for 
processes of intra- or interaction, primary and secondary relationships, conscious 
strategies and creativity. Mouzelis (1995: 108-117) holds that habitus successfully 
corresponds to the second dimension (and although he refers to Parsons for the 
first dimension, I believe generative structuralism is highly capable, with its 
theory of fields and class analysis, to account for the first dimension), but bears 
far too mechanistic overtones to explain voluntaristic interactions. Mouzelis 
(1995: 1 12) expands that: 
If one is going to reject deterministic linkages, the habitus-practice 
articulation requires the introduction of conceptual tools to permit an 
investigation of the voluntaristic dimensions of social life; to the fact that 
laypersons are to varying degrees rational beings, consciously striving to 
increase their share of material and non-material "profits" by planning 
ahead, by constantly reassessing their actions on the basis of their past 
mistakes, and so on. The fact that huınan rationality is never as perfect as 
some rational decision-making models assume is no reason for simply 
writing it off, for dismissing the possibility of the conscious construction of 
rational strategies altogether. 
Therefore, Bourdieu "underemphasizes the voluntaristic, interactive-situational 
dimension of games, and so rejects the distinction between learning the rules and 
actually applying them while playing concrete games. He considers rules as often 
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unconscious, so that our knowledge of them is practical, and such knowledge 
cannot be separated, analytically or otherwise, from the actual playing of a game" 
(137). So Mouzelis, without ignoring the reproductive aspects of habitus, wants to 
underiine the independent (from the implicit field rules) reality of interaction. 
Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische (1998) have a very similar project for 
the theory of agency. They develop almost the same three-dimensional model: 
They first talk about the iterational element of agency, that is, the structural, 
institutional, inherited dimension, (more or less corresponding to the positional 
dimension of Mouzelis); secondly, they assert the projective element (the 
dispositional dimension) "the imaginative generatian by actors of possible future 
trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be 
creatively configured in relation to actors' hopes, fears, and desires for the 
future" (emphasis in original; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 971); thirdly, and the 
most problematic one for the concept of habitus, the practical-evaluative element, 
present-oriented, creative action independent of the imposed dispositions which 
may go beyond immediate adaptation to inconveniences caused by the external 
constraints. 
If we reflect this latter model on Bourdieu, it can be said that there are 
moments, according to him, when projective action is impossible, or is normalized 
inside the power struggles of the game. Thus, the formatioıı of dispositions are 
generally hardly independent of external processes. However, considering that 
habitus is not equipped to account for the possibility of future-oriented resistance 
creating new critical strategies which can shatter the doxa of the field, or present-
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oriented complexity of primary interactions which may potentially undermine 
field dynamics, Bourdieu' s theory requires the introduction of this third 
dimension. 
N o w, lo o king at ho w voluntaristic action becomes possible, at w hat happens 
to the "structure" then, at how autonomous, creative strategies can emerge 
contingently and unexpectedly provides us with a novel and supplementary 
perspective in studying the social. Furthermore, operationalization of the 
canceptual framework constructed for this dimension of ageney is a must for 
research purposes. On the other hand, I do not think that any of the three 
dimensions should be given a priori epistemological privileges. The practical-
evaluative element may be prominent in studying the sociology of scientific 
research, or the iterational element may be more emphasized in studying party 
politics. I believe that only after the analysis of proper survey research data can 
we decide which dimension seems to be more significant in making ageney itself 
possible. In the rest of this chapter, I focus on anti-systemic politics, and I plan to 
speculate on which dimension seems to be more significant in the politics of new 
social movements only after the analysis of Alevi politics. Before dwelling on the 
problem of resistance in the next section, I now turn to political closures caused 
by Bourdieu' s understanding of agency. 
3.3.2 THE VISION OF POLITICS IN BOURDIEU 
This seetion is titled "B ringing the Political Back In", but it should not be inferred 
from that bold claim that I think there is no politics in Bourdieu. It should be clear 
from what is said until here that blaming generative structuralism by being 
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apolitical is mere absurdity. I try to "bring back in" the notian of the political 
which is seen unfıt by Bourdieu, unfit, that is, for the layperson. On the other 
hand, he claims a number of ethico-political principles speaking as Bourdieu the 
responsible intellectual. His theory of ageney and his visian of politics seems to 
be contradictory. Nevertheless, I do not think that this contradiction is caused by 
an epistemological iıncompatibility inherent this theory, which means that a 
revision may be possible without leaving Bourdieusian territory. 
First of all, we see that Bourdieu is a radİcal defender of the possibility of 
social science (or science in general) in terms of producing part of the true 
knowledge of the world. For him, the practice of scientific reason "makes possible 
a valued mode of communication that Bourdieu believes is less available in other 
types of cultural practices" (Swartz, 1997: 252). Yet his visian does not reproduce 
a Habermasian view of universal reason or a rational subject like the Cartesian 
subject: according to him, there is developing a histarical possibility of something 
like a universal reason (or a rational subject): "[T]he universal subject is a 
histarical achievement that is never completed once and for all. lt is through 
histarical struggles in histarical spaces of forces that we progress toward a little 
more universality" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 190). 
Furthermore, Bourdieu believes that scientific inquiries are enlightening and 
emancipatory for the humankind. His project of self-reflexivity entails that as 
people become more aware of the structures and conditions they are made in, as 
the daminating principles of our world are exposed by the social scientific 
enterprise, the world may then be a freer and more peaceful place. For example, 
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he (1998b: 128) argues against the conservative vision of neo-liberal economists: 
So against this banker' s fatalism, that wants us to believe the world cannot 
be any different from the way it is -wholly amenable, in other words, to the 
interests and wishes of bankers- intellectuals, and all others who really care 
about the good of humanity, should re-establish a utopian thought with 
scientific backing, both in his aims, which should be compatible with 
objective trends, and in its means which also have to be scientifically tested. 
They need to work collectively on analyses able to launch realistic projects 
and actions closely matched to the objective processes of the orderthey are 
meant to transform. 
"A utopian thought with scientific backing" is clearly a strong Marxİst legacy. 
Bourdieu repeats this vision of intellectuals politically intervening through 
scientific practice frequently. In an interview, he (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1993: 
38) makes anather bold statement: 
My own wish is for collective enterprises undertaken by intellectuals in 
utmost autonomy from established powers (including from the state on 
which most of today' s intellectuals depend) in which they would use the 
achievements that this autonomy makes possible to intervene in political 
life, not as experts, but as autonomous subjects. 
This an interesting move indeed. We have seen above that the critics of 
Bourdieu are uncomfortable with the implications of his theory which deny 
autonomous action to the "layperson". Moreover, he has also denied this 
autonomy to most of his fellow scientists (Bourdieu, 1988a). Personally, however, 
Bourdieu believes that the intellectual, armed with the privilege of self-reflexivity 
and with the capability of showing the evils of the world to others, is an 
autonomous agent. The collectivity of intellectuals does not seem to be a 
"collectivity on paper" (remember the blame he put on Marx for metaphysically 
prioritizing the collectivity of proletarians). He says that (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1993: 38): 
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My dream would be to create an international of artists and scientists which 
would become an independent political -and moral- force capable of 
intervening, with authority and with a competence founded on their 
autonomy, about problems of general interest (such as nuclear power, 
education or the new bio-technologies). They would not rule but, while 
remaining in their place, they would constitute a very serious control over 
rulers, especially in those domains where they know a great deal, if only by 
saying that we do not know enough. 
Ought we to buy this? I mean, although I share his call for autonomy and 
freedom for intellectuals, do we have the luxury to deny, in theory, the possibility 
of autonomous action for the "masses"? I do not think so. Yet should we make a 
scapegoat of Bourdieu for being apolitical or pessimistic? Let us once again hear 
other voices. 
John Frow (1995: 46) is extremely sceptical of Bourdieu's proposal of self-
reflexivity which secures a critica! exteriority to "dominant n orms", arguing that 
this is certainly 
not a political positioning which would inscribe its own class interest in the 
analysis, since Bourdieu detaches his categories from the political process. 
N or is it given in the disrupted and ambivalent situation of the intelligentsia. 
One can only conclude that it is a purely disciplinary, authority that enables 
Bourdieu's work to stand outside the political imaginary, outside the 
categories of a dominant and all-embracing culture. 
Frow (46-47) thinks that Bourdieu' s Distinction is written from an "impossible 
perspective" which seems to be outside the borders of the social space and thus it 
ends up "like the king in medieval social taxonomy, 'who, by setting himself up 
as the absolute subject of the classifying operation, as a principle external and 
superior to the dasses it generated ... assigned each group its place in the social 
order, and established himself as an unassailable vantage po int' [ cited from 
Bourdieu, 1984: 477]". Frow is trying to kill Bourdieu with his very own words ... 
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Robbins (1991: 173) observes that Bourdieu has difficulty in explaining 
revolutions. I think Robbins believes that Bourdieu's theory of ageney tends to be 
in vicious circles: "Our capacity to make ourselves into different selves is a 
function of the ways in which social conditions have enabled us to be constituted 
cumulatively in thepast-and all of these ways are manifestations of the 'habitus' 
which was the dispositian to act an think which was enshrined in the ethos of the 
group into which we were bom" (173). Robbins (1991: 175) concludes that there 
is no way out for individuals, little ho pe to change the way of things, and he labels 
Bourdieu as a fatalist: 
Bourdieu seems to hold out little hope that the social conditions can be 
created which would enable us to programme ourselves differently. Such a 
revolution is almost logically impossible for Bourdieu because he does not 
adequately allow for physical change in the universe or for changes in the 
nature of the relationship between people and the material resources of the 
environment. 
It should be bom in mind that these criticisms of closure and pessimism are 
targeting Bourdieu's ways of interpreting his empirical researches, not his 
personal commitments. With regard to politics, he tends to privilege agent-
constraining social processes, while his own political commitments reflect quite a 
voluntarism and autonomy. 
Let me make another comment, exposing his consideration of the political 
field (outlined in Chapter 2) to stili another critical outlook. First of all, 
Bourdieu's vision of parliamentarian politics as a giant "belief-producing 
machine" neglects the difference the existence of a political spectrum (from 
radical left: to racist right) makes. Within the field as he constructs it, issues like 
honesty, sincerity, revolutionary radicalism, representation are not discussed. 
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Nevertheless, Bourdieu (1985: 741) easily mocks the Marxist strategy of "class-
based politics": 
A class exists insofar -and only insofar- as mandated representatives 
endowed with plena po testas agendi [the full power to act on be half of] can 
be and feel authorised to speak in its name -in accordance with the question 
"the party is the working class" or "the working class is the party'' a formula 
which reproduces the canonists' equation: ''The church is the pope (or the 
bishops), the pope is (or the hishaps are) the church"- and so to make it 
exist as a real force within the political field. The mode of existence of what 
is nowadays called, in many societies (with variations, of course), "the 
working class," is entirely paradoxical: it is a sort of existence in thought, an 
existence in the thinking of a large proportion of those whom the 
taxonomies designate as workers, but also in the thinking of the occupants 
of the positions remotest from the workers in the social space. 
Here, Bourdieu draws attention to the problem of representation and its 
relationship with power, and does this coherently and rightfully, but his visian is 
limited with a political field of his own construction, a construction which is more 
marked by determinism. 
Let us turn to Gayatri C. Spivak (1988) for a moment, who also wrote on 
(although making use of a different toolbox) the problem of representation. 
Spivak thinks that the subaltern of the Third World cannot speak, in terms of 
representing themselves, voicing their demand, in the political arena. They are 
unable to invoke a resistance against power like the oppressed in the West: the, 
say, Indian subaltern discourse is incommensurable with the one employed by the, 
say, proletarian supporters of the English Communist Party. Similarly, under the 
symbolic violence of the field of class-hased party politics, Bourdieu tries to say, 
the dominated, that is, the represented, is "named" under one class. Professionals 
speak for the "officially categorized"; however, the magical rituals organized 
under the party apparatus, t1ags, marches, brochures, education committees, 
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impassioned speeches, and so on render the represented silent. Where they can 
speak to be heard, they can only do that through the language of the dominated, 
which is internalized intheir body hexis. 
Bourdieu is not totally wrong here, as I will try to demonstrate -ın a 
different context- in Chapter 4. Yet both the canceptual strength of "class" and 
the problem of representation are imprisoned inside the stasis of his limited 
formulization of the political field. Class struggle becomes only a struggle over 
the being-perceived of class, over its classifications, rather than a struggle for 
emancipation or an important factor of social change. Bourdieu' s political 
discourse (not the one canceming the international of intellectuals but the one 
implied by the application of his theory to everyday reality), then, lets us only talk 
about oppression, silence or futile reactions, not about resistance. 
3.4 CONCEP/AC/TUALIZING RESISTANCE 
In arguing for the reconstruction of political in Bourdieu and in expanding his 
theory of agency, I have to limit the scope of my cancem in the constitution of 
"the political" through autonomous, voluntaristic action. So I make a pragmatic 
move and deal with the question of action only in terms of resistance and social 
movements. I deliberately leave out other forms of autonomous action within the 
practical-evaluative dimension of agency, like creativity, love and so on. 
I hold that any particnlar political practice, whatever its "size" (from going 
on a strike to cursing at the TV screen each time the commercials interrupt) is a 
resistance if it is invoked 1 motivated (under at least a minimum awareness of the 
resİsting age nt' s own dominated co ndition inside the field and awareness of the 
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existence of similar other agents suffering) by a will to change the order of things 
arousing the resistant act, and if the resultant autonomous action can be said to 
further the structuring of a habitus which opposes the doxa, conditionings favored 
and reproduced by the dominant groups. In this section, I will attempt to search 
for the conditions of possibility of resistance through class embodiınent. In the 
following section, my argument will be expanded, via the discussion social 
justice, so that collective action within the political field could be theoretically 
incorporated. 
I begin by questioning the relevance of resistance as it is theorized in 
"popular cultural studies". Almost a year ago, when I was lost into Bourdieu's 
texts, I wondered whether there had been a debate within the Cultural Studies 
paradigm about fetishizing consumption and pleasures taken from it. It was 
interesting, after an extensive review of the field, to encounter with a fierce battle 
between those scholars more inclined to retain the Ideologiekritik dimension of 
cultural analysis and those "posts" who fiked being more happy-go-lucky, who 
abundantly (and some irresponsibly) applied concepts like carnival, resistance, 
text, deconstruction and abstained from class, oppression, exploitation or 
revolution. (Of course, there are intermediate positions, but I have no place here to 
relate the whole debate, which also includes a battle between Sociology and 
Cultural Studies departments. Socialİst scholars, for example Jim McGuigan 
[1992] or David Harris [1992], who are fed up with the postmodern pessimism of 
mainstream Cultural Studies, develop an argument which calls for a class politics 
and a return to the critique of political economy.) Presenting a very short 
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overview -risking to do injustice by summarizing and limiting- of these debates is 
useful, especially in order to explain what is not resistance. 
I willlimit myself to the criticisms of the work of John Fiske (1987; 1989a; 
1989b), because he became the scapegoat, the symbol of "bad" cultural studies, 
and was depicted as the advocate of the populist cultural studies slogan "if it' s 
popular, it' s good" (see Frith, 1991). 
Douglas Kellner (1995), for example, expands on Fiske's analysis of 
Madonna and criticizes him for his exaggerated focus on text and audience and for 
his neglect of the structural, political economic basis of cultural production. 
According to Kellner (1995: 37), popular cultural studies is blind to the analysis 
of how audiences, their social relations and their reception of texts are produced 
by the general system of domination. He (1995: 38-39) continues: 
There is atendeney in cultural studies to celebrate resistance per se without 
distinguishing between types and forms of resistance (a similar problem 
resides with indiscriminate celebration of audience pleasure in certain 
reception studies) .... This approach, taken to the extreme, would lose its 
critica! perspective and would lead to a populist positive gloss on audience 
experience of whatever is being studied .... Accompanying the fetishism of 
resistance is the fetishism of struggle .... Political struggle is ... displaced 
into "struggle" for meanings and pleasure, while "resistance" is equated 
with the evasion of social responsibility, as in Fiske's examples of youthin 
video arcades, hanging out on the beach, surfing, or loitering in the malls. 
Modes of damination are occluded, and resistance and struggle are 
depoliticized and rendered harmless, thus providing an ideology of "popular 
culture" perfectly congruent with the interests of the powers that be. 
He goes on to remind us, sounding like Bourdieu, that pleasures do not have 
essences, they are learned, produced, reproduced and manipulated. The logic of 
the field of cultural production, especially if we are talking about the 
entertainment industry, will only allow temporary reactions, but resistance as 
73 
awareness of the illusory nature of the field, and as mobilized action aimed to 
transform it, is nearly impossible, at least it cannot be found if we limit our focus 
with the survival strategies followed by amateur rock bands, drug-addictive 
punks, or "gansta' rap" (which can, in the last analysis, be highly reproductive 
instead of being resistant). 
David Sholle (1990) joins Kellner in criticizing irresponsible uses of 
"resistance" to explain practices of cultural consumption. He blames Fiske for 
attributing a certain consciousness to the audience in producing pleasure from the 
cultural "texts", w hile assuruing that the "texts" are produced as a result of 
unconscious (and mostly unexplored by Fiske) processes. Popular cultural studies 
suffers from the lack of the critique of ideology (Kraniauskas, 1998), which 
results with the scholars' consent regarding the liberal pluralism of resistances 
(Sholle, 1990: 96): 
It is recognized by most cultural studies theorists that forms of resistance are 
defıned in part in terıns of the prevailing power. But, forms of resistance are 
not necessarily invested in the dominant form of power. If they were, then 
resistance would serve no purpose for the subordinant. However, it is 
precisely the nature of this tension between struggles defined and channeled 
through the prevailing form of power and alternative resİstant strategies that 
remain uncoopted by the hegemonic culture that is left undefined in popular 
cultural studies. The dominant culture does not simply produce dominant 
messages that it expects will win consensus; it manages and limits the kinds 
of re sistane e possible w i thin i ts discursive space. [ emphasis mine] 
Complaints also came from socialist feminist critics of Fiske; for example 
Williamson (1986) and Morris (1988) develop very similar arguments about the 
populism entailed in such cultural analysis and they call in a socialist critique of 
the ideological implications of locating resistance everywhere, so easily. What all 
these critics with different academic dispositions unite in is the recognition of a 
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critical (and necessarily political) stance against a postmodernized carnival of 
cultural production where oppression and exploitation is hidden. They call for the 
intellectual' s resistance, who is invited to eriticize the ordinary consumer' s 
"invented" resistance. 
Nevertheless, a great number of studies on the politics of new social 
movements which also include detailed cultural analyses, inspired by a post-
structuralist outology of difference, search for resistance as it is constituted 
through the political, even through the body, outside the framework of 
consumption. Yet my problem with most of these studies, within the problematic 
of the thesis, is that the politics of the specific movement analyzed is disconnected 
from the field of politics. There seems to be no general, common principles of 
oppression, the participants of the specific movement are portrayed as if their 
struggle for "right to difference" satisfies them as long as their enclosed political 
territory is secure. Yet "the political is not merely personal"; if a resİstant habitus 
is being developed, whatever the specific issue is, the (new, and this time, 
positive, in terms of enabling) dynamics of the political field should co ndition that 
habitus so that the agent acquires a shared responsibility for the sufferings and 
strugglings of others. I will come to that point later. 
Regarding the issue of resistance, Bourdieu is, as also implied in previous 
sections, much more pessimistic. One can say that at the root of this pessimism 
lies his idea that a field does not operate in terms of consciousness, nor does it 
supply the agents with the means to achieve this, a field "works in terıns of 
practices, mechanisms and so forth" (Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992: 113). The 
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doxa, the "set of beliefs" about the field' s regulations and rules that the agents 
have, renders the field of power which encompasses a specific field far less 
fragile, Bourdieu claims, far less, than Foucault thought it to be. This "iron 
strength" of power in Bourdieu' s thinking is subsequently justified by his 
assertian that agents generally do have a great amount of "practical knowledge" 
but they do not have the instruments to grasp the true implications of that 
knowledge, which would open the road to resistance. 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 23) has some other thing in mind: 
"If, to resist, I have no means other than to make mine and to daim aloud the very 
properties that mark me as dominated (according to the paradigm 'black is 
beautiful'), ... is that resistance? If, on the other hand, I work to efface everything 
that is likely to reveal my origins, or to trap me in my social position (an accent, 
physical composure, family relations), should we then speak of submission?" 
Bourdieu confuses us more in treating this dilemma between resistance and 
submission as an "unresolvable contradiction" (24); nevertheless, his answer lies 
again in the inner dynamics of the fields and their relations with the habitus. 
Neither individual submission nor resistance is a result of conscious action: the 
form of damination is not a robotic compliance, rather a result of the embodiment 
of the "rules of the game played"; whereas the "vision" of resistance is a result of 
the "play" of dispositions and the investment of capital species, again within the 
limits set by the field (Bourdieu, 1994: 155): 
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Resistance may be alienating and submission may be liberating. Such is the 
paradox of the dominated, and there is no way out of it. In fact, a proper 
treatment would be even more complicated, but I think this is enough to 
confuse sornewhat the simple categories, especially the opposition between 
resistance and submission, with which these questions are usually thought. 
Resistance occurs on terrains altogether different from that of culture in the 
strict sense of the word - where it is never the possession of the most 
destitute, witness all the forms of "counter-culture" that, as I could show, 
always presuppose a certain cultural capital. And it takes the most 
unexpected forms, to the point of remaining more or less invisible to the 
cultivated eye. 
I believe that there are cases where Bourdieu's account can be safely confirmed. 
However, we have seen that his theory of ageney bore deficiencies, which makes 
his claims about the "iron strength" of symbolic power problematic. On the other 
hand, Bourdieu, to my knowledge, never explores those mystic terrains where true 
resistance occurs. (He nowhere talks about, for example, the history, victories and 
defeats of the workers' mavement in Europe. His analysis of May 1968, on the 
other hand, ensures that universities at that time were surely not the terrains of 
true resistance [Swartz, 1997: 214-21 7].) 
At the cost of repeating myself, I want to quote anather text where Bourdieu 
talks about resistance. In an interview with Loi:c Wacquant, when he is reminded 
that the re have been criticisms of his canception of power being to o "mechanical", 
ciased to resistance, he gives a more straight answer (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1993: 35): 
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It is nonsense to suggest that I do not recognize the resistance of the 
dominated. To put it briefly: if I stress the complicity of the dominated in 
the ir own domination, it is to "twist the s tic k in the other direction", to break 
once and for all with this populist mythology in currency among 
intellectuals who feel a need to believe that the dominated are always on the 
alert, always ready to mobilize, to rise up, to overturn the oppression they 
suffer. Projecting their intellectual vision, which is that of a spectator, an 
external observer, they forget that the dominated are socialized by the very 
conditions in which they live and that they are therefore often determined -
to varying degrees- to accommodate to their situation, lest the world be 
totally unlivable for them. 
Let me for the moment postpone my answer to Bourdieu (he gives away too much 
here), and pass on to his critique of Foucault. 
I will be a little pragmatic here and confine myself only with Foucault's 
posture with regard to power and resistance, shamefully simplifying his argument 
for my purposes. For Foucault, power is a strategy, a network of complex 
relationships which cannot stand on its feet if there were no bodies resİstant to it; 
power does not essentially nullify resistance; on the contrary, because of 
resistance threatening to show up anywhere, power is rendered fragile. For him, 
"w hat defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not 
act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action 
upon action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the 
future" (Foucault, 1983: 220). Where resistance emerges, it emerges against the 
immediate power effect, whatever it is for that particular person. The target is not 
a class, an institution or anather person, the target is the attempt of power' s 
"governınent", its threat to inscribe and reinscribe the body. So against popular 
etütural studies, Foucault would say that resistance could not emerge from a free 
subject when he or she consciously produces a meaning out of the etütural product 
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which is not implied by the original encoders. Moreover, he would argue against 
the Fiskean implication, namely, that pleasure can arise outside the field of 
struggles, without a political identifıcation. Foucault holds that "the theme of 
struggle only really becomes operative if one establishes concretely -in each 
particular case- who is engaged in the struggle, what the struggle is about, and 
how, where, by what means and according to what rationality it evolves" 
(Foucault, 1980: 164). 
Bourdieu, however, sees Foucault' s approach as a "theorization of 
adatescent revalt against institutions" (emphasis mine; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1993: 34). He characterizes Foucault' s visian of power as being exercised on the 
body from the outside, always reducing power effects to disciplines and 
constraints on the body externally. So Foucault is blamed to be blind to the 
workings of habitus and field, through which violence is made "gentle", invisible, 
where the agents internalize perception, interpretation and evaluation schemes 
dictated by the structure. Bourdieu, after throwing that stone against Foucault' s 
"campus radicalism", declares that "domination operates through belief, through 
a doxic relation to structure" (34). 
Very well. Now the reader is urged to skim once again Bourdieu's answer to 
Wacquant I quoted three paragraphs above, meanwhile let me wear Bourdieu' s 
jacket and tap him on the shoulder: What is at stake, let me ask, in his polemic 
against Foucault and against all other social theorists sailing in the same waters 
with Bourdieu, in other words, inside the academic field? Isn't labeling Foucault' s 
large body of work "theory of adolescent revolt" childish itself? Are all academics 
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(add them radicals, writers, joumalists, poets, and the like) who talk about 
resistance credit "populist mythology", thinking that the oppressed are "always on 
alert"? What we witness here, in fact, is a struggle over the "legitimate way of 
classification" as Bourdieu himself quite often tells us. 11 However, this does not 
justify him. I fınd his strenuous labor in problematizing the intellectual' s position-
taking in his or her looking at the social very innovative, but the academic who 
insists on that the dominant are in a doxic relation with the power structure cannot 
be in a privileged position, either. 
Besides, I do not accept that resistance cannot have an effectivity, or more 
straightly, that it cannot constitute a possibility. I agree with a lot of things argued 
against "popular cultural studies", and with everything Bourdieu criticized about 
"legitimate party politics". However, if the "death" of the science of society is a 
hoax as Bourdieu himself defends, we people of the academy should not "break 
the stick" while twisting it (see his answer to Wacquant above), and should be 
conscious of our own "scientific" closures. Foucault knew what he was talking 
about when he suggested to look at where the struggle is, how it emerges, who is 
struggling. 
11 Academic struggles are a whole different issue, of course. Bourdieu (1988a) himself wrote a 
marvellous book on the inner dynarnics of the field. Yet shortly, witlıout renouncing his general 
approach, I can speculate that he had risked and invested too much academic capital inside the 
tield, and won quite precious positions, for some very good purposes (most of which I myself 
follow). It is interesting that he is rarely (if not never) critical about his own position as a 
"revolutionary" inside the field. He does not seem to be willing to accept a supplement from 
Foucault, and I suspect that Bourdieu' s own habitus in tlıe academic field has to do witlı this 
reluctance. 
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I refer to my problematization of Bourdieusian ageney again: We must 
elaborate, politically speaking, on the dimension where agents "who face 
changing situations that demand (or facilitate) the reconstruction of temporal 
perspectives can expand their capacity for imaginative and 1 or deliberative 
response" (emphasis original; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 1006) or "who feel 
blocked in encountering problematic situations can actually be pioneers ın 
exploring and reconstructing contexts of action" (emphasis original; 1009). 
However, against Foucault, I would argue that class has a distinctive 
position in defining the core of the embodiment of externality of life in the 
capitalİst society. The plurality (and difference) of resistances and reactions, of 
"practices in general'' is made possible via bodies shaped in and shaping the class 
embodiment, notina "free play" marked only by contingencies and dislocations. 
Moreover, I would say that Bourdieu's theory of practice has far more 
explanatory power compared to Foucault' s micro-politics. (Curiously, Foucault 
himself, like Bourdieu, was criticized by other discourse analysts [Fairclough, 
1992: 55-61] because of the impression he gave to his critics that his notian of 
power helplessly subjected people, that it manipulated them, and that resistance 
posed no threat. He was blamed to exclude practice from his theory, giving 
priority to linguistic structures. Yet this study is not the place to argue against the 
core of Foucauldian theory.) 
In brief, I assert that actualizing resistance, an issue far more problematic 
than conceptualizing it, within the political field so that political change through 
collective action becomes possible, requires a strong emphasis on the "heing 
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embodied" of class inequalities. In the final section, I expand on this. 
3.5 FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: BRICK(S) IN THE WALL 
BREAKING THE WALL? 
In this seetion I will build a final argument on the reconstruction of the political 
field and try to establish a basis for studying social movements within the 
problematic of resistance and radical change, without abandoning generative 
structuralism. I wish to assert, once more, that the attempt to expand the theory of 
ageney in Bourdieu as entailed in this thesis aims only to account for political 
action (yet I am quite confıdent that the main tenets of a three-dimensional theory 
of ageney even in the limited form I presented here, can be operationalized so that 
a broad plethora of sociological issues can be studied). Moreover, the way I grasp 
political action is certainly marked (if not biased) by my own ethical and political 
concerns, especially in my privileging of class embodiınent and class politics. 
(Class politics should be distinguished from class-hased politics, which, as 
Lafferty [1996] shows, fixes a particular class identity and defines the political 
only through the representation of the limited interests of that identity. Class 
politics is not limited, as radical democratic critiques of Marxism would like it to 
be, with one exploited group and with only the domain of economics.) Indeed, this 
seetion is where I most clearly present those concerns. I begin this proposed 
presentation, in order to legitimize the linkage between the body and the need for 
collective action against capitalism, by introducing the notioı1 of social justice. I 
will than expand more on class embodiment and the new dynamics of the political 
field. 
3.5.1 THE NEED FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
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There has been endless debates on the theory and practice of justice, especially 
after John Rawls' (1971) challenging views. Yet I will not deal with these fruitful 
exchanges between political liberals, economic liberals and communitarians. 
Rather, I will make a short visit to socialİst interpretations in order to connect 
commitment to justice with collective action. 
Iris Marion Young (1990: 37) holds that social justice concems the 
containment and support of the institutional conditions within the society for the 
realization of "values that constitute the go o d life". S he argues against the 
distributive justice paradigm which only limits itself, according to her, with the 
distribution of material things, and this insight takes her to supplement this 
paradigm with the notion of justice where two basic kinds of values for good life 
are protected (and let to flourish). Those are (Young, 1990: 37): 
(1) developing and exercising one' s capacities and expressing one' s 
experience ... and (2) participating in determining one's action and the 
conditions of one' s action ... These are universalİst values, inthesense that 
they assume the equal moral worth of all persons, and thus justice requires 
their promotion for everyone. 
Therefore, Young reduces injustice to two basic forms, each corresponding to the 
negation of these two values above respectively, oppression as the structural 
hindrance of self-development and awareness and damination as the structural 
hindrance of self-determination and autonomous action. For Young, oppression is 
inside domination, being a worse form of injustice, and she goes on to analyze 
different forms ("faces") of oppression in her book. One superficial reading of 
Young may claim that distributional issues as problematized by the Marxİst 
notion of justice (as thoroughly discussed in the exchange between N orman Geras 
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[1985; 1992] and Joseph McCarney [1992]), which prioritize the radical criticism 
of the political economy of capitalism, are undermined. However, I think that her 
approach is not incompatible with the socialist paradigm of distributional justice, 
although she seems to treat exploitation on an equal level with marginalization, 
powerlessness or cultural imperialism. For example, in referring to Young' s bo ok, 
David M. Smith (1994: 26) allies with her in expanding the scope of social justice, 
yet he holds that a distributional and relational notion of social justice, above all, 
is concerned with "[t]he questions of who gets what where and how". 
David M. Smith (1994), in his theoretical and empirical study on social 
justice, argues for the need to develop a radical and collective resistance against 
the logic of capital and the doruination of capitalist market economy. According 
to him, the evils of injustice, be they materially or symbolically based, stern from 
the current world-economic system. Smith follows, as I also do here, David 
Harvey (1992; 1993) and he disbelieves in the relevance of the postmodern 
critique of universalismin issues about justice and morality (Smith, 1994: 290): 
It is the continuing and perhaps increasingly important need to identify and 
combat social injustice, as something which people actually experience and 
wish to challenge, which is turning attention back to the possibility of 
principles which can transcend local, group or cultural specificity, while 
stili having regard to criticisms of universalizing theory which marginalizes 
"others" by paying insufficient attention to human differences. [emphasis 
mine] 
Inspired by Bourdieu, I would add to these invaluable insights, that while 
talking about social justice, one should pay attention to both dimensions of 
domination, material and symbolic, and one should acknowledge the 
distinctiveness of the material dimension in terms of constituting the conditions of 
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existence of symbolic power in fields. This insight, according to me, perfectly 
matches with the concrete fact that every agent, from the disabled service 
proletarian to the handsome yuppie, possess a physical body which has social and 
political needs. Injustice, in the first instance, is embodied via habitus, and this 
enables the agent to fight against it inside the political field. 
3.5.2 ENTER: THE POLITICAL FIELD 
Having long before in the thesis exposed myself, let me comfortably produce one 
of those handy clicMs of political thought in order to provoke the discussion: W e 
are bricks in the wall. (lt is another after-effect of the symbolic violence of post-
structuralism in the academic arena that I am at this very moment feeling a need to 
acknowledge that the "we" here refers to the entirety of the human race, not just 
the intellectual community.) Furthermore, we bricks are able to be aware of our 
"brickness", to be indifferent to that, to be totally ignorant of that, to be desiring 
that, most importantly, to put an end to that. And sure, we are all different, but not 
in our being-there-as-brickness. The point of that analogy is to allege that once we 
all agree that we are living in a capitalist society, under the tyrannous techno-
economy of capital (whose logic was masterminded exclusively by the Marxist 
tradition of political economy criticism), what we all have (and by which we 
"are") in common is the body-habitus complex. 
Now, I know that it is hard for me to persuade a gencration of intellectuals 
socialized into a sceptical and pluralistic academic culture (although I myself a 
member of that younger generation) into taking this proposal seriously. The 
rcsponsiblc eritic would sigh in disappointment, murmuring about holism and 
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reductionism, and would ask about the relevance of all the talk about identity, 
subject positions, free play, communities, pluralities, diversities, hybridities, new 
social movements, so on and so forth, to this. This thesis does not outwardly reject 
those alternative toolboxes. Nevertheless, I would suggest the social eritic to fmd 
a mirror and look at herself (and kindly ask her, for a moment, to forget Lacan): 
The entity in the mirror, which is surely there even if the mirror is absent, 
biologically, plus what inorganic and symbolic properties are articulated with 1 
made actual by that organism, is a changing product of an unjust, unequal, 
inhuman history which was there before it, whatever identity the entity bears, 
whether he or she is Bill Gates or Charles Bukowski or Madeleine Albright. If we 
are against the wall itself, if webelieve in the possibility of consciously rewriting 
our habitus, then this belief points to a potential: there may be similar unhappy 
others who may agree with us. Postmodern "cyborgs" like Arthur Kroker may 
believe that they can leave their flesh at the cloakroom, unknowingly (or with 
purpose) allying with "communistic" utopias of software giants like Microsoft, 
yet I choose to lend political trust on the ontology of body as a suffering, feeling 
and -necessarily- cursing entity. 
The body-habitus complex makes us as we make it; it enables us to be 
"gendered", placing us in a "gendered" history that w as made be fo re us, that is 
de formed and re-formed by the net of relations w e engage in; in various field s it 
endows us with the practical knowledge of the games, letting us to gain or lose 
power positions, rise in class or prestige, be among the dominant or the 
dominated; intluenced by our dispositions, needs, and by the structuring of more 
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external, beyand-our-control mechanisms and temporal effects, it inscribes us into 
ethnicities, nationalities or various other group identities; but which also, contra 
Bourdieu, is not always capable of limiting our resistance against all those 
external conditionings that make it as it is. Moreover, most assuredly, I am not a 
separate entity from this body-complex. I am it, it is me. According to me, talking 
separately about body, agent or habitus is possible as long as our move is 
methodola gical. 
There is a logic to how bodies become and how they act inside the 
historically and locally differentiating dynamics of capitalism. There is a truth to 
resistance: Although resistance does not promise us a catharsis (so we should 
better be realistic about the myths of total freedom, pure happiness, the city of 
God, back-to-basics, and so on), it enables us to mock, to ridicule our habitus' 
doxical relation to the structures, to act in order to transform the conditionings of 
the field. Ours should be a "reasoned utopia": most probably a far less muddy 
swamp with mu ch fe w er thorns, very unlike "paradise on Earth". 
Arguing that people create, discover, invent, speculate, evaluate, 
problematize, solve, so on and so forth, in their everyday practices will not be 
saying anything surprising. On the other hand, a great majority of people, at this 
very moment, are acting on the basis of a set of "practical knowledges" in 
different contexts, on which they are not equipped to ref1ect. Bourdieu states that 
the "logic" practice has operates through "strategies". Stili, rival, unexpected 
practices may emerge: Indeed, it happens everyday. When the local power supply 
is out of order in the evening for hours, the family becomes aware of what TV 
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does to their normal, electrified evenings, they become annoyed by the uneasiness 
caused by TVlessness. When the teenager "rebel" walks through the streets of a 
highly conservative district wearing a purple hair, a short skirt and various "cool" 
accessories, she enjoys the grumbles, angry looks, tut-tuts, prayers, satisfied with 
her overall "guerrilla attack" on the conventional logic of clothing practice. 
We can think about thousands of examples. The problem is that the 
"awareness" such reactions imply is most of the time temporary, not radicalized 
and the practical results are insignificant. The practical-evaluative dimension of 
ageney tends to produce more significant and more organized dispositions and 
practices most frequently inside the field of politics. Only here reactions have a 
chance to become resistances. Religious communities, feminist struggles, worker 
strikes, student demonstrations, ecological movements, gay-lesbian politics, 
regional-ethnic uprisings, socialİst or communist radicalization, and so on are all 
situated within this field where the agents from different political orientations 
have both similar and dissimilar dispositions. The boundaries of the political field 
are never fixed, they are always wavering. Historically, it may be subjectedunder 
the field of legitimate politics, it may be transformed into an apparatus in the 
Althusserian sense (thus losing its flexible properties as a field), where the 
revolutionary cadres become the new oppressors. Yet practices specific to this 
field and the political movements participating should share (that is, attempts to 
articulate different movements should propose) a certain logic: to transform the 
logic of practices specific to other spheres of life, to revolutionize the field(s) in 
concern, and to change one' s own habitus in the process. What may be at stake 
88 
within the field is the control of the means to maintain reactions (which may 
become resistances the langer the dispositions engendering them survive, the 
langer the agent remains active in the field, being mo re aware of the "truth" about 
his 1 her position); means to expose the mechanisms of other fields, to utilize this 
awareness for political feed-back, and most importantly, control of the means to 
mobilize numerous reactions and resistances, articulating different (and proper) 
political struggles for a "bigger cause". Furthermore, self-reflexivity should be, 
through processes of political socialization, advocated so that none of the allying 
groups gain the upper hand in the field. That would only reproduce closures. 
Politically speaking, it is futile to passively applaud the plurality of social 
movements, each having a claim on a separate conflictual sphere, like 
environmental issues, animal rights, regionalism, homeless people, feminism, 
religious liberties, and so on. Although difference is for sure not to be effaced, the 
extreme fragmentation within the field of politics (I am not, any longer, talking 
about the field in strictly Bourdieu' s terms) has, in the last analysis, counter-
revolutionary, or, to use more forınal language, reproductory implications. 
Appreciation of difference among social movements should not justify 
indifference of each mavement to struggles and forms damination canceming 
other movements. Each sub-field (shaped by the endless debates and struggles 
within each movement) of politics carries the potential to further the production of 
a notian of "we" gathered araund comman principles, gathered for social justice, 
and against everything the dominant represent. A notian of "we" which is not 
holistic, not prone to doxical closures, but stili reaching across all sub-fields and 
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perhaps across even territorial boundaries. I am not claiming that constraints and 
hindrance of autonomous action is unlikely in the political field, but I am talking 
about the possibility of the impossible. 
This "we" may manage to break the chains of the "we" formed within sub-
fields as group identities, as long as there are people keeping each other "aware" 
of the injustice and inequalities they embody. David Harvey (1993) rightfully 
complains about the fragmentation, worse, compartmentalization of political 
struggles as a result of postmodern relativism, where each particular struggle 
"minds its own business". Harvey (1993: 60) invites us to recognize that "some 
kinds of (unspecified) universals are necessary and that some sort of epistemology 
(unspecified) is needed to establish when, how and where difference and 
heterogeneity are significant". He continues to remind us that it is increasingly in 
terms of money, capital flow, commodities, markets that the inhabitants of the 
world are sharing homogeneity and sameness (61-62), so to revolt against that 
sameness for a just world requires to recognize that sameness and hold on to "our" 
universals and principles. Thus, contra Bourdieu, it is not revolutionary to render 
individual subjectivities -however passive 1 pacified they are- as slaves of their 
habitus. Toni Negri (1994: 237) puts the necessity to politically link 
individualities and collectivities more straightly: 
90 
What does it mean, then, to ground a new politics today? It means above all 
positively grasping the passive collectivities or, if you wish, the latent 
subjectivities that are directly implied by the institutions of the Welfare 
State, by the new configuration of the labor process, or by the recent social 
hegemony of technico-scientific labor. W e have to apprehend the site of an 
absence, the positivity of a latency, the invisible hand of the collectivity. W e 
have to recognize how on this site, canfronting a destabilization of the 
enemy power, the motor of the social destructuration of damination is 
established. 
I will not try to filter Negri's political program for a "communist democracy" for 
the purposes of the thesis, I share his basic motive. If we denounce political 
representation for the Spivak:ian fear that one cannot speak: for the producers of a 
discourse whose language is in fact alien to the representer, it will lead to a 
dangerous relativism where all agents fight their own battles, within their own 
political playing grounds, indifferent to what is going on in the rest of the political 
field. 
At that point, Bourdieu's insight about the academic interrogator being able 
to objectify and expose the logic of practice, without falling for relativism or 
mechanical positivism, is not meaningless, as long as we establish that 
"laypersons" are (or can be) also self-reflexive. Bourdieu also always states that 
the process of sociological interrogation (field research, interviewing, 
participatory observation, and so on) is a process capable of equipping the agent 
being interrogated with tools s/he can reflect upon the practices daminating him or 
her. I would add that the agent does not always have to wait for the responsible 
intellectual for that. 
So consequently, I am in total agreeınent with Harvey (1993: 62) that this 
very day, theoretically and politically, we have an emergency to reclaim "the 
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terrain of justice and of rights for progressive political purposes". However, while 
I propose here, quite optimistically, to say "yes, yes" (amen!) to the prayers for 
collective action to come, history may stili smile upon the dominants and 
oppressors, and thus new social movements in Turkey may become new channels 
of compliance and obedience in the near future. 
3.6 PACKING THE TOOLBOX ... 
I have set up a thorough critique of the reception of the political in Bourdieu by 
supplementing his theory of agency, bringing new insights into the field of 
politics and problematİzİng his understanding of resistance. In doing so, I have 
alsa exposed myself: I emphasized the iınportance of class inequalities and the 
notian of embodiınent, I canfessed my dispositions canceming social justice and 
collective action and I did all these within a general socialist standpoint. Back in 
those pages lies my sins and mistakes, silences and possible closures. Yet now a 
more important task is ahead: Can Alevi politics and the public debates araund 
Alevism as they developed in the last decade, be reconceptualized as a social 
movement, or, in Bourdieusian terms, a political sub-field? What are the enabling 
and constraining elements in Alevi politics? Is there any possibility for the 
emergence of radical political action from within Alevism which could be 
articulated with a general anti-systemic mavement in the future? Or should we 
affirm Bourdieu, at least in this case, and emphasize the closures and doxical 
effects, disbelieving in resistance? What is the significance of religion in the 
politicization of Alevis m? 
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CHAPTER 4. 
CONTEMPORARY ALEVI 
POLITICS 
4.1 OFFERING A RESEARCH AGENDA 
In this chapter, having packed my re(de)fıned toolbox -filled with concepts and 
categorical constructions- I am going to "test" the usefulness of generative 
structuralism in a sh ort journey int o the heartlands of the "empirical world". I 
write the word "test" inside quotation marks, because the way I deal with Alevi 
politics in Turkey as it developed in the last decade cannot be a true test which 
would fulfil conventional social scientific protocols: My account here does not 
build on a field research and I have no statistical data to test and argue upon 
various hypotheses. Rather, my "test" relies upon a thorough literature survey, and 
I totally accept that this may create problems of plausibility in the arguments I 
offer and in the relationship of my account with what really is going on. However, 
considering the narrower sc o pe of a master' s thesis, I do not think that the limits 
of my research on Alevism should lead to thinking that generative structuralism is 
totally irrelevant. Planning to study social movements -especially those based on 
religion- in the future, I will attempt to outline a path which would lead, in future 
studies, to confirming (or rejecting) generative structuralist arguments in the field. 
In that sense, all the way into the formatian of this chapter dealing with Alevism, I 
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aimed to offer a research agenda (I expand briefly on what can be done for 
research purposes in the final chapter). 
There is also a second dimension to my account in this chapter: Following 
my "bold" arguments for collective action and class embodiment in the previous 
chapter, I am going to investigate the political implications of Alevism (or rather, 
Alevisms) as a social movement. Recalling my critical and reconstructive 
engagement with Bourdieu; my investigation of the inner dynamics, future trends, 
dominant and subaltern forms of Alevism will demonstrate whether my criticisms 
of Bourdieu are sound, and to what degree my analysis and Bourdieu' s are 
relevant for sociologically mapping this seetion of the Turkish political field. It 
will be in Chapter 5, the conclusion chapter, where I will discuss, more generally, 
about the potentialities of social movements in Turkey and how they can form 
alliances for a collective political struggle which would aim a more democratic, 
more pluralistic, egalitarian and just society. 
Therefore, I am proposing a twofold performance, with a mutual 
relationship with the third chapter: Firstly, mainly building on my proposal for 
rethillking human agency, I am going to investigate how autonomous action (in 
political terms) is enabled and constrained in Alevi politics, and this search for 
ageney (and the methodology to be used in order to operationalize this search in 
future studies) constitutes the basis of my research agenda. Secondly, this time 
referring to the sociological way I have exposed my ethico-political dispositions 
in the third chapter, I am also going to investigate the political possibilities 
cxisting inside the field of Alevi politics. 
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I begin with a brief introduction to Alevism in Turkey below, where I 
discuss how the case could be best objectifıed for social analysis. In the coming 
sections, I will further investigate into different dimensions (debates, literature, 
political agents) of Alevism. 
4.2 OBJECTIFYING ALEVISM 
As Bourdieu correctly draws our attention, the social scientist cannot escape from 
objectifying what s/he is studying. Assuming that the social scientific enterprise is 
meaningful for him or her, s/he has to establish certain categorical distinctions and 
follow certain "academic" protocols, which ultimately leads to the construction of 
the social scientific object. However, the point is to establish a proper relationship 
with this construction (Bourdieu, 1990: 135): 
Social science has to reintroduce into the full definition of the object the 
primary representations of the object, which it first had to destroy in order to 
achieve the "objective" definition. Individuals or groups are but by what 
they are reputed to be, a "being-perceived" which, even it closely depends 
on their being, is never totally reducible to this. Social science therefore has 
to take account of the two kinds of properties that are objectively attached to 
them: on the one hand, material properties, starting with the body, that can 
be counted and measured like any other thing of the physical world; and on 
the other hand, symbolic properties which are nothing other than material 
properties when perceived and appreciated in their mutual relationships, that 
is, as distinctive properties. 
So the question of reflexivity comes into the scene: The social scientist should be 
aware of the dangers her "spectator" position, her "outsider' s viewpoint" bears. 
He must be careful not to co me up with a perfectly "measurable thing", separated 
from the realm of symbolic struggles. During the process of objectification, a 
"social order", a "system" or a "function" cannot be assuredly imposed on w hat is 
goıng on. 
In that sense, my invocation of the Bourdieusian toolbox for the 
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purpose of generating statements about Alevi politics and Alevi identities is an 
attempt of objectification which, because of a lack of thorough investigation of 
the empirical situation (lack of a field research), bears the danger to fall for 
objectivism. To get rid of possible closures to be caused by this, I will try to catch 
Alevism in as relational a context as possible, by drawing attention to different 
social and political dynamics. 
Before warming up the discussion, I feel obliged to note that my focus will 
be limited to the last decade (from the end of the 80s until today) of Alevi politics. 
Therefore, I am not co ncemed with the history of the formatian of different forms 
of Alevism in the past (this history itself is a stake in the struggles for hegemony 
inside the Alevi political field). Moreover, my engagement with Alevism in the 
pre-1980 era of the Turkish Republic will not be comprehensive. I see the life and 
times of Alevisms until the 1980s as constituting an accumulated resource of 
various species of symbolic capital. Different agents draw different lessons from 
the history of Shah Isınail and Safawites, from Sheikh Bedreddin, from the 1960-
1980 era. Whether such lessons are historically correct is not my concern, but the 
meanings given to the cult figure, Ali, or to Pir Sultan Abdal, for example, is 
important for their effects on conditioning contemporary political attitudes and 
actions. It is through the symbolic capital of this history that various Alevi people 
define the ir "enemies" and "friends". 
The first thing to be noted about our construct "Alevism" is that there is not 
one single Alevism. There are various interpretations of Alevism, constituting 
various differing identities, religious practices, political coınınitınents and so on. 
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One of my central aims in this chapter is to catch this diversity inside the Alevi 
political field (and I use the category "Alevism" in singular to signify the political 
field, not a single identity 1 community). On the other hand, except for a few 
accounts, it is a common approach in the literature on Alevism that there is an 
Alevi identity which has become publicized (I will be dealing with this literature 
later). However, there are not only various Alevisms, there are also outsider 
claims on Alevism, trying to place the religious taught into their own casts. 
One very frequent interpretation of contemporary Alevism is that a 
"revivalism" is being experienced, a long-oppressed people is "returning" to the 
political scene, daiming justice and recognition ( e.g., see Çamuroğlu, 1 998; 
Zelyut, 1993). According to this rather halistic understanding, with socio-
economic developments and the relative "enhancement" of democracy after the 
coup, the once-silenced voice of the Alevi community is raised again, and 
millions of Alevi citizens are reawakening. Çamuroğlu (1998: 80) points out to 
three general reasons for the revival: Firstly, he mentions the fall of Communisms 
and its disillusionment effect on those leftists close to Alevism, which resulted 
with a focus on more cultural and ethno-religious aspects of the taught. Secondly, 
the rise of Sunni political Islam alerted the Alevi population, and they rapidly 
grew a defensive instinct (the need for such an instinct, in the eyes of many 
Alevis, was justified after the barbarous massacre of July 1993 in Sivas). This is a 
notable point, also addressed by Kehl-Bodrogi, who argues that the timing of the 
reawakening was no coincidence (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997: xiv): 
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It occurred at the peak of the political struggles to preserve the laicistic 
legacy of Kemalism. In this situation the Alevis were in a position to present 
themselves to secular Turkey as a natural stronghold against Islamism and 
as "guarantors of laicism". Indeed, the secularist circles had from the outset 
regarded Alevism, which presented itself as progressive, religiously tolerant 
and democratic, as their closest allies. 
Thirdly, Çamuroğlu mentions the Kurdish problem, where the considerable 
number of Kurdish Alevis turned towards this religious element of their ethnicity. 
Ayte Ayata (1997) also defınes a single Alevi community which has historically 
had "leftist" political tendendes and has been against anti-democratic Sunni 
practices, and emphasizes the rise of "Alevi identity politics". 
This stress on the "revivalism" of Alevi politics is not, of course, wholly 
misleading. Nevertheless, I have some reservations. It is stated by various authors 
that Alevi communities, or communities whose religious beliefs and practices are 
very similar to them (such groups, as in the case of Babai people of the Selchuk 
era, may be antecedents of actual Alevi communities; see Çamuroğlu, 1992), have 
historically been oppressed and discriminated by authorities and by Sunni 
communities (Çamuroğlu, 1992; Melikoff, 1993; Ocak, 1996; Ocak, 1998; 
Özkırımlı, 1998). Furthermore, the political struggles of the 1960s and 70s 
witnessed extreme discrimination against Alevi citizens, who were labelled as 
"reds", "atheists", "immoral people" and so on, and there were actual cases of 
murdering just because the victims were Alevi. However, in the contemporary 
scene, those who are "reawakening" cannot be the same oppressed masses, not 
only because of the time span, but because of the fact that the social and political 
context has totally changed. Two questions are iınportant here: (1) Is there really 
one unified Alevi community under oppression, which now raises its voice against 
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this injustice, or do diversified, affirmative, pro-systemic, non-radical versions 
exist? (2) Who lead the process of "revivalism", who "speak for" the community 
and publicize its demands? 
My point of entry into the discussion of Alevism will be over these two 
questions. It is certain that the way "being an Alevi" was politicized in novel and 
unseen ways, compared with the reception of Alevism in the history of the 
republic, in that sense, I see the formatian of a new Alevi political field after the 
Iate 80s as a repoliticization if not revivalism. Diversities were of course existent 
before that time, but the way they became publicized, in a context of urbanization 
and socio-economic restructuring, was totally different. For one thing, Alevi 
religiosity was badly hit by these processes (Seufert, 1997: 1 73): 
W ith the opening up of the closed parochial communities and the migratian 
of their members to the big cities, the orally mediated and simple folk-
beliefs of the Alevi are confronted by an outside world which cannot be 
integrated into their traditional religious parameters. The Alevi' s narrow 
social basis of tribe and village communities, and their isolated conditions 
of life, resulted in a mystic world-view which failed to objectify itself in a 
widespread written tradition. 
This had a permanent effect on the manifestation of Alevism in the urban arena 
(Bozkurt, 1998). The cultural and histarical "content" of Alevism was redefined 
as a resource of urban survival in maintaining an "extra-state welfare system" 
through informal networks and clientalism (Erder, 1997), which brought with 
itself not only oppositional forms of Alevism, but also pro-systemic forms, where 
the new content of "Alevi identity" was employed as a social capital in the 
constitution of lifestyles. Therefore, I read the contemporary constitution of a 
qualitatively different political field of Alevism as a modern, urban response to 
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the growing disturbances (religious- or economic-based), and to a large extent 
(there are rare exceptions), the agents active inside the political field, whose 
voices are heard, are a minority of the whole Alevis. It is hard to talk about a 
grassroots revivalism, though there is a considerable support from ordinary Alevi 
citizens. My point will be much clearer in the following sections. 
Alevi religiosity can be very generally -and very cautiously- defmed as a 
religious syncretism (including influences from Turkic shamanism, Shi'ism, 
sufism, Sunnism and Mazdaism) which can be interpreted as part of Islam. Many 
of the religious practices, textual interpretations and beliefs of versions of 
Alevism are totally different, and at times in opposition to Sunni Islam, the largest 
sect in Turkey (covering perhaps more than three quarters of the Muslim citizens). 
Therefore, in the political field, and as a part of the formation of Alevi lifestyles, 
religious capital is an important "stake" over which there is an endless struggle, 
and not only among Alevi believers, but also for "outsiders" having political 
claims on Alevism. On the other hand, given the differing content of Alevi 
religiosity, and the historical association of the political struggles of Alevi 
communities with "insurrection against oppression" or "battle for freedom and 
justice", the re have been secular and socialistic claims about Alevism. Such 
claims have started the circulation of an intellectual capital inside the field, a type 
of symbolic capital which is more concerned in the cultural, political or economic 
explanations and justifications of the belief system, bringing in quasi-sociological 
perspectives (like intrepreting Alevi politics as "class struggle") from a secular 
standpoint. Against religious dogma, for example, themes like "love" (of God, of 
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humanity) may be stressed (as in Kaleli, 1995). 
According to Johnston and Klandermans (1995: 10) there are three levels of 
meaning construction in a social movement: (1) public discourse, in which all 
citizens participate and where collective beliefs, via public circulation and 
transformation, may change in the long term; (2) persuasive communication, 
micro-level interactions of the mavement activists with other people for purposes 
of winning them into their cause, here activists try to manipulate or create a 
cansensus between their own and the others' beliefs; (3) consciousness raising, 
joined by the activists and sympathizers of the movement, occurring at times of 
meeting, demonstration, and so on. Of course, it is hard to talk about a general 
Alevi social movement, however, given that main rival groups active in public 
debates (and those numerous sınaller versions invisible publicly, but active at the 
grassroots, everyday level) share many beliefs with regard to Alevi religiosity, 
recognition of the Alevi identity, and the bitter experiences Alevi people had in 
the past, we can talk about a social movement. In that sense, after 1990, public 
discourse on Alevism intensified and as the debates went on, rival groups within 
the mavement -which was never a harmonious, organized, single movement-
sharpened their oppositional lines. On the other hand, in Turkey, as well as in 
some EU countries, the US and Australia, many associations, foundations, 
journals, culture centers, organizations and the like have been opened, concerning 
different aspects of Alevi culture, and through these consciousness raising 
channels, Alevi identities defined their boundaries. It should also be added that 
dire public events like the Sivas massacre in 1993 and police forces' murders in 
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Gazi, Istanbul in 1995 contributed to the strengthening of the axis of tension 
between Sunni and Alevi citizens. Furthermore, it could be argued that the 
demands of recognition from different Alevi groups and their struggling for 
eliminating wrong-headed Sunni bias against them, supply the movement with a 
persuasive communication level, which, of course, need not always be successful. 
Nevertheless, most of the popular books on Alevism bear this inherent desire for 
persuasion, for falsification of illegitimate defınitions or for showing what "true" 
Alevism is. Alevism is also different in nature than other non-religious social 
movements like women' s movement or the gay-lesbian movement in that it has a 
primary socialization component: Alevi generations are bom into and politically 
socialized in the movement, beginnin from childhood, or at least Alevi children 
gain sympathy for the cause of any Alevi group. They do not usually have, for 
example, when they are not open sympathizers, negative bias against socialist and 
social demecratic left. 
Analytically, two levels of social interaction may be defined for the politics 
of Alevism. The first is in direct relationship with the public discourse level of 
meaning construction, and will be my main concern in this chapter: Alevi political 
field as a su b-field of Turkish politics. Here the re are fe w er group s struggling, but 
the dynamics of the field, I will argue, determines whether the social movement 
tends to be affirmative or transformative, that is, "another brick in the wall" or 
radical. (In passing, although I will expand on this point in the coming pages, it 
should be noted that Alevi politics, as far as I could interpret it, obeys largely the 
"deterministic" model proposed by Bourdieu (problematized in Chapter 3), not, to 
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my alternative model outlinedin Seetion 3.5. For one thing, the whole field, as a 
sub-field of Turkish politics, seems like neither to produce necessary political 
influences in order to satisfy the demands of the masses it represents, nor to 
wholly ally with other movements for radical changes. Moreover, the inner 
dynamics of the field produces its own closures about which I will talk.) The 
second level is the group-interactional level, where both constitution of everyday 
life and influences of the field converge. I will be talking less about this level (and 
studying it empirically has to be included in our research agenda), but it should be 
noted that much of what is going on here, including some of the organizations' or 
communities' activities (again, as far as I could investigate), is not represented in 1 
does not influence the first level to a great extent. This is rather weird, considering 
that the dimension of ageney neglected by Bourdieu, destructuring, autonomous 
action, emanates from here, when it has the opportunity. I will not discuss the 
reasons for that "reign" of constraining dynamics of Alevi politics at the moment, 
leaving the discussion to the end ofthe chapter. 
The final part of my objectification of Alevism concerns the political 
dimension of my own account here, mentioned in Seetion 4.1. W ith a mo re 
general aim to investigate the possibilities of the formation of a "political 
collective" among anti-systemic, non-violent movements in Turkey, I will also 
reconsider my account of Alevi politics from a perspective suggested by Nancy 
Fraser (1998). Fraser makes an analytical distinction between recognition-
redistribution and between affirmation-transformation. Thus, a politics of 
redistribution is about socioeconomic injustice, rooted in the political-economic 
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structure of society (21). A politics of recognition, on the other hand, deals with 
cultural or symbolic injustice, rooted in social patterns of representation, 
interpretation and communication (22). Furthermore, she distinguishes between 
affirmative and transformative forms of politics (31-2): 
By affirmative remedies for injustice I mean remedies aimed at correcting 
inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the 
underlying framework that generates them. By transformative remedies, in 
contrast, I mean remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes 
precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework. The nub of 
the contrast is end-state outcomes versus the processes that produce them. 
Fraser offers a matrix between these two pairs of categories and investigates 
varıous social movements (from gender politics to race struggles) inside this 
matrix, comıng up with a call for, from a socialist-feminist standpoint, the 
reconciliation 1 alliance of transformative forms of politics of recognition and 
politics of redistribution. 
Following Fraser, I hold that by all means, the ways of politicization of 
Alevi identities define an overall "politics of recognition" for the movement. I 
will argue that there is a politically weak call from some of the leftist sections of 
the movement for expanding to movement to change the current regime of 
redistribution, but compared to the overall tendencies, such attempts are 
irrelevant. My account, as I made apparent sornewhere above, also demonstrates 
that Alevi politics is affirmative in the last analysis. Attaching this debate to the 
criticism of Bourdieu, it is certain that "transformation" is in close relation with 
political action which is both collective and which emanates from autonomous 
action and awareness of the unjust conditions to be transformed. There is a 
potential for that inside the political field of Alevism, but there are also very tight 
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constraints. 
Having made this entry into the realm of Alevi politics, I now turn to 
develop the actual discussion, on the way concretizing what actually Alevi politics 
ıs. 
4.3 WRITTEN ALEVISMS: IDENTITY POLITICS ON 
PAPER 
The first, and perhaps most significant, marker of the repoliticization process of 
Alevi identities is the rapidly growing literature dealing with every thinkalıle (and 
unthinkable) aspect of Alevism. So in order to make sense of Alevi politics, we 
should first make sense of the general shape and content of this vast amount of 
written and published work.12 
The repoliticization process of the Alevi identity does not have a fixed 
"origin". However, the Iate 80s can bemarkedas the period when the first popular 
and academic works began to appear, and the first debates were heard (or read) in 
the media. After 1990, both in Europeandin Turkey, Alevi (Turkish and Kurdish) 
cem houses, organizations, associations and federations began to flourish, most 
having sub-branches of literary or other specifıc societies. Nevertheless, I think 
that the Alevi Manifesto is a significant landmark in the re-politicization of 
Alevism in post-coup Turkey. It was written collectively by numerous 
12 It is necessary to remind that "written Alevism" should also cover documentation circulated via 
other forms of media, like TV and radio channels or the Internet. Aside from the coııcrete fact that 
I had no access (and neither the time to do that) to the prograrn archives of telecommunication 
media, I think that for the ordinary Alevi believer, books (brochures, handouts, and the like) are 
much more solid, permanent and easily accessible. 
105 
intellectuals, religious (Alevi or Sunni) persons, academics, authors and 
journalists in March 1989 and first published in February 1990 (for a reprint of the 
manifesto, see Zelyut, 1990). The manifesto begins with the following opening 
statement: 
This manifesto airns to make the problems of Alevism, a branch of 
Muslimhood living in Turkey, known and to inform the public with the 
demand s of Ale vis. . . . Alevis see other beliefs as "true, beautiful, sacred". 
However, they expect a siınilar positive sense and approach for their own 
faith and culture ... The recognition of the Alevi taught will be a source of 
peace and prosperity for Turkey ... 
The manifesto goes on to call for the acceptance of the difference of the 
Alevi faith and culture, equal representation and opportunities in education, media 
and in receiving their own religious services. It is further emphasized that Alevis 
have always supported and do support the principles and reforms of Atatürk, and 
Sunni people are called to learn mo re about Alevis and get rid of their biases. 
Therefore, with this text, the Alevi identity made its first influential public 
appearance. Although the irnplication iıı the manifesto that there is only one 
singular Alevism and a unified Alevi people is objectable, the text is of high 
importance for it was prepared by intellectuals and received very positively in the 
intellectual community, an effect which later lured many non-religious people or 
even non-practising Sunni sympathizers into contributing to the growing Alevi 
literature. This fact also demonstrates how intellectual capital is used for an 
influence inside the field. 
In making a brief survey of this vast accumulation of texts, my attempt will 
naturally be far less than exhaustive, but will give a general idea about how the 
political claims, blames and demands are constructed and supported within the 
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field. As Tord Olsson (1998: 200) implies, the mere existence of this small library 
of Alevi literature shows the eagerness of the Alevi communities to know about 
their identities and to produce histarical and political claims about them: 
Among the rights claimed by minorities like the Alevi is the right to write 
down their own version of history. . . . The reflection on a common past 
would normally tak:e shape in a body of interpretative postdictions which we 
call "history". By writing or telling one's own history an imagirred 
community of an idealized past is constructed, and even conjured up, into 
which the needs and wishes of all present are projected. Like genealogies 
and origin myths, the teliing of history provides meaning, experience of 
identity, and visibility. Hence, historiography creates mutually conflicting 
histories which are used and abused to justify politically controversial 
issues, such as claims on !and and independence. [emphasis mine] 
I divide the Alevi literature into three: (1) popular works, (2) semi-academic 
and journalistic works, (3) academic works. In this classification, I had in mind a 
number of criteria: the targeted readers of the work, the topics included, 
references and methodology used, the language, and so on. While the gap between 
popular works and academic works is certain, the boundaries of the second 
category are very vague. Nevertheless, I think that this classification has a 
sutficient explanatory power for my purposes. 
4.3.1 POPULAR WORKS 
Popular works on Alevism deal with a number of comınon theınes: Alevi religious 
teachings, rituals, folklore, poetry, the nature of Alevi religious institutions like 
cem or musahiplik. Alınost all of such works give a brief history of Alevisın and 
depending on the writer' s political intentions, these histories vary: S ometimes the 
cult of Ali may be highly praised, sametimes various social uprisings in Selchuk 
and Ottoman history are emphasized, or the writer ınay try to justify his or her (it 
should be noted that an overwhelming majority of the contributors to the Alevi, 
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literature are male) case by focusingona certain personality, lik:e Pir Sultan Abdal 
or Hacı Bektaş Veli. The target population is either the large amount of"ordinary" 
Alevis (usually, the subaltern members of the community) who do not have access 
to practical knowledge about Alevism and who, in the official education system, 
caıınot learn anything about Alevism; or the mass of Sunni readers who do not 
know anything about Alevism (and most probably what they know is highly 
biased) are targeted. 
The authors of popular works may or may not have high level of education 
-yet there are very few practising academics in this group- and they are 
sometimes Alevi religious leaders (dedes or dede-babas, or descendants of them) 
with a significant amount of religious and histoncal knowledge on the specific 
A1evism they have faith in. A very common practice is the supp1ementation of the 
texts by tasavvuf, Alevi-Bektashi poetry, religious prayers, excerpts from Koran 
or from A1i's or Muhammed's sayings. A1though they are 1ess in number, there 
are also popular works by Sunni religious people (e.g., Kırkıncı, 1987) and 
nationalists ( e.g., Erdoğan, 1993; Eröz, 1992) who se target population is the large 
Sunni and patriotic communities whose majority has very 1ittle knowledge about 
Alevism. These latter works and most of the 1ikes of them are propagandist works 
which supply the reader with misleading information which tends to reproduce 
already-existing Sunni bias against Alevi faith. On the other hand, some of the 
popular Alevi works may a1so be manipulating and usually assume an anti-Suımi 
rhetoric when they talk about the injustice done to Ali and his family after 
Muhammed' s death or when they teli the Sheikh Bedreddin revolt, and so on. 
108 
Marxist-oriented populist works (Algül, ı996; Celasun Dede, ı992; 
Ciranoğlu, ı 990; Zelyut, ı 993) in this category share a comman -and sametimes 
quite anachronistic because of irresponsible use of categories like "class"- theme 
of equating, ina halistic manner, the histarical oppression of Alevi communities 
(and even pre-Alevi uprisings like Babai revolts of the Selchuk era) with class 
struggle (e.g. the Sheikh Bedreddin case) and Alevism with popular socialism. 
These works are less in number than those which only infarın about the historico-
religious aspects of Alevism. 
Rival "popular Alevisms" are more or less apparent: Kurdish Alevi 
populists mixing socialism with a Mazdaist-Alevi liberation theology (Kervan and 
Zülfikar are two joumals promoting this), social-democratic Alevis, more 
religiously conservative Alevis, Alevis emphasizing patriotism, and so on. On the 
whole, we may say that while the Alevi identity (whatever form it takes according 
to the political standpoint of the writer) is strengthened through this 
popularization via books in circulation, the majority of the popular works do not 
establish any social links between the traditional-religious dimension of Alevism 
and the changing, transforming processes in contemporary capitalism. 
As this category of Alevi literature is the largest of the three mentioned 
above, we further divide it into four sub-categories, fallawing Vorhoff (1998): 
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1. Survey books: These works try to explain Alevis m in to to, co vering mo re 
or less every main topic with respect to definition, rituals, holy days, folkloric 
aspects, institutions, and so on. 13 
2. Doctrinal and devotional books: These works teli specific histarical 
events, revolts, stories of persecution, heroes, lineages, specific locations and 
Alevi rituals. In doing this, they create an epic and populist ethos.14 
3. Reflections on Alevism: These are generally about concrete questions and 
issues canceming everyday issues, popular politics, and contemporary problems 
canceming the Alevi believer. Some of these works are attempts of 
"consciousness raising" by pointing at the sufferings of and injustices to Alevis 
today. 15 
4. Papers and journals: Among these we may count Kervan (a radical leftist 
journal, whose circulation stopped in 1995), Cem (very popular monthly 
supported by the Cem Vakfı- the Republican Education and Culture Foundation), 
Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür ve Sanat Dergisi (with socialistic tendencies), Gönüllerin 
Sesi, and Yeni Zülfikar. There are of course lots of other weeklies, monthlies 
published by various associations. 
13 See Kaleli (1995), Korkmaz (1997b), Noyan (1985), Yaman (1993) and Zelyut (1990). 
14 See Arslanoğlu (1992), Kaygusuz (1991) and Seyirci (1992). 
15 See Balkız (1994), Eyüboğlu (1995), Öz (1996) and Pehlivan (1993). 
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4.3.2 SEMI-ACADEMIC AND JOURNALISTIC WORKS 
Joumalistic works, aside from those numerous serial articles printed in dailies, are 
not many in number (e.g., Çalışlar, 1997; Selçuk, 1998) yet the criteria to 
distinguish "academic" works from "semi-academic" ones cannot be so clearly 
defined. However, there are works by academics which very much resemble in 
style and methodology joumalistic works that appear in Turkish papers like 
Cumhuriyet, Milliyet and Hürriyet and weekly magazines like Aktüel and Tempo. 
The use of language is obviously "levelled down" for the uneducated reader (like 
Özkırımlı, 1998). All in all, it is hard to classify them as academic, at least 
compared to the current publishing standards in joumals where Turkish articles 
are published. On the other hand, same joumalistic surveys on Alevism bear 
academic overtones with respect to the delicate use of secondary literature and the 
level of abstraction (Selçuk et. al., 1991). Nevertheless, the political rhetoric 
embodied in these works make them hard to include in academic works. Semi-
academic and joumalistic works stili bear the overtones of populism and they 
often reproduce the effects of popular works, considering the variety of "Alevi 
histories" and political positionings. 
Similar to popular works, these works also include summarıes about 
common Alevi rituals and institutions, who is Ali, what do Alevi dedes do, and so 
on, but the writers' academic dispositions lead them to make sociological or 
political-scientific judgments about the history of Alevism or about the current 
situation. The populist standpoint is tried to be justified with a rational, scientific 
discourse. Different than the first category, we encounter here as ınany non-Alevi 
intellectuals and joumalists (usually left-oriented, even non-practising 
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Sunni) as Alevi ones. The political dimension, different than popular works, is 
more carefully introduced in these works: We are introduced a more genuine 
analysis of the oppression of Alevi people in Ottoman and Republican times, learn 
how and why the socialist discourse is related with Alevism; or we are told, in a 
less populistic manner, how Alevis embraced Kemalismin 1920s and how they 
establish a "popular front" against the radical Sunni threat today. 
Some of these works reflect also upon the sociological condition of various 
Alevi communities in contemporary Turkey, using a pro-Alevi, quasi-academic 
language. 16 W ith respect to this category' s conditioning effects on the Alevi 
political field, the best known "defenders" of a certain version of Alevism from 
any political standpoint have published books which can be included in this 
category. 17 On the other hand, as we mentioned before, Sunni and nationalİst 
writers too, are represented in this category, using a less agitative or misleading 
methodology and language anda more sound methodology. 18 
4.3.3 ACADEMIC WORKS 
Understandably, the most sophisticated and informative, and the least ideological 
and politicized, works are included under this category. As far as the scholar 
constructs an object of Alevism for a social scientific purpose, not for winning in 
16 Usually, one can sense in such analyses that the main intention is to "appropriate" the cultural 
aspects of the specific case being studied for the purpose of providing legitimation for the writer' s 
political claim. A comman example is the case of social democrat-Kemalist Alevi intellectuals, 
who exaggerate certain points, keeping silent in others (see, for example, Tener, 1991). 
17 See Bozkurt (1990a; 1990b), Birdoğan (1990; 1992) and Bulut (1997). 
18 Two very typical, semi-academic examples are Fığlalı's (1990) nationalist account and Öztürk' s 
(1990) Sunni-theological account. 
112 
a power struggle over the proper defmition of Alevism, his or her influence on the 
political field is minimum, excluding the fact that other agents may use 1 abuse 
academic works for political purposes. It may even be speculated that there is a 
consensual silence within Alevi politics with regard to academic criticisms (for 
example criticisms canceming the use of Marxist or liberal-democratic concepts 
in discussing archaic Alevism, or the anachronistic abuse of histarical sources for 
ideological purposes). 
However, this does not mean that academic works neutrally "watch" the 
ongoing debates, struggles and social processes. One very important after-effect 
of academic practices on Alevism, almost ignored by all academics is the non-
reflexive, social scientific damination of Alevismas an object, a practice eventhis 
study may be said to suffer from. This leads to illusions about the existence of a 
unified Alevi identity, about "authentic" Alevism, or "true" origins. Moreover, a 
new power position emerges, for which Ahmet Yatar Ocak is the best example in 
the current debates. Ocak's very careful and sophisticated approach (Ocak, 1996: 
191-258), presented in a number of articles, criticizes different ideological, 
unscientific interpretations of histarical Alevism (from vulgar nationalism to 
Kemalist humanism). He argues against the employment of modern concepts like 
socialism, democracy, egalitarianism, and so on in understanding the issue and 
co ncludes that "true" Alevis m emerged only after 1 5th century as a religious 
syncretism of Turkic Shamanism, Mazdaism, Sufism, and Shi'i Islam (with which 
it is impossible to disagree), and that today it should be preserved as a set of 
religious and moral practices just like Sunni Islam, as a second sect of Islam, it 
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should not be politicized. I appreciate Ocak' s impartiality against politicized 
Alevism, but the disciplinary -and "cold"- approach prominent in his study 
implies a judge's role, trying to determine, using the "iron laws of science", what 
is proper to say and what is not.19 Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are 
very few studies on Alevism and on other marginal religious movements (Ocak, 
1998) which approach the sophistication of his studies, he should certainly be 
credited for his masterful work using first-hand histarical sources and his rightful 
warnings against abusers of existing data. 
Academic works on Alevism may be broadly divided into two: sociological-
anthropological studies (concerned with Alevi connections in migration, 
gecekondu life, urbanization, ethnicity, folklore, social conflict, and so on)20 and 
histarical studies. 21 There are fe w er Alevi intellectuals in this category, and a very 
small number of such books are publicly read (most of the academic work is in 
foreign languages). 
In closing this section, it is possible to a general observation on the 
influence of this vast literature on contemporary Alevi politics. Popular works 
seem to follow the ancient line of the cultic figure in Alevism, Imam Cafer-i 
19 Interestingly, Çamuroğlu (1992: 127-128 and 158) draws our attention to the rigid Sunni-
moralistic bias of Ocak's "non-ideological" histarical analyses on the Babai revolts of 13th 
century, where Ocak talks about the "imınoral" lifestyles of Kalenderis (huıniliating their 
"hoınosexuality", "drug use", and so on). 
20 Bruinessen (1996), Kehl-Bodrogi et. al. (1997), Melikoff (1993), Naess (1988), Olsson et. al. 
(1998), Shankland (1993) and Türkdoğan (1995) are the best known (and most frequently cited) 
examples of such work. 
21 Çamuroğlu (1992), Gölpınarlı (1979), Melikofff (1998) and Ocak (1 996; 1 998) ınay be counted. 
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Sadık, who lived in 1 5th century and who left behind a written text, the so-called 
Buyruk (Commandment). Buyruk, alsa supplemented by the texts of Shah Isınail 
himself(Imam Cafer-i Sadık was his great uncle), had a very easy, understandable 
language and had the sole aim of what Johston and Klandermans (1995) called the 
consciousness mising dimension of meaning construction in a social movement. 
Contemporary popular works, those penned by Alevi dedes, dede-babas or 
intellectuals, have a similar purpose. Although popular works do not directly 
"agitate" the Alevi believers and make them hat activists of whatever Alevism 
preached in the book, they provide easy access to the cultural and histarical legacy 
of Alevisms: Legends, tales, poetry, religious practices, all these accumulation of 
knowledge helps justify the existence of a particular Alevi identity. In addition, 
most of them aim to falsify humiliating biases against Alevis (e.g., that Alevi men 
share their wives), in that sense we can say that they alsa constitute part of the 
persuasive communication dimension. I now turn to same of the public debates in 
which Alevi activists have participated, and through which Alevis gained friends 
and enemies. 
4.4 ALEVISM ON PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
If the first rhetorical resource of the formatian and shaping of the Alevi political 
field, by which the Alevi symbolic capital is circulated and fought on, the second 
rhetorical resource is the way Alevi issues are represented in public discourse, 
where all sorts of people, actively or passively, participate (so this level is far 
beyand the limited author-reader relationship). At this level, the debates are both 
inf1uenced by the constraints of the political field, and by the individual respanses 
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and reactions of Alevi citizens. Through these public debates, rivalries within 
Alevi politics, tensions with outsicter groups, the strong and the weak are made 
more apparent. What is more important in this second resource is that reactions or 
resistances in these debates are openly constructed in either an affirmative way 
(being content with the elimination of biases, or with equal religious 
representation, or with only the legal punishment of those who did wrong against 
Alevism) or in a transjormative way (protests leading to demonstrations which 
demand the restructuring of the education system in order to do justice to Alevi 
children, preparation of political programs and agendas in order to establish a 
wide-based Alevi collectivity which would aim to end inequality and state 
oppression, calls for the total abalition of state-financed religious institutions). I 
will discuss what kind of voices are heard more and are likely to be dominant in 
the following sections. 
Below I discuss three very important and very specific public debates. In 
fact, there have been hundreds of public debates concerning Alevism since Iate 
80s, started most usually in weekly magazines or in newspapers, sametimes in 
journals or in conferences. Y et these three debates, I believe, are the most 
important ones. The first one is also the longest and the largest, revolving around 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and the debate has led to sharp clashes 
among rival Alevi groups and between Alevis and Sunnis. Secondly, the violent 
murders of 37 people (most of whom were Alevis) in Sivas had a stronger impact 
power on the public discourse, bringing further inner divisions along. Thirdly, 
1995 Gazi neighborhood events, where unidentified attackers shot at two Alevi 
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coffee houses, killing a 1ocal religious leader and wounding many, led to two days 
of protesting and uprising. As a result of the irresponsible measures taken by the 
police, the insurrection ended with the killing of 18 protestors by palice bullets. 
Similar to the Sivas pogrom, Gazi killings created strong reactions within Alevi 
politics- alsa see Marcus (1996) and Dural (1995). 
4.4.1 "DIYANET DEBATE": WHO GETS THE BUDGET? 
The crux of the public debate was about the Sunni-Hanefi bias of the official 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (shortly Diyanet), which was blamed to privilege 
and represent only the Sunni majority by organizing and controlling religious 
services practised only by Sunni people. Thus, same Alevis called for equa1 
representation in the bureaucratic structure of Diyanet, while same atlıers called 
for the total abalition of this state institution. On the other hand, Diyanet (and 
main Sunni political powers) played its own cards. The debate, though on a minor 
sca1e, stili continues. 
The "Diyanet Debate" began in December 1991, after the pub1icization of a 
"secret" meeting unofficially gathered by Diyanet on the 101h of December, 1991 
(that is, the calls made to the participants were informal) to which a number of 
Alevi intellectuals and low-rank Alevi religious leaders were called. In fact, 
officia1 declaration from Diyanet was made after four days, but a high-rank 
bureaucrat from Diyanet inf'ormed the media the next day. He declared that as a 
result of the recent publicization of Alevism, they felt a need to be informed and 
to learn the views of Alevis. The same bureaucrat ("Diyanet, Alevilere Açılıyor", 
1991) told that Diyanet was thinking that there is no significant difference 
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between Sunnis and Alevis and the existing disputes w ere the work of "leftists". 
After the meeting, he told, they were assured that the two sects were "brothers" 
(sic), with no rigid distinction. A few days later, famous Alevi dede İzzettin 
Doğan (today the head of Cem Vakfı) was interviewed by the weekly magazine 
Nokta (15.12.1991), who made positive remarks about the attempts of Diyanet, 
teliing that he supported the representation of Alevism within the institution. A 
week later, the first angry reactions came from Alevis, reported in Nokta again 
(22.12.1991). The interviewed intellectuals were all blaming Diyanet for trying to 
assimiiate the difference of Alevism into Sunnism by justifying themselves via 
people whose Aleviness was doubtful. Some said that this was a "dirty game": 
Diyanet, which never accepted the demands of Alevis who wanted cem houses not 
mosques, who wished to hear ezan in Turkish, who rejected other Sunni practices, 
was now teliing the people that Alevism was not a true difference. 
During these debates, according to Pehlivan (1993: 29), many Alevis 
phoned Cumhuriyet, in order to tell about their demands concerning religious 
recognition. Among these demands were the following: Given that one-third of 
the population is Alevi (which, in truth, is highly doubtful), 30% of the Diyanet's 
budget should be used in the service of Alevis; 30% of the institution' s personuel 
should be Alevi; cem houses should be constructed; compulsory courses on 
religion should be abolished, or, Alevism shuld be taught on equal basis in these 
courses. 
For weeks, the debate continued in the papers. Diyanet made an official 
declaration and stated that the institution's connection with Alevis was not 
118 
new, ithada history of 40 or 50 years, and that they were not trying to create a 
Sunni-Alevi division. The mission of the institution was mainly to bring 
religious service and to make the practice of Islam easier for the citizens; 
Diyanet wanted to bring better service to Alevi people (Pehlivan, 1993: 39-
40). On the other hand, very diversified voices were heard in paper columns: 
Villagers, townspeople, conservative Alevis, intellectuals, social democrats, 
Marxists, almost anybody had an idea. Yet the lines of division began to 
appear: Alevi intellectuals supporting SHP, who defined Alevis m as a sect 
within Islam, following the same book and the same prophet, were supporting 
any positive, constructive acion emanating from Diyanet, given that it was 
ready for a wide-based institutional reform. On the other hand, Alevi 
intellectuals with socialİst tendencies, ordinary Alevis from Pir Sultan Abdal 
Associations, and also those who do not wish to see their belief system on the 
same platform with Sunnism w ere against Di yan et' s attempts and many called 
for its abolition. 
Diyanet's meeting's full documents were published in January 1992 twice: 
Once in the first issue of the institution' s new journal, Diyanet Dergi, and for a 
second time, in Sabah, printed throughout a week. Those Alevi participants in the 
meeting were openly supporting the Sunni ways of practising Islam and were 
trying to define the differences of Alevism as alternative interpretations, which 
implied that at the center would be "true Islam", which followed the Sunni-Hanefi 
path. On the other hand, the participants and Diyanet representatives were 
blaming "less religious", "more political" interpretations of Alevism for treason 
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and for trying to "divide" the sacred community of believers (the meeting ıs 
reprinted in Pehlivan, 1993). The debates got hatter after the publicization of the 
meeting, Alevi organizations and ordinary Alevi believers were enraged. Semah 
Culture Foundation, the journal Cem, Hacı Bektaş Veli Association of Culture and 
Promotion, Federation of European Alevi Communities and various other local 
solidarity networks made a co lleeti ve declaration criticizing Diyanet ( cited in 
Pehlivan, 1993: 89): 
The Directorate of Religious Affairs, which, for years, denied the existence 
of Alevismor neglected this grand community in silence, suddenly becomes 
an activist and lays a claim on Alevism. This is not a well-taken signal. 
Fallawing a pre-determined strategy, the Directorate has found or created 
so-called Alevi dedes and citizens, and attempted to use Alevi against Alevi. 
By doing so, it is playing a dangerous and ugly game, a game which 
threatens particularly the unity of the society, and in general that of the 
country. 
Let it be known by the Directorate and by the high-rank Sunni ulema (!): 
in contemporary Turkey, Alevis are loyal to and respectful of the State of 
the Turkish Republic, which is a "secular, democratic, socially just state". 
They are eternal guardians of the unity of the country. 
This political manoeuvre is important. Let us quickly remember that political 
Sunnism, led by the Welfare Party, was newly on the rise, the intellectuals were 
aware of a Sunni grassroots radicalism, but the potentials of the Sunni mavement 
was yet unknown (until the 1994 local elections). In that sense, this reactionary 
reflex of what I will call in the next seetion "Republican Alevism" is very 
meaningful. This group makes a double gesture here: First, they demand 
recognition, but notunder the shadow of Sunnism, desiring to establish their own 
channels of distribution of the Alevi symbolic capital. The religious autonomy 
they ask for would not be state-sponsored, in that sense we can talk about the 
constitution of an autonomous political agency. But second, while placing the 
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mavement directly in conflict with Sunnism (though they also declare that they 
recognize, pleasantly, their Sunni "brothers" [sic] culture and faith), they seek an 
alliance with the secular principles of the Kemalist regime. Both Alevi people and 
people of Turkey are one, both are a united community in themselves. 
Although there were other voices, almost all reactions against Diyanet 
criticized the degree of Sunni ideological expansion within state's institutions and 
within the education system. In later years, as I will discuss in the next section, 
those groups which stress on the popular-oppositional aspects of Alevism 
(Alevism as "Liberation Theology") would reject the statist, pro-systemic position 
taken by Republican Alevis. 
These debates continued all along the year 1992. Mter the Sivas events in 
July 1993, the hostility against Sunnism became more acute. Nevertheless, in 
1996, the "fronts" within Alevi politics with respect to the "Diyanet Debate" were 
clear (they remained more or less the same taday; looking ata couple of issues of 
Cem, published by Cem Valifı, and Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Sanat Dergisi, 
published by Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association [PİSA] gives an idea about 
conflicting political dispositions): That year, Cem Valifı organizedan international 
meeting in Istanbul, a symposium on the restructuring of religious services in 
Turkey.22 There were three speakers from Europe, who talked about state-religion 
relations in Western countries; there were also famous academics of law, 
22 Din-Devlet İlişkileri ve Türkiye 'de Din Hizmetlerinin Yeniden Yapılanması Uluslararası 
Senıpozyunıu [DYY] (1998). The syınposium was held between 26-27 March 1996. 
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historians, politicians representing various political factions, theologians and 
intellectuals discussing issues like laicism, secular policies, popular religion and 
civil society. The most important debate was about the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs, and its position with respect to different forms of Islam. 
Naturally, the president of Diyanet, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz and other 
representatives of the institution reproduced the positions introduced back in 1991 
(DYY, 1998: 34-38 and 169-173): Diyanet was above all sects, it was irnpartial 
towards all forms of Islam, its sole mission was, like a municipal govemment, to 
bring religious services. Anyone (that is, any graduate of an İmam-Hatip high 
school) could be employed in the Directorate, there was no discrirnination against 
Alevis. It was also stressed that there was no apparent need to establish different 
divisions within the bureaucratic structure of Diyanet for different sects, because 
there would not be an end to that, and because the institution was neutral anyway. 
For the representatives of Republican Alevism (İzzettin Doğan and Abidin 
Özgünay),23 Diyanet required radical reforms, and its biases against Alevis, its 
institutional privileges favoring Sunnis, its use of the budget should be 
transformed. The restructuring of the institution should be carried out so that there 
would be no injustice in bringing religious services to ditierent communities of 
believers (DYY, 1998: 31-33 and 162-167). Özgünay says that Alevis' call for 
23 As I have mentioned before, Doğan is the president of Cem Vakfi. Özgünay is the ex-owner of 
the journal Cem, its current General Editor, one of the founders of Cem Vakfı and is the leader of 
Pcace Party. 
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freedam and fraternity should not be rejected with an exclusionary denial of "we 
have no difference", which leads to an insincere view of national unity. The 
perfect understanding of national unity and solidarity would be achieved if "we 
have differences" is recognized (DYY, 1998: 165). Özgürray further states that 
religion cannot be totally left to the control of the religious community, because, 
he thinks, the community would then try to impose its own rules and laws and to 
conquer the state: "In this context, saying that 'Diyanet has no place in a secular 
state. Religion is the business of community. It should be left to the community', 
under contemporary conditions in Turkey, would be imitation" (165). Diyanet, for 
Özgünay, isa must (166): 
The mission of true democrats and of those Muslims who are sincerely 
devoted to their religion, should not be leaving religion to the hands of 
fundamentalists, but should be strengthening the blocks raised against those 
who try to dominate the country with the rule of religion. In that sense the 
best solution is, to make the state responsible for guarding the secular 
regime, and with the help of an institution which will make that task 
possible, to control those extremist religious developments and elements. 
Beloved Atatürk had this purpose in mind in establishing Diyanet, but 
unfortunately, this institution could not adapt to this inherited mission 
through its activities and discourses, it has become the defender of the 
religious affairs of a single sect, rather than embracing the religious affairs 
of whole Islam. It has been witnessed, with pain and anxiety, that the most 
vicious enemies of Atatürk and of the secular state came from nests fed by 
this institution. 
Thus, through the "Di yarret Debate", an interesting "war of positions" is being 
carried out within Alevi politics. The openly statist, pro-systemic arguments of 
Republican Alevis, on the other hand, has always been sharply criticized by 
Alevis who interpret Alevism outside of Islam, as a philosophy of freedam and 
equality, and who also are strongly against the way politics is manipulated by the 
Army (Korkmaz, 1997a); there are also merciless criticisms of Cem Va~fl, from a 
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left-Kemalist standpoint, for their alliance with Welfare 1 Virtue Party ideologues 
(like Bahri Zengin) and with Diyanet (Yetkin, 1998). 
4.4.2 THE BURNING OF MADIMAK HOTEL 
On the second day of July, 1993, during the series of cultural activities organized 
in the name of Pir Sultan Abdal in Sivas, 37 citizens were murdered when their 
hotel was bumed by Sunni fundamentalists. This dire event had an undeletable 
impact on Alevi politics and on the relations between Alevi and Sunni citizens. 24 
Aside from the criticism of the state' s role during and after the event, all the tales 
which were told to Alevi children about the oppressions and massacres committed 
against Alevi communities in Ottoman times, all those Alevi biases against the 
dogmatism and intolerance of the Sunni faith were confirmed as the TV channels 
broadcast day after day the angry Sunni-nationalİst mob demonstrating in front of 
the buming hotel. The comments of the Islamİst media defending the angry mo b, 
blaming Aziz Nesin and his atheism, condemning the leftism and heresy of Alevi 
people, created even worse effects, leaving behind a mass of Alevi people filled 
with sorrow and hatred.25 
The after-effects of the Sivas massacre were also reflected in the struggles 
between rival Alevi groups. Most of the people killed were intellectuals with 
socialist tendencies, leftist youngsters, artists, and except a few, all of them were 
Alevi (or non-believers working in Alevi organizations), and the 4th Traditional 
24 For an account of the histarical clashed between Sivas Alevis and Sunnis, see Cotkun (1995). 
25 For these discomforting comments from the conservative media., see Kaleli (1994: 58-65). 
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Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Activities was organized by a plethora of Turkish and 
Kurdish Alevi organizations (led by PİSA) some of which had oppositional 
tendencies against the regime. For that reason, those Alevis who regard their 
cultural and histarical heritage as separate from Islam and who interpret it as a 
liberation theology became the rightful-and most outrageous- mourners after the 
deceased. In later debates with Kemalist-traditionalist Alevis of the Cem Valifz 
circles, this was used against those who were in touch with Sunni activists 
(reminding them that they were in contact with the defenders of Sivas murderers). 
Given the affirmative alliance of Republican Alevism with the state, critics 
blamed them for betraying their dead brothers and sisters, reminding that the state 
could not do anything and could not find and punish the guilty. Of course, for 
most activists within Cem Vakfı, the real blame was not to be put on the state, but 
rather, the "primitive", "dark" minds of "bloodthirsty" Islamists were the only 
scapegoat. In fact, as Balkız26 (1994: 158) bitterly notes, the journal Cem (of the 
Cem Vakfı) was among those who blamed PİSA for calling Aziz Nesin, who they 
blamed for provoking the Sunni fundamentalists with his pro-atheist (but never 
anti-Islamist) speeches. Some of the Kemalist Alevi intellectuals shared the pain 
and the anger equally, but without neglecting to eriticize the "radical leftist" 
tendencies of PİSA and other allying organizations. All in all, Sivas confirmed the 
fears of Republican Alevism, the fears they shared with the rulers of the Kemalist 
regime (who were, shamefully, helpless and irresponsible, being unable to stop 
26 Ali Balkız is the General Editor of the journal Pir Sultan Abdal. 
125 
the mob, although the developments were observed for hours). P SA, on the other 
hand, never neglected to curse the (intended?) hopelessness of the state. In fact, 
there have been some "conspiracy theories", claiming that the Army deliberately 
watched the religious insurrection passively, because this was part of a plan to 
stop the PKK infiltration over Sivas into the heartlands of Anatolia (Erdost, 1996). 
Nevertheless, shortly after July 1993, PKK, in response, killed over 50 villagers in 
rural Sivas. 
Something all Alevi groups shared after Sivas was a new wave of 
accumulation of symbolic capital: The horrors of July the 2nd was inscribed into 
tales, poems, folk songs, marches, books; ancient events of persecution were 
recalled -like Kerbela, Sheikh Bedreddin, Pir Sultan Abdal's execution, Dersim 
revolts of 1937-8, Maratand Çorum massacres organized again by Islamists and 
fascists. Regardless of the political content of this symbolic capital, one thing is 
certain: Sivas will never be forgotten by most Alevis. 
4.4.3 GAZI UPRISINGS 
Ona Sunday evening, on the lih ofMarch, 1995, two Alevi coffee housesin the 
Gazi neighborhood (Istanbul) were assaulted by unidentified attackers using sub-
machine guns. Many Alevis were wounded, and an old man, an Alevi dede, was 
killed. The attackers were never caught, but what they did started a local riot 
which was, in the end, suppressed by the police, whose countermeasures caused a 
number of deaths. The neighborhood is populated by a majority of Alevi migrants 
from Sivas and Tunceli (some Kurdish), most ofwhom are among the ranks of the 
working poor. 
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Shortly after the news of the assault on the coffee houses and the death of 
the dede spread, large numbers of people from the neighborhood, youngsters and 
children mostly, began to gather in front of the local cem house to protest the 
attack on the Alevi community. There were rumors holding that the local police 
(Gazi police had areputation ofbeating and mistreatment of Alevi citizens living 
around) co-operated with fascist militiamen from MHP (Nationalist Action Party), 
which only threw fuel over the growing fire. As the protests got angrier and the 
crowd grew, radicalleftist groups, some illegal, attempted to organize the whole 
event, building barricades on the streets and agitating the crowd to fight against 
the police. 
Soon, police squads, armed to the teeth, escorted by armed vehicles 
equipped with pressurized water cannons, arrived and the things went beyond 
control. As the crowd rained stones upon the police, the police irresponsibly fired 
upon them, killing a number of Alevi protestors, wounding more. The fights 
continued until the night next day (March, 13), the army arrived (and was partly 
successful in calming the people down because they trusted the Armed Forces), in 
times shielding the crowd from police brutality. However, until the moming of 
March the 14t\ 18 protestors were killed by police bullets, many others, inciurling 
police officers and soldiers, wounded. Gazi uprisings became a national fiasco for 
the state authorities. Although statesmen, high-rank police officers and their 
collaborators in the media produced some conspiracy theories about PKK and 
other illegalleftist groups assaulting the coffee houses to provoke an Alevi-Sunni 
confrontation (which was never proven, and if we consider that the police almost 
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always fo und, dead or ali ve, urban PKK criminals, this scenario is not believable ), 
or scenarios about Greece organİzİng the whole thing, the harm was done. It was 
argued in the media that the police and the government, during the Gazi events, 
were the agents of injustice against the Alevi residents of the neighborhood and 
the killings were protested. Today, Alevis in the neighborhood, not the true 
criminals, pay for what happened: Gazi became an open prison camp, and young 
Alevis are labeled as potentialleftist "terrorists" in the eyes of the authorities. 
Since the active cem house in the neighborhood is from the Pir Sultan Abdal 
group (socialist-oriented, also see the next section), the Alevi intellectuals and 
religious people in the neighborhood identify themselves with the working poor 
and the underelass majority there. This leftist identity of the neighborhood 
teadership was also exploited by the media, which assumed either the "they-are-
all-separatist-enemies-of-the-nation" rhetoric or the "rage-of-the-poor-slums" 
rhetoric. Consequently, what was kept from the critical eyes of the public was the 
resistant, radical elements of the Alevi identity. 
I hold that this dire public event (event, if not anather pogrom), like Sivas 
1993, deepened the political trenches already dug within Alevi politics and 
underlined the strict boundaries between the Alevi community and other political 
agents like the government and the Sunni community. The whole event was 
effectively politicized by a secular version of Alevism which priorized, fed from a 
socialİst discourse, a liberation theology and which favored freedam and equality 
through political action. This left out middle-class, pro-systemic versions of 
Alevism. Given the loyalty of republican Alevism (see the next seetion where I 
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discuss this political group) to the Kemalist establishment, Cem Vakf and i ts 
associate Alevi organizations could not easily identify (or w ere not convincing in 
their mouming) with the victims of police brutality. I do not mean that republican 
Alevis supported the police and the state openly, they certainly did not; but given 
the radical and anti-systemic nature of the protest, they could not eriticize and 
condemn the behavior of the state as sharply as socialİst Alevis. 
On the other hand, Gazi uprisings bear the mark of class conflict. There you 
have a community of doubly oppressed migrants: They come from rural Anatolia, 
placed into the ranks of urban working class, hoping to rise up to stable middle 
class positions. Moreover, their religious identity makes their urban lives more 
diffıcult, where they experience di serimination (and Kurdish Alevis can be said to 
be triply oppressed). They are mistreated by the local police, their poverty and 
their difference is used against them as a sign of criminality, even of potential 
terrorism. It can be speculated that these people in the Gazi neighborhood have 
embodied the symbolic and material properties of their religious and class 
identities, which inscribe them an unequal and unjust social position and shape 
their habitus accordingly. These people's everyday reality has the potential to 
generate anger and reaction to the social order, to the ( e.g., Sunni) reproducers of 
that order which sets the living conditions they are entitled to; this "potential" 
seems to be transformed into a "kinetic" social energy when their everyday reality 
( daily routines of socializing in coffee houses ), their very existence is threatened. 
Consequently, Gazi uprisings became anather resource for public discourse 
from which various Alevi groups produced myths, folk songs or symbols; by 
129 
which such groups legitimized their political claims about other Alevis, about 
Sunnis, or about the state. However, having been brutally suppressed, and having 
been abused by pro-violence leftist groups incapable of driving the protests 
toward a nonviolent path, toward unity between different political groups, Gazi 
uprisings failed to lead to a broad-based political platform from which a number 
of issues might be politicized and from which many once-silent voices might be 
he ard. 
4.5 RIVAL GROUPS WITHIN ALEVI POLITICS 
After drawing attention to the rhetorical and 1 or textual resources feeding the 
political field, in this seetion I am going to talk about the field itself. As I 
mentioned in Seetion 4.2, I will not be dealing with the everyday level of 
interaction which is also a part ofthe political field, rather, by drawing attention to 
the notable players within Alevi politics, I will be analyzing macro dynamics and 
constraining effects. However, I will discuss in Chapter 5 that Alevi political field 
does not operate as rigidly as Bourdieu thinks so. Nevertheless, I hold that within 
Alevi politics, there exists a constant struggle over the specific symbolic capital of 
the field, which consists of what I have been calling "Alevism": a struggle over 
the boundaries of the "Alevi identity", over the proper accounts of Alevi history, 
over the religious or intellectual content and implications, and so on. This, I hold, 
justifies the treatment of Alevi politics as a sub-field. Yet there are reservations I 
have against treating Alevi politics as a field with a rigid logic goveming 
"acceptable", "proper" practices, conditioning the actions of agents at the micro-
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level. I will be speaking about such reservations ın the fınal section, while 
discussing the apparent potentialities of Alevism as a social movement. 
Various scholars have pointed out that historically, the majority of the Alevi 
population has supported the political tradition represented by CHP (Republican 
People's Party), giving also support to Kemalist principles, especially to 
secularism (Ayata, 1997: 65-69; Schüler, 1999: chp.7; Taylan, 1990). However, as 
I have implied in previous sections, the whole Alevi community is politically 
heterogeneous. With regard to CHP's Alevi eleetaral support, for example, one 
should remember the existence of a minority of Kurdish Alevis, whose political 
allegiances may radically differ -even though they may vote for CHP or for 
HADEP. 
There exists hundreds of Alevi associations and societies of various sizes, 
and different political views among the Alevi population (and I am excluding 
those numerous federations, academies and associations outside Turkey). 
Moreover, in constructing the political field for social analysis, we should also 
consider the serious claims on Alevism coming from outside of the community of 
believers, some of which are politically significant. Nevertheless, in reducing the 
whole Alevi political sphere to a number of rival groups, I cannot claim to be 
exhaustive. When one goes through the literature and skims over the public 
debates, it is apparent that the vast diversification at the micro level is not 
represented at the macro level. On the other hand, the groups I try to cover are not 
closed, established communities (yet the two most powerful Alevi groups, 
gathered around Cem Valffl and PİSA, as leaders of the inner dynamics of the 
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movement, are close to being established communities). Most of the time, one 
would encounter political locations where certain critica! views and sametimes 
organizations ally. 
Some academics have offered certain "schools" within Alevi politics, and 
my categories, inspired from them, are an improvement and detailing of w hat they 
offered. For example, Faruk Bilici (1998: 52-57) delineates four main groups: (a) 
Left-Alevism, using Alevi teachings as a "liberation theology" much like the way 
Latin American popular Marxism used Catholicism. (b) Mystical-Islamic 
Alevism, which is organized around Hacı Bektaş Veli associations, supporting a 
more solipsist, individualist Islam and emphasizing the theme of "love". (c) 
Center-Alevism, politically social-democratic or liberal, this family is represented 
by the powerful Cem Valifz. (d) Shi'i-inclined Alevism, more fundamentalist and 
conservative; this clique is supporting the cause of Iranian Shi'ism and interprets 
Alevism within the Twelve Imams doctrine. Anather classification is made by 
Ocak (1996: 191-223): a) Kemalist-humanİst approaches, b) Sunni-Islamİst 
approaches, c) Marxist-liberationist approaches, and d) Turkish-nationalİst 
approaches. 
Below I expand on my own suggestion of classification, brief1y discussing 
the way each group politicizes its particular "Alevism". I begin from the 
politically least influential group and move toward the most powerful. 
4.5.1 IRANIAN SHI'ITE ALEV/SM 
This very marginal group comes from a strictly conservative, highly religious 
background of Iranian S hi' is m. The "militan ts" of this group are mainly trained 
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politically and religiously in the Islamic Republic of Iran, sent to Turkey for the 
purpose of spreading their teachings among Alevis. Organized around mosques 
like Ehl-i Beyt Mosque (Çorum) and Zeynebiye Mosque (Istanbul) and 
periodicals like Ondört Masum and Afure, they defend that Alevism should 
reinvoke Islamic shari'a principles, reminding that Shi'ism has also developed on 
the Ali and the Twelve Imams cult (Bilici, 1998). They claim that, because of the 
long years of Ottoman rule and then of the Republic, Alevism could never fınd a 
chance to returu back to its roots, it was corrupted, and the believers were made to 
forget their true Shi'ite pasts. 
Interestingly, this group' s ideas about Bektashism are also in line with some 
of the orthodox Marxist interpretations: According to Shi'ite Islamists this 
tradition was founded by the Ottoman rule to prevent the spread of S hi' ite ideas 
among Alevis during the threatening years of Sheikh Isınail and Shi'ite dervishes. 
Urban Bektashism was used against the doctrines of Twelve Imams. The group is 
totally against the practice of cem and other similar Alevi rituals, seeing them as 
part of the Bektashi tradition and call all Alevis to mosques, to o bey the orders of 
Koran and to practice namaz. Moreover, they interpret the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis as fascism. Their teachings, on the whole, rely totally on old religious 
works; plus, the nature of the religious capital they use is almost alien to the 
conventionally used Alevi religious capital. They try to articulate their Shi'ite 
teachings with existing Alevisın. Some of the members of the group have close 
ties with extremist groups like Hizbullah, preaching for armed struggle against the 
infıdel rule in Turkey (Çakır, 1990: 15 5-163 ). 
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4.5.2 MYSTICAL-ISIAMIC ALEV/SM 
"The basic thesis of this group", tells Bilici (1998: 53), "which is assembled more 
particularly araund the Hacı Belcra ı V eli associations and lodges, is to view Alevi 
religious devation and the lo ve of God from the po int of view of the 'individual"'. 
Feeding mainly from the Sufist tradition, the stress is more on love, passivism and 
solipsism. The individual believer' s direct relationship with Allah is priorized. 
The group is small compared to the Pir Sultan Abdal or Cem Valifı group, 
but there is a wide variety of Hacı Bektaş organizations. Following Ocak (1 996: 
151) the economically better-off associations are quite traditionalist and 
conservative, and may have Sunni tendencies, for example preaching that Hacı 
Bektaş Veli was a Sunni theologian and religious personality. On the other hand, 
Hacı Bektaş Veli is seen by some others as a mythical, holy religious figure, 
including both the majority of Alevis and some Sunni sufists. This group more 
represents the orthodox Turkish sufist tradition, rather than the heterodox sufist 
tradition later claimed by Bektashism. 
Politically, the group is alınost insignificant. Various associations devoted to 
the patran saint, however, may serve as discursive resources in order to justify 
other groups' claims for A1evism. For examp1e, certain ceremonies or 
symposiums canceming Hacı Bektaş Veli may be sites of "re-affirming" the 
saint' s Sunni or Alevi ties. 
4.5.3 ULTRA-NATIONALIST REACTION 
This approach can be considered more as a kind of reaction than as an alternative 
Alevism. However, we should also bear in mind that certain Alevi ıneınbers of 
MHP' s youth organizations in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, feeding from 
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the anti-Kurdish propaganda of the party, reproduce the "one religion, one Flag" 
rhetoric of nationalİst writers on Alevism I have surveyed above. 
S ome of the versions of this reaction bear highly Sunni overtones, daiming 
that the Alevi-Sunni division, like the Turk-Kurd division, is artificially created 
by traitors, terrorists and communists in order to push the nation towards anarchy 
and disintegration. According to this group, certain versions of contemporary 
Alevismis a non-Islamic diversion that should be reintegrated into Sunnism. 
Some nationalİst interpreters of Alevism strongly stress upon the Shamanist 
1 ancient Turkic legacy within the Alevi syncretism and claim that Alevism was a 
"Turkmen Sunnism" formed during the era Turks were newly accepting -or being 
forced to accept- Islam. Gradually, according to nationalists, it was corrupted into 
a heresy (even küfr) whose followers reject practising Sunni rituals, think that Ali 
is God, share their wives, tend to become communists, and so on. 
Given the historical enmity of ultra-nationalists against Alevis (Alevi 
responses to ultra-nationalism often remind the pre-coup pogroms of Marat and 
Çorum, and also the recent Sivas and Gazi tragedies), these reactions or attempts 
to disintegrate Alevi differences are bound to fail within Alevi politics. Moreover, 
nationalists' manipulation of historical facts and their anti-intellectual stance, 
thought together with an unsatisfactory account of Alevi religiosity which has a 
number of totally different practices than Sunnism, makes nationalİst claims -
even though they come from people defining themselves with Alevism- obsolete. 
However, given the contemporary high credit of Turkish nationalism and 
patriotism, nationalists' call for primitizing "our Turkish identity" (putting it even 
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before death) above all other forms of community-belonging finds an affirmative 
echo in almost all significant political groups (perhaps except those Alevi groups 
who privilege a socialistic interpretation). 
4.5.4 CRUDE-MARXIST 1 ATHEIST CLAIMS ON ALEV/SM 
I distinguish this group from the liberation theology approach of Kurdish Alevism 
or the socialistic-social democratic approach of some of the Alevis from Cem 
Vakfı group, although those three groups sametimes share a Marxian terminology. 
The crude Marxist approach, not being very much credited by the majority of 
Alevis, is the most marginal of the three "leftist" versions. Here, Alevism is 
siınilarly seen as an egalitarian ideology, and Alevis a historically anti-systemic, 
socialıst people: Beginning from Ali' s times, coming to Babai revolts and Sheikh 
Bedreddin revolts and so on, all revalting peoples are coded as Alevis, which 
results with many anachronisms. There is a stress on the "class character" of all 
those histarical struggles, which, if carefully studied, might have a certain 
explanatory power, but almost all writers use Marxian concepts without critica! 
reflection on them (and on the histarical cantext studied). There is also an anti-
religious, atheistic overtone, a decisive reluctance against accepting Alevism as a 
religious syncretism. 
Therefore, the distinguishing feature of this group is its critique of the 
religious, conservative, anti-modernİst aspects of Alevism, calling for a 
disenchantment of the teachings and rituals, and the proposed filtered version will 
be a folkloric, egalitarian, "native" socialism (e.g., Metin, 1999). A recent work 
(Bulut, 1997), for example, argues that the cultic figure Ali was a practising Sunni 
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and was as cruel and bloodthirsty as other fundamentalist fallawers of the Islam 
shari'a. The author argued that Alevi shari'a was as bad as the Sunni one, and he 
ended up with o ffering an "Ale vis m without Ali". 
With this call for the abalition of the "cult of Ali" from Alevism, a hot 
debate began,27 where same Alevi Kemalist-traditionalists and religious Alevis 
reacted against anti-religious 1 Marxist interpretations of Alevism. The author is 
violently humiliated in arecent book edited as an answer to his theses (Aktat et. 
al., 1998). 
It seems that as long as religion and tradition is outwardly rejected for the 
sake of revitalizing a "politics of redistribution" (ina Marxist vein), such attempts 
will be politically insignificant, even creating reverse effects and popular 
reactions. I argue below that liberation theology or Kemalist-traditionalism has a 
much stronger appeal to the Alevi population, because of the way they make use 
of the symbolic capital they possess: Both groups try not to over-intellectualize 
Alevism with theoretical 1 sociological accounts, meanwhile they credit the 
religious capital, resurrecting the history araund different figures, tales, sacred 
texts and practices. 
4.5.5 ORTHODOX ISLAM AND SUNNIFICATION ATTEMPTS 
Sunni Islamists, be they politicians or academics (or both), do not stand much 
chance within Alevi politics to gain support for their views. From time to time, 
27 The journal Pir Sultan Abdal has prepared a special dossier regarding the interpretation of the 
Ali cult (November 1998, issue 29). 
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former Welfare Party (RP) made sympathetic calls to the Alevi communities and 
invited their "religious brothers" to the party ranks. lt was even claimed that the 
party' s economic promises and populist policies lured so me of the Alevis into 
voting for them. However, especially in the aftermath of the Sivas massacre, 
where we witnessed some proto-fascist reactions from the Sunni Islamİst media 
and from the Sunni politicians, as well as anti-Alevi and 1 or assimilationist 
declarations from high-rank RP members, a great majority of Alevis today, 
regardless of political dispositions, became highly suspicious towards pro-Sunni 
politics. 
It should also be noted that Alevism is totally absent in Koran courses, 
İmam-Hatip schools, Higher Islam Institutes, theology faculties, even in the 
compulsory religious courses in the official education system. All of the religious 
institutions associated with the state (beginning with the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs) are Sunni-dominated, especially by the Hanefi version of Sunnism. 
Today, Sunni Islamists, at least those who are from the moderates majority, do not 
openly lımniliate Alevism, yet it can be said that they follow three assimilative 
strategies (Bilici, 1998: 60): 
One method is to regard Alevism as a type of folklore or "sub-culture" [as 
Bolay (1995: 3) does- EG] within the synthesis formed by "God, the Book, 
the Prophet, the Nation, the State, the Patheriand and the Flag", thus 
denying it any significance on the theological level. As opposed to those 
who say that the Alevi should be represented in the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs they prefer to regard Alevism as a mere sect or religious order, and 
oppose its representation on the grounds that the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs is superior to all the various sects and religious orders. Or, finally, 
they assume the position of a referee sifting the good Alevi from the bad on 
the grounds that Alevism is being used as a tool by atheists, materialists, 
Marxists, Christians or Jews. 
138 
When they are not implicitly assimilative, Sunni Islamists label ordinary 
Alevi believers as ignorant, na'ive, innocent Muslims who have somehow been 
pushed out of the "true path". They strongly argue against the Alevi belief that the 
Ko ran has been c hang ed by the political opponents of Ali after Mo hammed' s 
death, and they harshly eriticize Alevis' rejection to practice namaz and other 
Sunni religious services. 
lt may sound meaningless to discuss the place of Sunnism within the Alevi 
political field; considering the amount of theological and political tension between 
the two communities, the relevance of Sunni-biased scholars as agents within the 
sub-field may be questioned. However, I have an answer to such an objection: 
While most of what is written by Sunni-biased authors lacks an intellectual 
elaboration (in terms of credibility according to social scientific standards, for 
example), the religious capital and part of the symbolic realm circulated by Sunni 
Islamists are not totally irrelevant to Alevism. There is an undeniable parallelism, 
regardless of one' s wish to see Alevism inside or outside Islam, because of the 
fact that the two sects share a comman religious history -and a comman 
geography, Anatolia- and this connection, along with the processes of conflict 
and reconciliation it implies, is enough to create an effect within Alevi politics, in 
terms of both constructing a different Alevism (remember the views of Alevi 
participants in the December 1991 meeting gathered by Diyanet) and attracting 
various Alevi reactions which lead to stili different Alevisms. Furthermore, 
regarding the recent close relations of the Cem Vakfı with certain Sunni cü·cles 
(and here w e remember the criticism made against İzzettin Doğan for his ties with 
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Fethullah Gülen or with RP 1 FP), and regarding the foundation' s central 
argument that Alevism is an official sect of Islam, brother to Sunnism, Sunni 
claims on Alevism become relevant. 
4.5.6 ALEV/SM AS LIBERATION THEOLOGY 
After the Cem Valifz group, this group represents the second most powerful Alevi 
political movement, and is similarly organized around an association, Pir Sultan 
Abdal Kültür Dernekleri (PİSA, Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associations) and a 
journal, Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür ve Sanat Dergisi (Pir Sultan Abdal Journal of 
Culture and Art). There are also many smail organizations, as well as radical 
leftist journals close to this group, which are ideologically supportive of Kurdish 
nationalism. 
A defining characteristics of this political group is the use of a socialist 
discourse which is different from the atheist claims summarized above. Alevism is 
defined outside of Islam as a non-Islamic, quasi-religious (not irreligious) 
movement prophesizing emancipation. In this group, it is possible to distinguish 
intellectually-oriented writers and those traditionalist Alevis with more religious 
dispositions who try to resurrect a divine tradition against Sunni threats (or against 
statist threats which use a Sunni rhetoric, and which are anti-Kurdish). On the 
other hand, the supporters of the Kurdish movement within the group focus on 
Kurdish and Zaza mythologies and Mazdaist influences on Alevism. They draw 
upon Kirmanci and Zaza languages, and by merging these cultural elements with 
the history of both Kurdish and non-Kurdish popnlar resistance movements (from 
the Babai revolts in the Selchuk era to Dersim revolts in the Republican era), they 
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construct an Alevisın to be adopted by the Kurdish (or Zaza) popula tion. 
Consequently, Alevisın as liberation theology is rhetorically ınobilized in 
defense of Turkish and Kurdish people and ınany socioeconoınic and cultural 
aspects of conteınporary Turkey are criticized from a Marxian point of view. The 
Turkish leftists within the group defending a popular-secular Alevisın against 
conservative Alevisın and separate from Islam, are ınore powerful in the group, 
but they are not hostile to the cause of Kurdish Alevis by any ıneans. On the other 
hand, there are soıne extreınist eleınents in the group, who syınpathize with the 
Kurdish guerrilla mavement and in the fınal analysis, these constitute an 
iınportant barrier in front of the group' s general claiıns for popular support and 
political legitiınacy. Bilici (1998: 52) cites such declarations: 
Alevisın is a religious belief which formed and proliferated within the 
process of development of Islam among the peoples of the Middle East, 
Mesopotoınia and Anatolia. It spread ınore particularly among the 
iınpoverished namadie and serni-namadie Kurdish and Turkınen tribes. 
While Sunnisın, the predoıninant Islaınic right-wing interpretation and 
evolution, was preferred by the oppressed classes whose interests were 
totally opposed to those of the ruling classes and states against whoın they 
conducted a perpetual struggle. This was, in effect, a class war that assuıned 
a religious form and was conducted under the guise of a struggle between 
different faiths and religions. Alevisın was a rebellion, a resistance, a flag of 
liberation raised against the ruling classes who, with Sunnisın, the dominant 
form of Islam, adopted a feudal structure and established centralised states 
and eınpires ... 
As Bruinessen (1997) correctly points out, unlike the majority of Turkish 
Alevis, Kurdish Alevis were never at peace with the Kemalist regiıne. He tells 
that the Dersim revolts of 1937-8 were Alevi as well as Kurdish revolts, where 
both Turkish Alevi villagers and Zaza Alevis fought together against the 
pacification policies (leading to violent ınassacres) of the Ankara government 
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(1997: 12-14). On the other hand, there is the histarical tension between Sunni 
Kurdish tribes (mo re powerful and crowded) and Alevi Zaza tribes, and PKK' s 
pro-Sunni strategies have led to identity shiftings among these Alevis: "Alevi, but 
unlike the Turkish Alevi [and] Zaza or Kurdish, but unlike the Sunni Zazas or 
Kurds" (Bruinessen, ı 997: ı 7). 
Although a certain trend in the Pir Sultan Abdal journal supports anti-statist 
yet Republican ideas, being mainly opposed to the right-wing -and 
"establishment"- policies of Cem Valifz, ambiguities within the group with regard 
to how Alevi liberation is to be accomplished, render the group less powerful than 
the Cem Vakfı, which is also in direct opposition toPİSA (the former being more 
nationalist, strongly pro-Kemalist, and led by better-off Alevis). 
4.5.7 KEMALIST-TRADITIONALISTS AND REPUBLICAN ALEV/SM 
This group, fonned araund the Republican Education and Culture Foundation 
(REC Foundation, or Cem Vakfı) and the monthly journal Cem, is economically 
and politically the most powerful and perhaps the most popnlar Alevi 
organization. Within the foundation, there are left-inclined writers, intellectuals, 
artists and academics who do not place much stress on religious aspects of Alevi 
and Bektashi orders, but point out the positive relations of Alevism with 
Kemalism, Enlightenment, Westernization, liberalism, religious freedom, 
toleration and so on. Along with this group, there are former dedes, dede-babas, or 
descendants of such Alevi-Bektashi religious leaders, who try to institutionalize 
an Alevism with itsfıkıh theory, its written theology, legal academies, schools and 
religious institutions (cem houses). This trend totally agrees with the intellectual 
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trend in building an Alevi barrier in front of the rising Sunni Islam, but defining a 
secularized version of Alevism within Islam, unlike the PİSA group. 
Cem Vakfı is a devoted supporter of the Kemalist principles, the Republican 
regime, and social-democratic policies (also a considerable but not total support to 
CHP, which will most probably be turned towards DSP (Democratic Left Party) 
in the current political situation). The foundation's dislike of Sunni extremism 
(but they are in contact with mainstream Islamİst politicians) is totally in line with 
the Army' s (and the parliamentary "center" s) policies, and the foundation' s 
lobbies work to bring its own version of Alevism-Bektashism to an equal level 
with mainstream Sunnism. 
One of the most important political manoeuvres of the foundation, as I have 
discussed in Seetion 4.4, is its pressure on the government and the parliament for 
Alevi representation in and equal funding from the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs, plus extra funding from the state for the construction and opening of new 
cem houses. This strategy is closely paraUel with the group's studies on making 
Alevism-Bektashism a strong sect as powerful as the current organizational 
structure of Hanefi Sunnism. This demand, if we recall, is sharply criticized by 
other Alevi groups, which almost always defend the abalition of the Directorate 
totally. 
In recent years, Cem Vakfı gained the upper hand among Alevi communities 
with regard to the "Diyanet Debate". Acting decisively, the foundation has been 
increasing its lo bbying activities in ord er to channel part of the Directorate' s 
budget for the benefit of the movement. Rather than seeing Alevism as a sodalist 
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liberation ideology, the mainstream writers of the clique seem to accept that 
Alevi-Bektashi religious structure today is a syncretism which unites many belief 
systems from Shamanism to Sufism. Although we can encounter from time to 
time "socialistic" interpretations (like Alevism as resistance), there seems to be a 
general consensus within the clique to construct an institutionalized religion with 
its own version of Koran. According to them, Koran today is not complete and is 
unadulterated: It is claimed that during the era of Caliph Osman, many passages 
referring to Ali were excluded from the compilation of the holy book (Bilici, 
1998: 54). 
I will be talking more about how the foundation gained power in the final 
section, to which I turn now. 
4.6 WHITHER ALEVI POLITICS? 
Remembering Seetion 2.4, Bourdieu was teliing us that through the circulation of 
a specific symbolic capital within the political field, "political activists" were 
defined and their "activism" made possible with the unconscious reco gnition of 
what is politically legitimate to defend and to offend, what is politicizable. The 
Alevi political field, similarly, having been constituted by the publications, 
meetings, organized festivals and symposiums, hot debates, concrete political 
clashes, countless small and large institutions, has a definable generative logic: 
This logic, which is about categories, definitions, identity borderlines, "true" 
picturing of histarical events, "real" knowledge of cult names (like Pir Sultan 
Abdal and Hacı Bektaş Veli), legitimate religious practices and so on, both 
enables and constrains the way Alevismis politicized. In order to be initiated into 
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the field as a speaker (not every Alevi agent is endowed with the privilege of 
"voicing" their own -or the community's- demands), one should master this 
logic, know how to speak about Alevis and Alevisms, what to discuss and what 
not to discuss, shortly, one should have a "feel for the game". 
However, this is not enough. As I mentioned before, as in every field, there 
is a principle of hierarchy with respect to economic and political power within 
Alevi politics. Agents' positions are also determined according to how they 
generate strategies with the known "rules of the game": With respect to the Alevi 
symbolic capital, which has a religious and intellectual content, the agents are 
positioned on the dominant-dominated continuum according to their use of that 
capital, and thus according to the political they produce regarding Alevism. This 
"proper staking" of the capital, for the struggling groups within the movement, 
ensures or makes difficult the establishment of key connections with powers 
outside the boundaries of Alevi politics (e.g., wealthy businessmen, CHP, or 
Army policies). I argue that it is this assurance of external support which makes a 
group weak or strong. (And I will show that for Alevi politics, this results with 
affırmation of the existing social order instead of aiming to transform it.) 
Nevertheless, the inner dynamics of a social movement should not be equated 
with that of a mainstream political party struggling for parliamentary power, and I 
will also argue that we should not be blind to the anti-systemic potentialities of the 
Alevi movement. Let me first turn to where Alevi politics is heading. 
4.6.1 STUCK WITH RECOGNITION 
I have argued that S hi' is m and atheist Marxism do not stand mu ch c han ce to 
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generate political strategies which would steer the whole mavement toward their 
causes. Shi'ite religiosity is not only extreme in its use of symbolic capital, it is 
alsa hostile, and thinking its radical purposes imported from Iran, its claims are 
bound to be marginalized. Although their vulgar intellectual justification for 
revolution and radical change remind those of the radİcal left, it is apparent that 
the symbolic violence of faith in their proposals are of a totalitarian nature. On the 
other hand, those Marxists who try to radically "de-mystify" the Islamic content 
of Alevism fall for over-intellectualizing (if not wrong-headed histarical 
interpretation, like equating Sunni shari' a with Alevi shari' a), w hile their rhetoric 
has no appeal for the religiosity of the Alevi masses. 
Extremely nationalİst claims on Alevism have a similar problem of not 
being able to make sense, however, I suspect that two factors may lure same 
Alevis into defining their Alevism with the categories offered by nationalists: (1) 
Histarical connections of Alevi syncretism with ancient Turkish religious rituals. 
Turkmen and shamanist influences on Alevism is emphasized and praised by 
same nationalists, who try to justify their point that Alevism is something very 
Turkish, very Islamic and should be protected from "communist infestation". (2) 
That use of symbolic capital is connected with an outside power, that of MHP, 
and in the contemporary context, where MHPisa coalition partner, with a strong 
popular support, and where the hegemonic power of nationalism in general is 
frightening, nationalİst claims on Alevism may be appealing. 
The case of Sunni claims is very different. As I tried to show, especially 
after the Sivas tragedy, Sunni scholars' nonnalizing 1 correcting attempts do not 
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stand much chance to be persuasive. Yet given that there are many similarities (as 
wellassharp differences) between the nature of Sunni and Alevi religious capital, 
moreover, for some political purposes, Sunni claiıns may be meaningful. For 
example, some writers from Cem Valifı circles may ally with Sunni critics in 
condemning atheism and irreligious interpretations of Alevism, teliing that they 
meet within the "melting pot" of Islam. (Then, of course, Kemalist-traditionalists' 
demands from Diyanet also become legitiınate.) 
In brief, mystical Alevism, Alevism as liberation theology and Republican 
Alevism are the three most significant "native" groups which have a strong appeal 
within the Alevi population. There are of course some alliances between those 
groups, the boundaries are not sharp: There are Bektashi groups (associations and 
the like) which are closer to the PİSA group, yet there are more conservative 
mystical-Islamist versions which ally with Cem Valifı. Nevertheless, the clash 
between Cem Valifı and PİSA is more rigid and stricter. 
As I have claimed before, Republican Alevism, in the current context, has 
the upper hand within the political field because of the proper strategies and 
delicate balances it has established in its staking of the Alevi symbolic capital. 
This usage helped Cem Vakfı to articulate itself with a highly legitimate extemal 
political power: the Army and the Kemalist way of making politics. Their 
dominant position within the field is mostly dependent on their statist, secularist, 
affirmative standpoint. This alliance with a power outside Alevi politics (and 
which is dominant) allows the group to shift between "leftist" and "rightist" 
maneouvers: On the one hand, they assume a progressivist, secular, egalitarian, 
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tolerant, even social-democratic stance and try to gain popular support from the 
Alevi population. On the other hand, they affirm the Turkish state as it is, avoid 
direct conflict with its institutions, ally with the National Security Council policies 
against Sunnism (while never losing touch with certain "moderate" groups of the 
Sunni community for pragmatic reasons) and never clash with "defensive 
nationalism". In doing so, the foundation has also successfully staked the 
intellectual and religious capital it controlled, established anather balance between 
being-religious and being-modern: on the one hand, they are working for the 
institutionalization of Alevism as an Islamic sect with its own specific religious 
structure; on the other hand, they reproduce the myths of "civilized, modern 
citizens of Atatürk' s Republic". 
What other agents lacked within the field was this balance: Building rhetoric 
on a highly religious base did not allow for a reasonable intellectual justification 
which would properly appeal to the reality of everyday life; in the case of Sunni 
or S hi' ite attempts to penetrate, the content of the religious rhetoric, for als o 
histarical reasons as I mentioned above, was rejected by the majority of Alevi 
population. It was also iınpossible for the proponents of pure rationality, atheism 
or agnosticism to touch the popular "spirit" (this time there was a lack of 
religiosity and respect for tradition), thus their Alevisms were bound to remain 
elitist, sympathized by only a small group of middle-class believers. 
On the whole, then, I hold that the Alevi movement, in which the legitimate 
constitution of "the political" is almost under the monopoly of Republican 
Alevism, manifests itself through a "politics of recognition", where the demands 
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of various Alevi groups are voiced in order to have equal participation in all 
spheres of life, without having to tolerate discriminate attitudes of the Sunni 
population. From the perspective of general power struggles in jin de siecle 
Turkey, there are three points which justify an affırmative (that is, allied with the 
republican "establishment") rather than transformative Alevi politics. 
First, it can be argued that after the rise of Sunni political Islam and its 
gaining of considerable eleetaral power, and with the following influence of 
Army-sponsored campaign against political Islam (which gained momenturu after 
the National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997), the majority of the 
Alevi population rapidly developed a "defensive instinct" against Sunnism, in line 
with the revived Kemalist images of secularism, modernism and progress. There 
was already a history of physical and rhetorical conflict between certain Sunni and 
Alevi communities, and after the massacre in Sivas, and the Gazi neighborhood 
events in 1995, a majority of Alevis found themselves close to the anti-Islamİst 
campaign. As Kehl-Bodrogi (1997: xiv) writes: 
[The reawakening of Alevism] occurred at thepeakof the political struggles 
to preserve the laicistic legacy of Kemalism. In this situation the Alevis 
were in a position to present themselves to secular Turkey as a natural 
stronghold against Islamism and as "guarantors of laicism". Indeed, the 
secularist circles had from the outset regarded Alevism, which presented 
itself as progressive, religiously tolerant and democratic, as their closest 
allies. 
Therefore, Alevi politics tended to stress on its difference (and usually on its 
difference within Islam, not from Islam) against the rising Sunnism, abstaining 
from challenging the Republic's political-economic institutions, and offering a 
reformative project for some of its religious and cultural institutions. 
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Secondly, this consolidation attempt had also amutual relationship with the 
Turkish State' s struggle against PKK activities. Both central right and central left 
Alevisms reproduce the affirmative discourse of their politics in their attempt to 
show that they do not ally with Kurdish separatism, that actually there is no 
Alevi-Sunni "split", that religious group s of Turkey are "united" under one Flag, 
one Book, one Vatan, and one State. The country-wide nationalisı frenzy after the 
arrest of Abdullah Öcalan (leader of the PKK), stili buming with rage during the 
"İmralı Theater", strengthened the calls from the Turkish civil society for 
unification and national solidarity, leaving space for Alevis only for a politics of 
reco gnition. 
Thirdly and lastly, the space for an oppositional and transformative politics 
ın Turkey (especially for the social demecratic and socialıst left) is further 
narrowed after the 18 April elections: 6 leftist parties ( excluding "ce n tre left" 
parties)28 could collect only about 6% of the votes and the self-claimed "social 
democratic" CHP (Republican People' s Party) could not enter the parliament. On 
the other hand, ultra-nationalist MHP gained 18% of the votes, emerging as the 
second party, after the self-claimed "Kemalist-nationalist" DSP's (Democratic 
Left Party) 22%. Although it is yet to be seen what kind of "leftism" will DSP 
perform, the current scene seems to justify my claim in the near future: Alevi 
2 ~ Those are: HADEP (People's Democracy Party), ÖDP (Freedom and Solidarity Party), İP 
(Workers' Party), EMEP (Labor's Party), SİP (Socialist Power Party) and DBP (Democratic Peace 
Party). 
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politics will continue to be affirmative in not totally effacing its difference, but 
reducing various ethnic, denominational or religious diversities present in its 
space to "harmonious parts of a national whole". 
4.6.2 THITHER ALEVI POLITICS! 
Consequently, in the medium term, an affirmative politics of recognition is likely 
to prevail, led by Cem Vakfı and the similar-minded minor Alevi groups 
supporting it. The foundation, I hold, is likely to achieve its aim to lay a daim on 
all proper defınitions of "Alevi", contents and histories of Alevis m, and on w hat 
the legitimate religious practices are. On the other hand, the PİSA group, 
seemingiy the only group carrying significant oppositional potentials within the 
movement, is far less likely to gain the upper hand: With their less religious, more 
socialİst rhetoric, it is questionable whether they will manage to politicize 
subaltern Alevis' economic and identity problems. Given that in taday' s political 
cantext the winds of nationalism are blowing harder than ever, any political 
mavement with explicit anti-systemic dispositions, especially socialİst discourses 
(even though they have nothing to do with violence and support for armed 
struggle), will tend to receive a cautious rejection from the average Alevi citizen. 
(Without articulating the mavement with a united, general oppositional alliance, 
popular negative la be ls stamped on socialism will be a se rio us hindrance.) 
So thither goes the Alevi mavement for now. Though the political field has 
not (yet?) become a party apparatus, and the closures indicated by the Kemalist-
Alevi monopoly are not insurmountable, I personally have a reservation against a 
naive politics of recognition which is to be led by pro-systemic elements. In the 
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coming final chapter, while evaluating what I have done, I will talk about the need 
also for the emphasis on a politics of redistribution. 
Finally, as long as the subaltern majority of Alevis are convinced that the 
current space of politics and their current representatives are all they would and 
could get, a reconciliation between politicizing redistribution and recognition will 
not be any good for the deprived Alevi. 
[H]ow does the spokesperson come to be invested with the full power to act 
and to speak in the name of the group which he or she produces by the 
magic of the slogan, the watchword, or the command, and by his mere 
existence as an ineamation of the collective? ... The spokesperson is the 
substitute of the group which fully exists only through this delegation and 
which acts and speaks through him. [Bourdieu, 1994: 139] 
If, as Bourdieu implies, the magic spell of "we, the Alevis" spoken by certain 
privileged groups makes both the spokespersons and the represented majority 
believe in the existence of a collective whose demands are fully reflected, Alevi 
politics will be heading toward dead ends: Their politics, demanding recognition, 
will become a politics of the misrecognition of Alevis' actual problems and the 
movement' s potentialities. The question "who speaks for the Alevi?" has 
important implications for power balances and class struggle in contemporary 
Turkey. For a truly democratic anti-systemic mavement to emerge from Alevi 
politics, the Alevi majority should struggle for its own voice, instead of relying on 
"professional politicians". 
I have thus reached the end of my excursion, and I see that my pack has now 
become much lighter. Nevertheless, it is not yet empty, and I want to deal with the 
question of resistance in the final chapter, where I also formuiate a future research 
agenda. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
CONCLUSION 
In this fınal chapter of the thesis, I will fırst attempt to objectify my own 
objectification of Alevism, drawing attention to the strengths and weaknesses of 
the discussion of this phenomenon through generative structuralism. Then, to cast 
a fınal bridge between my reconsideration of Bourdieu's theory and the study of 
religion-based social movements, I will briefly talk about the potentials (in terms 
of autonomous political action) of the Alevi movement. The thesis will then end 
with a preliminary outline for a future field study. 
Before passing on to these two parts, risking to repeat myself about the 
limits of this thesis, I should confess that -for the sake of self-reflexivity- my 
basic motivation leading me to the idea and to the actual inscription of that idea, 
was theoretical. Given the erisis in social theory (about which I briefly talked in 
the introduction), which has also solid political implications ( conceming the 
dilemmas of the academic intellectual, like "taking sides" versus "academic 
impartiality", or "essentialism" versus "anti-essentialism" in practical politics), I 
was seeking answers for the questions about agency, capabilities of the agent, 
conditionings of the structure and resistance against these conditionings. Pierre 
Bourdieu was only, as can be observed in Chapter 3, part of the answer. Here 
enters the specifıc case of Alevism: For one thing, it is "native", it is unlike those 
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mainstream "new social movements" theorized by contemporary W estem 
scholars, having a different background, being in close relation with religion, and 
so on. Secondly, given "the political" constituted by European or American social 
movements, Alevism implies a qualitatively different political agenda. This has 
two implications for this thesis: First, considering that Bourdieu's is a theory of 
practice, i ts weaknesses and strengths become "tested" through the study of social 
movements, an area, in fact, not much studied by Bourdieu himself. Second, 
looking at social movements through the spectacles of an agency-structure 
paradigm which is concemed with the "logic", with what is hidden from the 
consciousness when interpreting practices, in the case of Alevism, helps us avoid 
"academic imperialism" (for a discussion of this, see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1999). In "academic imperialism", social things studied in Westem countries, 
through the circulation of paradigms, dictate themselves on "peripheral" (if the 
word still has explanatory power) social contexts, as if, for example, a paradigm 
offered for British women's movement is totally appropriate for the Turkish 
women's movement. The danger is in looking for "the political" which actually 
belongs to the Westem context within the native context, searching for the same 
political motivations, goals and so on. Therefore, I think that generative 
structuralism is eye-opening for studying movements like Alevism in that it is not 
a movement-specific theory (like for example, certain versions of feminism, or 
like "queer theory" of the gay-lesbian movement) and that it does not only search 
what the political practices do, but also which "rules" or "strategies", beyond the 
control of single agents, enable or constrain these practices. 
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Therefore, generative structuralism has more explariatory power in the study 
of social movements: It is, first of all, skeptical about the autonomy and 
voluntarism of the participant groups and individuals who make the movement -
and in time be made by it. This critica! skepticism enables the analyst to reflect on 
strategy-generating principles, on action-conditioning processes, as well as how 
agents, through micro-processes, make the movement's history. Moreover, 
Bourdieu's conceptualization of "capital", which can be read as an expansion of 
the Marxian notion of economic capital to social and cultural spheres, brings in a 
novel perspective: The analysis of the production, distribution and reproduction of 
symbolic capital within the political field of a specific social movement enables 
the researcher to investigate how group identities are made and remade, how their 
boundaries are shaped, how representation is contested and what the power 
balances are. Nevertheless, to the question of how the social is made possible, 
generative structuralism is only part of the answer which, perhaps, will never be 
wholly found. The theory will be revised and revised, and I believe that most 
significant revisions will result from empirical findings. 
Aside from the theoretical strengths offered by the adaptation of generative 
structuralism to the analysis of Alevism, the thesis, in its practical interrogations 
on Alevism, has limitations. For one thing, my discussion is limited with the 
political discourse associated with Alevism; I focus on the politics which is 
constructed using the rich cultural "material" found in various popular 
manifestations of Alevism. Therefore, although I try to expand on different trends 
of Alevi politics, I do not capture the heterogeneity and variety of Alevism's 
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anthropological dimension. As a result of centuries of histoncal existence, 
throughout the Turkish geography, quite distinct Alevisms exist, some of which, 
like urban Bektashism or like the Alevi community known as Tahtae lar, may 
represent quite different cultural diversities. However, when one focuses on how 
these groups' political interests are represented in the public sphere, it is hard to 
find the same diversity of voices. Given that there is a struggle for monopoly over 
the legitimate definitions of "w hat is political for Alevis" within the political field, 
and as a result of the unequal power balances, only certain groups are publicly 
visible and influential in Alevi politics. Of course, a more sophisticated 
methodology, broader than mere literature survey, might tell us about how 
different Alevi cultural identities exist within a comman political ageney (like 
Cem Vakf). 
Another limitation of the discussion of Alevism stems again from my choice 
of methodology: Although I try to reflect the political economic dimension in the 
power struggles within Alevi politics, the connection between my theoretical 
discussion of class and the practical etaboration of Alevi politics is not without 
problems. For one thing, those groups, like the Alevi underclass, whose voices are 
unheard in the public debates because of their disadvantaged class positions, are 
not thoroughly investigated. Because of time limits, it was difficult for me to 
picture Alevi class structure coherently, using a more extensive methodology. Y et 
as I try to argue, public events like Gazi uprisings, clashes between 
"establishment" Alevis and socialİst Alevis, carry the marks of how political 
agents embody their class belongingness. 
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In the final seetion of this chapter, I am going to try to offer a research 
agenda which is supposed to surpass such limitations. 
5.1 RESISTANCE AND ALEVISM 
Towards the end of the previous chapter, I have argued that affirmative, pro-
systemic elements within Alevi politics are likely to prevail. However, this does 
not mean that there is no resistance (rather than reaction) within Alevi politics. 
Perhaps it should quickly be remembered that throughout history, Alevi, 
K z lbl9 and the precedent communities these two have emerged from have 
been a minority among Sunni communities, and they have endured the most 
villainous persecutions from either state authorities or from other groups. 
Secondly, there are quite a lot of Alevis today, stili under the influence of the 
socialİst politicization of 1970s, who have developed anti-systemic, egalitarian, 
religiously non-dogmatic (if not altogether secular) dispositions, which sure carry 
destructuring potentials. Furthermore, relying on my personal (but quite limited) 
field experiences (and on what I have listened from other friends who have been 
interviewing Alevi families), I can observe that there are lots of "militant" Alevis, 
who speak, quite consistently, a leftist political language, criticizing both non-
recognition of the Alevi identity and class inequality. 
29 The word "K z lba " literally means "Red-headed"; the name was given to those heterodox 
religious groups following a mystical, egalitarian ethos in Anatolia and Minor Asia, led by 
dervishes. The followers wore red leather hats. K z lba groups were known from at least 131h 
century to 151h and 161h centuries and have played an important role in the dashes between Yavuz 
Sultan Selim (Ottomans) and Shah Isınail (Safawites). 
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On the other hand, there are a number of Alevi groups who try to revitalize 
a transformative "politics of redistribution", in order to abolish the class character 
of the Turkish society along with oppression emanating from identity conflict, but 
they are politically very weak. Collective action requires the gathering of not only 
subaltem Alevis; for the democratic goal of social justice and class equality, 
common principles are also needed, which would "ring a beli" in the minds of 
other disadvantaged groups. Today, it is unfortunate that radical leftist groups 
who preach freedom and equality (and who have a certain support within the 
Alevi youth), are (1) divided among themselves, condemning each other's 
political purposes, (2) stuck either with the necessity of armed struggle and 
violence, or with the necessity of an "iron cadre" which would lead the 
movement. 
I do not argue that Alevis actually suffer from class inequality the most, and 
that struggling for identity is meaningless. Yet rather, like all deprived Turkish 
citizens, many have embodied, as a result of the conditioning dynamics of the 
economic field, class inequalities, which, in combination with the dislike from the 
Sunni majority, enable a certain potential for protest and mobilization against the 
order. The trouble with this statement, on the other hand, is that unless a 
transformative way of politics is organized within a democratic and pluralist 
framework, subaltem Alevis will not find the chance to challenge the political and 
economic field and change their habitus. Bourdieu is right in stressing that social 
processes tend to follow predictable "rules" and produce predictable "strategies". 
Resistance, above everything, is difficult. I choose to stress, on the other hand, that 
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it is possible. 
W e can say that, given that religion, tradition and the "sacred" values 
adhered to the "nation" are quite strong in Turkey - so strong that the symbolic 
violence of the nationalİst ideal of "moderately Muslim, fully Turk" influences a 
large number of Turkish citizens today - there are emancipatory elements within 
Alevism as a religious syncretism, which, through politics, may help the Left in 
weakening this symbolic violence for democratic purposes. 
Consequently, I believe that the current "politics of recognition" prevalent 
in Alevism should be supplemented by a "politics of redistribution". If the Alevi 
working class and the worse-off members of the socioeconomic hierarchy suffer a 
second "face" of oppression because oftheir being-Alevi, then what is needed isa 
reconciliation of "class politics" with "identity politics". A form of politics w hi ch 
is content with defending only the cultural and religious boundaries of Alevism(s) 
cannot address contemporary economic problems. Moreover, this reconciliation is 
likely to help the movement ally with other oppositional groups, who share with 
Alevis in suffering from class inequality. 
However, with what actually goes on, it is diffıcult to be optimistic. After 
the 1 8 April elections, and making a general assessment of the current trends, it is 
hard to say that Alevi politics willlead to democratization. Of course, one should 
avoid social-engineering prophecies in the social sciences. Y et current trends, 
according to my limited observations, do not promise a democratic future for the 
Alevi communities. The dominant Alevi political group is marching slowly 
towards hegemony, preparing to establish its own "church", under the watchful 
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eyes of the dominant power groups. Y et anything can happen in the near future 
that would change the power balances. 
5.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Finally, after all my complaints about the limits of this thesis, I am going to draw 
attention to a number of suggestions for a field research on social movement 
politics in Turkey (not only limited with Alevism), a research which would use a 
generative structuralist toolbox. 
1) Levels of meaning construction: As I have briefly outlined in Seetion 4.2, 
public discourse, persuasive communication, and consciousness raising are three 
possible means of meaning construction for a social movement. While the first 
means can be analyzed us ing published data, the picturing of the other two means 
requires the co lleeti on of field data. First of all, common locations of meeting, if 
any exists, could be investigated and focus-group interviews or in-depth 
interviews may be carried out with the participants and sympathizers of the 
movement. Ho w is the symbolic ( cultural) capital specific to the movement 
reproduced, distributed and received? Through which channels? How does the 
movement "recruit"? Leading members of small associations and organizations 
may be interviewed, and their life histories ( along with those of the min or 
members) may lead us to determining how and why and which people participate. 
Focusing on this dimension in a field research also enables us to account for an 
Alevi anthropological diversity: Different historically-shaped forms of Alevism 
will have different ways of giving meaning to their religious (or perhap s, ethnic) 
identity as Alevis. 
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2) The political network: Here the structural elements of the movement, i ts 
way of organization, its inner hierarchy may be investigated. Where does the 
movement have its allies? Who are its defined enemies? Who are the 
representatives? How come have they arisen? How are the goals defined? What 
are the goals? This may require the studying of the rival groups within the 
movement, interviewing with these groups' representatives, and also asking minor 
militants their opinions about the "leaders" of the movement. Moreover, there are 
numerous levels of organization within a movement, so the researcher might track 
how certain forms of symbolic capital (political, religious or intellectual capital) 
circulates among different levels (for example, from the Central Committee to the 
lo cal cem house), and ho w these forms differ in content. Furthermore, the separate 
study of the political network may give an idea about ho w social capital within the 
movement is produced and distributed, how loyalty to the politicized Alevi 
identity and in-group socialization within the community proceeds. 
3) The limits ofthe movement: By consulting the history of the movement's 
activities, which are never separate from the country's specific histarical context, 
and also by investigating the impacts of certain activities of the movement on 
other different groups or elements in the country, we can have an idea about from 
where the movement has come and toward where it is heading. \Vhich goals have 
been achieved? What were the results? What hindered the achievement of other 
goals? Practically, various archives belonging to organizations of the movement 
(if there are any), archives of individual intellectuals (also interviews with them) 
who have given theoretical and practical support to the movement could be 
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researched. To determine the limits of the movement, it should be placed within 
the general field of power, i ts potentials would be largely constrained (or enabled) 
according to whom it opposes in what ways. At this dimension of research, a 
number of statistics might also be of use: Statistics about the economic and social 
status of the groups the movement claims to represent or statistics to determine 
the organizational power of the movement. Moreover, discourse analyses of 
various struggles within the movement would offer a clue to its limits and 
potentials, allowing the researcher to speculate about issues where the movement 
is at a loss, unable to act further, or issues which are frequently brought and 
discussed. 
I believe that, as a useful supplement to common approaches (like "resource 
mobilization", "rational choice", "difference" paradigms), generative 
structuralism is capable of b ringing in some different openings, especially through 
investigating the assumed or embodied symbolic structures that make a movement 
something that socially "moves". In the future, if I find the opportunity, I am 
planning to expand the horizons of the sociology of social movements ( especially 
those based on religion) by conducting field research from a generative · 
structuralist perspective as -rather primitively- introduced in this thesis. 
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